

Université de Montréal

Existential Criminology:
A Profile of Phantom Killers

Par
Stephen M. Steck

Département d'études anglaises
Faculté des arts et des sciences

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Cette thèse intitulée:

Existential Criminology:
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présentée par:

Stephen M. Steck

a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:

[Redacted Name]

président-rapporteur

[Redacted Name]

directeur de recherche

[Redacted Name]

membre du jury

[Redacted Name]

examineur externe

[Redacted Name]

représentant du doyen de la FES



Résumé de synthèse



Après avoir situés les éléments principaux du modèle de psychanalyse existentielle de Jean-Paul Sartre au sein du modèle criminologique de socialisation violente de Lonnie H. Athens, mon projet essaye principalement d'équiper les profileurs de société avec les outils nécessaires à l'identification des conspirateurs légitimes qui hantent les chemins interprétatifs de la création violente. Afin de donner une définition précise de ces individus isolés qui se trouvent bloqués dans l'imagination de l'isolation, et qui existent comme exceptions uniques en dehors du modèle existentiel criminologue d'interaction social constante, des amplifications simultanées de la notion d' « Autre » par Sartre et de la désignation de « communauté fantôme » d'Athens apparaissent comme une nécessité inévitable. Un supplément théorique révèle ainsi de manière évidente les motivateurs situationnels cruciaux qui surviennent suite à ce que j'appelle « makeshift phantom consultants », dont l'existence a été suggérée par des différents chercheurs sur la violence et les amusements à travers les siècles et dont l'identité est exacerbée par ce que Frank Lentricchia et Jody McAuliffe appellent le « désir artistique transgressif ». En définitive, une combinaison intégrante des faits et de la fiction saillants permet aux profileurs de s'équiper avec non seulement les outils nécessaires mais aussi les armes créatives requises afin de démontrer comment la criminologie existentielle résurrectée, l'intégration des théories de Sartre et d'Athens, en plus de la contribution de Lentricchia et McAuliffe et ma délinéation personnelle, sert à démystifier les motivateurs correspondants derrière les manifestations agressivement violente et transgressivement artistique.

Mots clés: Existentialisme, psychanalyse criminologue, interaction symbolique, écriture de prison, déviance, violence, activisme

Abstract

Upon situating the core elements of Jean-Paul Sartre's model of existential psychoanalysis within Lonnie H. Athens's criminological model of violent socialization, my project specifically endeavours to equip unrelated societal profilers with the tools necessary to identify the legitimate co-conspirators haunting the interpretive channels of violent creation. In order to accurately assess those isolated individuals interpretively trapped inside the isolation of imagination, and who exist as unique exceptions outside the existential-criminological model of consistent social interaction, simultaneous amplifications to both Sartre's notion of "the Other" and Athens's designation of "the phantom community" present themselves as inevitable necessities. A theoretically-amended appendage thus convincingly reveals the crucial situational motivators imparted by what I have deemed "makeshift phantom consultants," whose existence has been suggested by disparate entertainment-violence researchers over the centuries, and whose identity has been fuelled by what Frank Lentricchia and Jody McAuliffe have designated "transgressive artistic desire." In the end, an integrative melding of the resounding facts and fictions permit profilers to equip themselves with not only the necessary tools but the creative weapons required to demonstrate how existential criminology resurrected, the integration of Sartrean and Athenian theories, in addition to Lentricchia and McAuliffe's realization and my own informed delineation, serves to demystify the corresponding propellers behind aggressively violent and transgressively artistic manifestations alike.

Key words: Existentialism, Existential Psychoanalysis, Criminology, symbolic interactionism, Prison Writing, deviance, violence, activism

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Introduction

"The knowledge that our many sciences discover is not forbidden in and of itself. But the human agents who pursue that knowledge have never been able to stand apart from or control or prevent its application to our lives."

Roger Shattuck, *Forbidden Knowledge* (225)

"But naturally, you can't always be reasonable."

Albert Camus, *The Stranger* (111)

The year was 1980 and the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences was being held in Oklahoma City. A novice criminologist and conference participant by the name of Allen Sapp, awarded his doctorate from Sam Houston State University that very year, had just finished delivering a paper entitled "Existential Criminology: Responsibility and Meaning in Criminal Behavior." If there had been a single round of applause, nobody seemed to hear it, and if there had been a single shred of peer approval, nobody wanted to voice it. Unfortunately, young Allen's predominantly positivistic counterparts and competitors had felt nothing short of an affront, as though the idealistic greenhorn not merely spoke on the existential individual's potential connection to criminality but somehow sullied academic airspace with taboo. Over twenty-five years later, the now seasoned Dr. Sapp, so as to appease the incessant contact efforts of a determined doctoral candidate confident in the Sartrean existential and suspicious of the contemporary criminological, succinctly relays why his theory had been discarded so vehemently: "They told me: 'Existentialism is a philosophy, *not* a theory of criminal behavior'" ("Re: Existential Criminology Query" n. pag.).

The evaluative synopsis apparently stopped the would-be trailblazer dead in his tracks:

I did not pursue the issue after that paper received no support or encouragement. However, a few years later, the hottest thing in criminological theory was "Rational Choice Theory," which is nothing more than what I claimed--criminal behavior is free will, a series of choices one makes from available options." (Sapp, "Re: Existential Criminology Query" n. pag.)

That observation inevitably brings to mind the controversial criminologist Richard Quinney, who, beyond being linked to the labelling tradition of crime and criminology, has been tagged an existential dreamer in a field wherein Sartre's Other and Camus's absurd are still childish distractions best left to the insignificantly artistically inclined. Dr. Quinney recalls his detractors in a poignant piece published in *The Critical Criminologist* in 1994. Reminiscing about the shift in ontology that had taken place during the 1960s, he reflects on the bittersweet:

In those days, I was trying to make my own song. One result was a book I called *The Social Reality of Crime* (1970). Shortly after its publication. Taylor, Walton, and Young, in their influential book *The New Criminology*, wrote about my efforts: "Many of Quinney's statements about a theoretical orientation to the social reality of crime seem to be the product more of the author's own existential angst than they are the result

of clear-headed theoretical analysis.” [...] My questioning of the conventional scientific enterprise took further attack from Robert Merton in his book *Sociological Ambivalence*. He wrote: [...] “Such total subjectivism conceives of social reality as consisting only in social definitions, perceptions, labels, beliefs, assumptions, or ideas, as expressed, for example, in full generality by the criminological theorist, Richard Quinney, when he writes that ‘We have no reason to believe in the objective existence of anything.’” (n. pag.)

Outcast criminologists in the vein of Sapp and Quinney are much braver than their critics have imagined, which is a designation people in the philosophical sciences can authoritatively make after being strong-armed into drawing the most fundamental line in the current analytical sand: Freud or Sartre? The unconscious or the conscious? Psychological shackles or self-created freedoms? Until stumbling upon the violentization process and primary interlocutors as proposed by American Criminologist Dr. Lonnie H. Athens, there did not appear any logical support or opportunity for middle ground. Before proceeding momentarily to Athens, as well as the crucial aspects of Sartre, let us ponder what remains the fatal contradictory flaw in a purist’s brand of existential criminology. Quinney marvels:

How can we know for certain of the existence of anything, including existence itself? The mind is the grand piano which provides the space for the mice--our thoughts--to play. We humans cannot step outside of our

existence. And we cannot know, in the larger scheme of things, or non-things, if the grand piano is other than a dream. The dream of a cosmic dreamer. Why not? (n. pag.)

While flippant to suggest that a question begged is a question begging to be answered, Quinney apparently invites the same criticism that Sartre himself became so well acquainted with, anticipated dismissals justified by what Merton deems to be an existentialist's vague generality. Sapp once proclaimed that criminal behavior is a rational choice accompanied by individual will; Quinney equates the individual's interpretive channels to the indeterminate keys of a "grand piano," one that might not actually exist. It appears that a lingering question mark *might* support responsibility or *perhaps* "cosmic" excuses shrouded in mystery and based on the caveats life *might not* possess. Why not?

Because, if ever a discipline did exist wherein specificity and exactitude must be status quo, it is the study of criminal human behaviour. There cannot be any exceptions to the rule, however intricately crafted a system might be, and even one miniscule blemish equals a model that must be reassessed as quickly as the case study that shatters the mould. At times, students and teachers of literature can afford to be dead wrong, to espouse theories and revised inversions that throngs of dissimilar poets snicker at yet give credit to for some sense of distinctive aestheticism. However, it remains impossible to afford the same luxury to contemporary criminologists if they are to fathom the authentic propellers behind dangerous violent acts and actors. Rational-choice theory, essentially

intent on sharpening and elaborating B.F. Skinner's and then Hans Eysenck's assertion that criminal acts are made from realistic choices "given the possibility of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain" (Innes 208),¹ exists in itself as a crucial layover for an integrative call-to-arms. Nevertheless, based on the aforementioned charge of vague generality, this particular brand of profiling should only be digested as a springboard toward the specific.

Even candid 'free will' experts themselves, such as Stephen G. Tibbetts and Chris L. Gibson, have acknowledged and alluded to necessary exterior forces by insisting that "our understanding of the etiology of criminal offending depends on the creativity and persistence of our fellow criminologists in examining individual perceptions of the costs and benefits of criminal activity" (19). At the mere mention of the word "creativity," it has been made abundantly clear who is *not* being invited to participate in the future of criminological debate; ironically, the very same practitioners who maintain either Freudian or biologically bound strangleholds on the rationale deemed acceptable for deviant exploration. Therefore, it is useful at this stage to be acquainted with the contemporary psychologists and scientists eternally devoted to the unconscious, chromosomes, testosterone, or any other pre-determinant contributing to the erasure of man's individual choice.

Deciphering and overcoming "The Coppelia Complex," as proposed by Dr. Roger Shattuck in *Forbidden Knowledge*, represents a technically-minded quest and question:

In the E.T.A. Hoffmann story “The Sandman,” Nathanael finally loses his mind because the dancing doll Coppelia, which he has mistaken for a real flesh-and-blood woman, alerts him to the possibility that he, too, may be a mechanical being, a robot. For Nathanael, the bottom drops out of both reality and identity. In despair, he throws himself from a tower. Molecular biology and socio-biology treat our essential functions as determined and take no account of consciousness and free will. Are we all dancing dolls without knowing it? (Shattuck 219-220)

According to any interpretation of deviant human behaviour rooted in the unconscious, invisible puppeteers are most certainly in charge. However, the masses are still waiting to hear precisely who or what these forces consist of and precisely to what extent they convincingly contribute to either aggressive or violent practices. In *Profile of a Criminal Mind: How Psychological Profiling Solves True Crimes*, the biochemist Brian Innes refers to analytic stagnation by informing his readers that “a great deal of present-day psychological explanations of the development of violent or sexually deviant personalities remain rooted in Freudian theories” (199). Innes subsequently concludes that loyalists intent on the irreducible must readily acknowledge that even the most precise study of the unconscious remains unable to “take into consideration many other factors that lead to a criminal personality” (199).

While the nineteenth-century Italian Psychiatrist Cesare Lombroso has been credited with developing the first scientific theory of “criminal man,”²

modern-day profilers have abandoned the idea that physiognomy and congenital weakness possess the crucial answers that we seek herein. Nevertheless, it should be noted that “the lengthy intellectual history of criminology has been dominated by the belief that physical features are external signs of inner and spiritual darkness” (Beirne 187). As a result, society has not yet entirely abandoned the geneticists who deem that the study of chromosomes has the potential to allocate and elucidate future human conduct. As the Canadian criminologist Neil Boyd recounts in *The Beast Within*:

In the 1960s research into the linkage between violent crime and biology became more sophisticated, drawing upon the burgeoning discipline of genetics. Researcher Patricia Jacobs reported that a disproportionately large percentage of violent men in Scottish prisons had an extra Y chromosome—a genetic anomaly that affects about one in a thousand men in the general population. Women typically inherit two X chromosomes and men an X and a Y chromosome; in these exceptional cases men receive two Y chromosomes. Jacobs and her colleagues, in their survey of several Scottish jails, found ten to twenty times as many men with the extra Y chromosome as would have been anticipated. They described these XYY chromosome males as “double” males or “super” males and suggested that such men were taller than average and more inclined to criminal behaviour. (101)

Precisely due to the “exceptional cases” XYY chromosome males present to the

overall study of deviant human behaviour, this line of enquiry, ill-equipped to account for any and all exceptions to the rule, must be penalized for imprecision much like Freud and his predecessors.

As Andrews and Bonta confirm in *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct*, “the existence of the XYY anomaly is extremely rare in the general population (less than 1%), and it links weakly with criminality and not at all with violence” (166). Moreover, in regards to the proponents of testosterone-fuelled analyses of aggressive behaviour, Hoffmann’s dancing doll can be considered a raging bull set in motion. However, vague generality and the testosterone/aggression connection go hand in hand as one must instantaneously reject the notion that hormones *unfailingly* control human function and consequence. Boyd cites at least three major problems with correlating adrenaline levels and human brutality:

First, when athletes and others intentionally increase the levels of testosterone in their bodies by a factor of four or more, there are no reliable data to suggest that they become more aggressive. Second, when testosterone levels are increased for medical reasons, for a range of conditions, there are no data to support increased aggression. And third, when violent men and non-violent men are compared, testosterone does not appear to have any consistent relevance. (135)

We have already established that a theory or process aimed at fathoming the motivations behind turbulent behaviour must be entirely precise and able to account for divergent individual acts and actors. The scientific profilers who

claim that they have achieved a functioning line of enquiry have either lost sight of our common goal or submitted themselves to unbalanced statistics that to this day remain more suggestive than determinative.

Is it in fact possible to discover *the* true causation behind deviant aggressive performance? If one breaks away from the preconceived and popular, the answer remains “affirmative.” However, let us consider our specific investigation’s overarching goals and then go back in time so as to explain how and why the leap from existential to rational choice to our new coordinates has been made. Any remaining sceptics should heed a suggestion by a violent Italian thinker or their time reading this thesis will be Hell: “Wherefore I think and discern this for thy best, that thou follow me; and I will be thy guide, and lead thee hence through an eternal place” (Alighieri 14).

Upon situating the core elements of Jean-Paul Sartre’s model of existential psychoanalysis within Lonnie Athens’s criminological model of violentization, criminal profilers shall unmask the legitimate interlocutors haunting the interpretive channels of aggressive human performance. So as to accurately assess those unique individual exceptions outside this existential model of violent interaction—those interpretively trapped inside the isolation of imagination—a simultaneous amplification to both Sartre’s notion of “the Other” and Athens’s designation of “the phantom community” presents itself as an inevitable necessity. A theoretical appendage convincingly reveals the crucial situational motivators imparted by what we shall call *makeshift phantom consultants*

regarding not only the possible motivations of violent individual offenders but also transgressive individual artists. An interdisciplinary melding thus permits individuals to equip themselves with the tools necessary to demonstrate how existential criminology resurrected, the integration of Sartrean and Athenian theories, in addition to the informed delineation of makeshift phantom consultants, points to a potential demystification of the corresponding propellers behind aggressively violent and transgressively artistic expression alike.

Those outside of current criminological enquiry deserve to pose at least three questions: What is violentization? What is the phantom community? Who or what is the makeshift phantom consultant? Those outside of twentieth-century philosophical theory deserve to pose at least one question: What is existential psychoanalysis? While the relevant tenets of Sartre's existentialism and applied psychoanalysis will be elucidated in chapter one and three, a better acquaintance with Dr. Lonnie H. Athens is required at this stage.

In Dr. Richard Restak's "The Great Cerebroscope Controversy," a satirical critique of the neuro-biological stance on violent behaviour, introductions are being made at a fictitious meeting of the National Institutes of Health (NIH):

Moderator: Before we get into the neuroscience, let's hear from a man who has interviewed and studied more violent people than anyone else alive. Lonnie H. Athens is a criminologist with two qualifications for understanding and explaining violence. First, he speaks from experience: As a young child Athens regularly suffered violent beatings at the hands of

his father. Second, Athens, in his capacity as one of the nation's foremost criminologists, spent more than 30 years interviewing hundreds of violent people. In those interviews, Athens discerned a pattern. Violent people are violent because they incorporate the attitudes and values of other violent people they have been exposed to. This "phantom community," as Athens puts it, is the "hidden source of emotions like fear, anger, hate and love. It also provides a skewed interpretation of people and situations that serves to justify violence in the eyes of the violent offender." [...] As I understand it, Mr. Athens believes that violent criminals, as a result of early exposure to violence, interpret their world different from their non-violent neighbours and that their violence emerges from these different interpretations. (Restak 80-81)

The process of violentization explains *how* an individual becomes a dangerous violent offender. The individual's phantom community explains *why*. And whereas Restak's moderator is merely a fantastically contrived character, one Lonnie Athens is most certainly not. He is a former protégé of the University of Chicago's Herbert Blumer and a staunch subscriber to the symbolic-interactionist approach to criminological thought.³

As Blumer restates in the introduction to Athens's third major work, *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*:

It may be that a new approach is in order, one that comes closer to the detection and study of violent behavior as it actually takes place in the

empirical world. This is essentially the lead that underlies the present work of Dr. Lonnie Athens, [as] he has sought in a pioneering effort to approach the study of violent criminal behavior from the point of view that has come to be known as “symbolic interactionism.” (4)

The foundation supporting this “point of view” remains “the premise that human action takes place always in a situation that confronts the actor and that the actor acts on the basis of *defining this situation* that confronts him” (Blumer 4). Beyond the complement to Sapp and Quinney, for those comfortably versed in Sartre, immediate connections should become clear. In a designated chapter from the 1943 work *Being and Nothingness*, a precursor and theoretical counterpart to symbolic interactionism was originally evoked in Sartre’s postulation that his own unique brand of existential psychoanalysis rejects the notion that the “environment acts mechanically on the subject under consideration. The environment can act on the subject only to the exact extent that he comprehends it; that is, transforms it into a situation” (*Existential Psychoanalysis* 54). Therefore, like Athens, and contrary to long-held beliefs of disparate critics, Sartre concerns himself with the real by deducing the reality of a subject’s intimate circumstances: “Hence no objective description of this environment could be of any use to us. [...] By renouncing all mechanical causation, we renounce at the same time all *general* interpretation of the symbolization confronted” (*Existential Psychoanalysis* 55).

Athens’s second significant work on human behaviour, *The Creation of*

Dangerous Violent Offenders, contains essential case studies linked to individualistically geared analyses of situations. Sartre's second major work of existential biography, *Saint Genet*, contains an essential case study linked to individualistically geared analyses of situations. Moreover, it is not sheer coincidence that the stages of development locatable in both texts, which will be compared and elucidated in chapters one and three, symbolically prompt a comprehension of the "deviant" individual's own active and interpretive roles. Sartre, the existential humanist, and Athens, the symbolic interactionist, have actually taken it upon themselves to scrutinize those clues first proposed in 1893 by the pioneer of profiling, Dr. Hans Gross,⁴ in *Criminal Investigation*: In any formal investigation of crime, "every conversation, every concise statement, every word thrown out by chance, every action, every aspiration, every trait of character, every item of conduct, [and] every look or gesture" (Gross 146) should be scrutinized. In short, everything that relates to the individual's *specific* situation.

In addition to Sartre and Athens, Michel Foucault,⁵ in his essay "About the Concept of the Dangerous Individual in Nineteenth-Century Legal Psychiatry," legitimately ponders if violent acts can be grasped by acknowledging the existence of "designated" violent offenders. He asks: "By what signs can they be recognized, and how can one react to their presence?" ("About the Concept" 198). Foucault, like Gross, provides a methodical solution through choice words by insisting that "there must be confession, self-examination, explanation of oneself,

[and a] revelation of what one is” (“About the Concept” 177) if one is to comprehend our legacy of planetary ferocity. Proceeding an examination of the first two stages in Athens’s Violentization process as detailed in both *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders* and “Violentization in Larger Social Context,” as well as their correspondence to the core elements of Sartre’s existential humanism as detailed in the first two stages of metamorphosis outlined in *Saint Genet*, the second chapter of this thesis concerns itself with assessing, comparing, and updating Athens’s crucial theory of the phantom community as well as Sartre’s demarcation of the Other.

While it seems that both the criminologist and the philosopher have derived their concepts from the theory first proposed by the philosopher and social psychologist George Herbert Mead,⁶ it also appears that Athens’s and Sartre’s perceptions of influential others are too extreme: the former for its rigidly narrow postulation of who or what constitutes an individual’s primary group members; and the latter for its flaccidly broad postulation of the individual’s predominantly figurative relationship with secondary and even third-rate group members. Ironically, Sartre himself has insisted on that which he falls a tad short of explicating:

What we are demanding then [...] is a *veritable* irreducible; that is, an irreducible of which the irreducibility would be self-evident, which would not be presented as the postulate of the psychologist and the result of his refusal or his incapacity to go further, but which when established would

produce in us an accompanying feeling of satisfaction. (*Existential Psychoanalysis* 27)

While the specificity of Athens's phantom other remains the most convincing update to Mead's theory of provisional interlocutors, twenty-first-century profilers, intimately acquainted with the interpretive imaginations of isolated individuals, have unearthed the only "consultants" missing from Athens's phantom conception.

James P. Steyer provides an insight into an oxymoron, or, the authentic fictive interlocutors that comprise primary communities for a myriad of isolated individuals locked into post-modern reality:

American kids now spend 40 percent less time with their parents than kids did in the mid-sixties. That's right, *40 percent* less time—just seventeen hours a week total with their parents, down from thirty hours in 1965. At the same time, they spend *far more than double* that amount of time—more than forty hours per week on average—staring at the tube or the computer screen. listening to the radio or CDS, and playing video games. Now, which is the parent in the picture? (4)

Steyer has directly alluded to this investigation's appendage, makeshift phantom consultants. Clearly, the support for such a formulation and supplement to the primary group transcends scientific observation:

If another person spent five or six hours a day with your kids, regularly exposing them to sex, violence, and rampantly commercial values, you

would probably forbid that person to have further contact with them. Yet most of us passively allow the media to expose our kids routinely to these same behaviours—sometimes worse—and do virtually nothing about it. (Steyer 5)

Alas, this problematic issue simply remains steeped in common sense and substantiated logic. By the end of the second chapter, an unveiling of makeshift phantom consultants will be conducted and then supported by an evaluative synthesis of dissimilar textual materials that appraise the imaginary or fictitious other's influence on the isolated individual's interpretations.

In *Media Violence and Its Effect on Aggression*, an implied rejection of the makeshift phantom consultant has been posited:

Films and television programs that contain violence are not designed to convey the message that violence is good or that people should engage in violent acts. They do not contain information that is likely to convince anyone of anything; they do not contain explicit messages in favour of aggression or violence. (Freedman 204)

Two imperative problems with this observation present themselves as questions: Who can say or legitimately verify that aggressive artistic expression is not intentional? And since when does the intention of a model have anything to do with the way it is digested or interpreted by dissimilar individuals? Thus Brewster Ghiselin's introduction to *The Creative Process* exposes an undeniable caveat:

The alien, the dangerous, like the negligible near thing, may seem

irrelevant to purpose and yet the call to our own fruitful development. This does not mean that we should surrender to whatever novelty is brought to attention. It does mean that we must practice to some extent an imaginative surrender to every novelty that has even the most tenuous credentials. Because life is larger than any of its expressions, it must sometimes do violence to the forms it has created. (31)

In the end, and due to the fact that today's violent expressions have become larger than life, our fathoming of makeshift phantom consultants will sanction us to understand, in a credible manner, the analogous violentization processes undergone by the violent offender and the transgressive artist.

Undoubtedly, the Marquis de Sade's "principle of delicacy" will always apply to the enraged killer and the outraged artist alike.⁷ However, if the choices we make spring from our interpretation of available options, as the existentialists, rational-choice experts, and symbolic-interactionists collectively reinforce, then the emaciated line that separates those who pick up a gun or knife and those who pick up a pen or brush has never even existed; at least, not for all *motivational* intents and purposes. "What?" asks Nietzsche. "A great man? I always see only the actor of his own ideal" (*Beyond Good & Evil* 83). If it were not for the uncontrollable limitations imposed on individuals by smaller stature, slow reflexes, fits of panic or physical handicap, who knows how many more physical horrors our society would have to endure?

Accordingly, the third chapter of this thesis examines an inspired hybrid of

violence, and relies upon Frank Lentricchia and Jody McAuliffe's pseudo-original theory of "transgressive artistic desire" from their 2004 work *Crimes of Art + Terror*. This particular form of deliberated aggression "is desire not to violate within a regime of culture [...] but desire to stand somehow outside, so much the better to violate and subvert the regime itself" (*Crimes of Art + Terror* 2). Proceeding an examination of the final two stages in Athens's Violentization process as detailed in both 1989's *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders* and 2003's "Violentization in Larger Social Context"—as well as their correspondence to the core elements of Sartre's existential humanism as detailed in the final two stages of metamorphosis outlined in 1952's *Saint Genet*—this aspect of the investigation does not concern itself with the physical violentization process and the dangerous violent individual who undergoes it. Rather, the focus shifts onto the transgressive artistic process and the imaginatively aggressive individual who undergoes it.

Although this correlation might appear ostentatious to some, it has nonetheless been under serious consideration since at least the eighteenth century. For instance, Thomas De Quincey's "Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts"⁸ melded the killer and the artist by conceiving of a scenario where murder experts congregated and deliberated on acts of violence in the same manner that art experts congregate and deliberate on particular paintings. Since De Quincey was apparently seeking "an almost aesthetic appreciation" of transgressive expression (Gaute and Odell 16), a labelling of Lentricchia and McAuliffe's

theory as pseudo-original is warranted as their arguments have been admittedly borrowed from dissimilar profilers and profiles. They have even conceded that their “thoughts about art are old, old thoughts, and [they], not being especially professional, are probably guilty of being amateurs, in the root sense of the word” (“Interview” n. pag.). Fortunately, Lentricchia and McAuliffe can commiserate with positivistic criminologists. They too have collected “old, old thoughts” and proved through scientific and psychological stagnation that even experts can be “guilty of being amateurs, in the root sense of the word.”

While the prison writings of Jean Genet, as well as the philosophical theories buttressing Sartrean existentialism, are recognized by European outcasts as authoritative catalysts for their own artistically aggressive expressions, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* has been designated a makeshift phantom consultant to throngs of American criminal artists intent on exploring their own imaginatively radical outlets.⁹ “After the assassination of Malcolm,” writes H. Bruce Franklin, “prison writers acknowledged him as both their political and spiritual leader: he is conventionally compared to Moses, Jesus, even Allah” (*Prison Writing* 148). “In a sense,” adds Angela Y. Davis, “the feeling that Malcolm had conjured in me could finally acquire a mode of expression—collective, activist, and, I hoped, transformative” (*An Autobiography* 290). Accordingly, the fourth chapter of this thesis introduces *hardened criminology*, an unofficial field of criminological enquiry that consists of prison writers’ philosophically transgressive investigations into the harsh realities of the

prison-industrial-complex.

By integrating the hardened criminologist's seasoned narratives, both concretely and fictitiously demonstrative, into Athens' own sociologically-based assessment of embedded violence in major and minor communities, it becomes abundantly clear that the most authoritative voice on human violence belongs to those who have undergone *both* the physical and the artistic violentization process. Athens's specific designation of malignant communities undeniably transforms into a lucid magnification under the lenses of hardened profilers trapped inside the most sadistic subculture, as prison writers have always felt compelled to provide more than symbolic mirrors reflecting our own hypocritical natures. These unique expert-participants provide a behind-the-scenes look into the patriarchal keepers and reapers controlling both internal and external communities and authentically illustrate how the problem of violence, at both individual and institutional levels, cannot be left to the original perpetrators of a warped patrimonial legacy bound to perpetuating lopsided power. As Nietzsche forewarns: "What a time experiences as evil is usually an untimely echo of what was formerly experienced as good--the atavism of a more ancient ideal" (*Beyond Good and Evil* 90). Chapter four thereby eerily concludes with a comparison of the current American inter-prisoner power hierarchy and the penal power structure that existed in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. The horrifying parallel ultimately discloses an equally horrific individual reality in that specific situations transform with immediate settings whereas violent models remain

perfectly intact.

Finally, so as to situate humanity's fusion and confusion with phantoms, the imagination, and the real, the present investigation would be incomplete if it did not point to possible alternative solutions on top of an overview of feasible theorems and foreseeable consequences. (Athens himself asserts: "A theory with no policy implications is sterile, whereas a policy not guided by any explicit theory is foolhardy" [*Violent Criminal Acts* 155]). The conclusion must also re-establish the original relationship that once existed between criminology, institutions, and narratives. Nothing other than a literature of the specific, a viable criminology relies on the narratives of criminals and their crimes lest the field (and all hope) perish. Is criminology *the* microcosm of literature as prison is *the* microcosm of society? Interpretations abound. Still, the criminal expert and historian Colin Wilson has insisted that it is actually Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes who should be credited with paving the criminological way. Seeing as though Sherlock Holmes first appeared in 1887, twelve years prior to the publication of Lombroso's *L'Uomo Delinquente*, this is not mere conjecture.

Consequently, informed ontological detectives should keep in mind that not all is elementary:

Holmes's ideal remains unrealized—a survey of criminality that should be far more than a mere list of crimes and criminals, yet which should also be more human in its essence than that rather academic branch of social science known as criminology. What seems to have fascinated Holmes is

the feeling that there must be *underlying patterns* that have been so far unrecognized. And such patterns must obviously lie in the mind of the murderer, as well as in his social environment. But how does one go about recognizing them? (Wilson 10)

One goes about recognizing them by investigating violent phantom models, anticipating Sartre, memorizing Athens, and reading onward. It remains fitting that the first existential criminologist was Sherlock Holmes, a makeshift phantom consultant conjured by Doyle and then released, interpreted, and taught by criminality experts such as Dr. Joseph Bell, Doyle's instructors at the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, and even Dr. Edmond Locard, a pioneer in contemporary forensic science.¹⁰ Indubitably more than a mere overview of the major findings that proceed this investigation into violence and the isolation of imagination, the concluding chapter, like the overarching project itself, exists as a challenge to any and all profilers and literary critics who practice bad faith.

Chapter One:
Existential Criminology Revisited

“Existentialism is an attempt to understand man, it is a doctrine of human life; and it certainly contains a sense of tragedy. But perhaps most of all existentialism is an offering to mankind of an alternative way of viewing man, his nature, and the human condition.”

Dr. Allen Sapp, “Existential Criminology: Responsibility and Meaning in Criminal Behavior” (3)

“If we could fly out that window hand in hand, hover over this great city, gently remove the roofs, and peep in at the queer things which are going on, the strange coincidences, the plannings, the cross-purposes, the wonderful chain of events, working through generations, and leading to the most *outré* results, it would make all fiction with its conventionalities and foreseen conclusions most stale and unprofitable.”

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *A Case of Identity* (134)

Many people experience anger, jealousy, resentment, or embarrassment, and entertain the possibility of taking some kind of aggressive recourse. Indeed, to deny the existence of our Darwinian impulses remains to this day an entirely foolish endeavour. Yet while some people merely contemplate action, others are quick to lash out. Therefore, the question must be posed: How can certain individuals bring themselves to physically perpetrate the violence others merely contemplate? David Berkowitz, better known as The Son of Sam,¹¹ begins his autobiographical-essay with the dubious claim: “The Devil made me into a murderer” (n. pag.). The Pulitzer-Prize-Winning-Author Richard Rhodes locates media taglines specifically designed to disturb: “a senseless murder;” “no apparent motive;” “he just snapped;” “an explosive outburst;” “we will probably never know why” (*Why They Kill* 67-68). Although the proceeding chapter will examine that *why*, let us demystify precisely *how* the violent offender behind the sensational headlines, satanic or otherwise, comes to be capable of perpetrating aggressive acts.

The mistake would be to introduce Sartre's existential psychoanalysis first and then proceed to extract the commonalities within Athens's process of violent socialization (hence, "violentization"). Although Sartre was born forty-five years before Athens, this is not a simple case of superseding seniority. For existential criminology to be revisited thoroughly and presented credibly, one must begin by understanding the first two stages of development as proposed by the succinct criminologist, Athens, and then proceed to elucidate the first two stages of metamorphosis as proposed by the admittedly prolix existentialist, Sartre. However, so as to perceive the specific rationale fuelling the overall study herein under consideration, let us address a few sequential exceptions:

As the evil action wills itself as pure destruction, when you have reduced its perpetrator to being only a *case*, only an illustration of contemporary society, there remains no residue; the crime is the criminal's failure. The culprit considers his act, that highly individual act which changes into a universal before his eyes, and he no longer recognizes it. The stupidest murderers will be content with muttering until the day of their execution:

"I don't understand what I did." (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 235-36)

Clearly, to discard the individual's own violent interpretation of self and render that person "statistic-worthy" remains an act of bad faith and potentially hazardous to everyone's health.¹² That stated, there are many aspects of Sartre's existential biography of Genet that will be and should be left out of this particular work.

Since we will be paralleling existential psychoanalysis as it has been applied to the criminal artist, much of our immediate task relies on filtering out the self-indulgently superfluous passages that pervade Sartre's massive ontological case study. Citing an intentional overkill, Susan Sontag describes *Saint Genet* upon conception as "a cancer of a book, grotesquely verbose, its cargo of brilliant ideas borne aloft by a tone of viscous solemnity and by ghastly repetitiveness" (441). Indeed, it does legitimately appear as though Sartre has taken Gross's judgment from *System der Criminality*, that "everything in life can be utilized," and somehow transformed it into a mere launch-pad for further exploration.

The other aspect of Sartre that will not be credited herein has been suggested by Loren Ringer in *Saint Genet Decanonized*. Ringer justifiably accuses Sartre of making unsupported fantastical claims about homosexuality and, more specifically, Genet's own sexual predilections in terms of his real and fictitious characters: "Sartre continues to play the role of the indignant heterosexual male who nearly starts to hallucinate when, titillated by Genet's 'dirty books,' he witnesses Genet's brawny boys wax androgynous" (46). This tendency to "hallucinate" actually evokes what is perhaps the principal motive for leading with Athens and solidifying through Sartre, namely, the latter's arguably inaccessible assemblage of thought; or, that which has prohibited serious interdisciplinary investigations into existential psychoanalysis and its potential applications outside the field of clinical psychiatry.¹³ Whereas Athens provides a

chronologically sound process in terms of narrative straightforwardness, Sartre's logistical model has the tendency to annihilate time and sequence at will which inevitably "turns into a kind of momentary departure from the narration. There is a point here beyond which our analysis cannot pass." (Jameson 120).

In actuality, the present work can escape from Sartre's verbose quicksand by discarding the insignificant grains and reassembling his findings in and through the chronological stages of metamorphosis originally posited via *Saint Genet's* table-of-contents. Nevertheless, one should never confuse discarding insignificant observations with discarding passages that appear to be riddled with riddles. Consider one of Sartre's more tame examples:

The metamorphosis occurs immediately. He is nothing more than what he was before, yet he is now unrecognizable. Driven from the lost paradise, exiled from childhood, from the immediate, condemned to see himself, suddenly provided with a monstrous and guilty "ego," isolated, separated, in short changed into a bug. An evil principle dwelt in him unperceived, and now it has been discovered. It is this principle which is the source of everything. It produces the slightest impulses of his soul. (*Saint Genet* 18)

With an aesthetic dash of Kafka,¹⁴ Sartre is in fact referring here to the myth of Jean Genet's original crisis, wherein Genet has been labelled a thief by his Mother and thus objectified by the Other and condemned to play his role for eternity in a liturgical drama. The metamorphosis entails an inward blow that does not actually transform (à la Ovid) young Genet into an insect but actually announces his

Sartrean identity as “living dead man” condemned to the freedom that accompanies the severance and amalgamation of being in-itself/for-itself.¹⁵ Why a seemingly mythical account of Genet’s initial becoming deserves to be allocated alongside serious criminological enquiry is due to its correspondence to Athens’ first stage of violentization, designated “brutalization.” As Athens explicates in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders*:

Brutalization is a composite experience consisting of three more elemental experiences: *violent subjugation*, *personal horrification*, and *violent coaching*. Although these three experiences are all different from each other in certain important concrete respects, on a more abstract plane there is a real and indisputable unity between them. They all involve in their own way people undergoing coarse and cruel treatment at the hands of others that produces a lasting and dramatic impact upon the subsequent course of their lives. Thus, these experiences may be thought of as constituting a trilogy. (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 27)

Whereas Athens succeeds in presenting the case studies of those who have violent inclinations and are able to physically act on them, Sartre succeeds in providing a case study of a man who has taken his violent inclinations and transformed them into alternative manifestations of hostility. Therefore, let us initially examine Athens’s conceptions of violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching prior to revisiting the initial act of metamorphosis as detailed in *Saint Genet*.

Proceeding disparate evaluations of Sarnoff Mednick's study of the indices of the autonomic nervous system (and its connection to the bio-physiological theory of the making of dangerous violent actors), as well as Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti's investigation into the variance of occurrences of aggressive criminality (and its connection to the social-environmental theory of the making of dangerous violent actors),¹⁶ Athens presents the overarching argument fuelling his own investigation:

The key to this discovery will not come through developing theories from studying the social environments of dangerous violent criminals, nor from studying their bio-physiological make-ups. [...] The key to the discovery of the creation of dangerous violent criminals lies in developing theories from the careful study of their *social experiences*. (*Creation of Dangerous* 16-17)

Informed by the methods of Blumer and the school of symbolic interactionism, Athens assembles the entirety of his material from interviews conducted with prison inmates previously convicted of unrelated violent offences. Although certainly not the first time prisoners had been required to unmask the face of violence,¹⁷ he would distinguish himself from the positivists in his field by *not* establishing a manner in which the interviews were to be conducted. Alternatively, the focus becomes how "the subjects described the experiences which they, rather than [*he*], deemed significant for their lives and the approximate time in their lives when they had undergone these experiences"

(Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 23).

The Wisconsin Correctional System Board insisted that the young criminologist supply a predetermined questionnaire to the prisoners who were to be potential case studies. Athens adamantly refused on professional grounds and told them outright: ““This is symbolic interactionism. We don’t believe in instruments. Instruments prejudice the situation. They’re damaging”” (Rhodes, *Why They Kill* 40). The innocent directive was interpreted as an intentional insult by the board members, somewhat like that affront experienced by the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences after listening to the one-time existential criminologist Allen Sapp. However, after red tape and fervent objections, the sceptical powers that be in Wisconsin did in fact grant Athens entry into their prison system. By the end of his interviews and information gathering, the determined criminologist had discerned that an individual’s direct “social experiences” with “primary group members” (who assiduously force said individual to undergo violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching) inescapably lead to the completion of the first stage in the overall violentization process. Once again, regardless of how much time elapses between these experiences, it should be reiterated that all aspects of this three-step progression *must* be experienced for the brutalization process to be considered actualized: “Thus, the number of weeks, months, or years it takes to finish this stage is subject to great variation” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 56).

Athens concept of primary group members has been derived from the

original theory proposed by Charles Horton Cooley in *Social Organization*.¹⁸ Cooley would categorize primary group members as “those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation” with the individual in question. A primary group member’s relationship with the individual “involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which ‘we’ is the natural expression” (Cooley 25). Athens builds on this notion in order to take the generalization of “we” and bestow upon the unit a specific identity. He contends:

A primary group may be more accurately defined as a group characterized by regular face-to-face interaction and intimate familiarity between its members, such as a family, gang, or clique, whereas a secondary group can be characterized by the absence of the quality of intimacy, such as a large school’s graduating class.” (*Creation of Dangerous* 28)

Due to the fact that direct social experiences cannot exist without the involvement of primary group members, it is crucial to be familiar with these interlocutors before examining the metamorphosis the term undergoes in Athens’s next significant work, *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*.

During the brutalization stage, an initial technique practiced upon an individual at the hands of a primary group member is violent subjugation. Violent subjugation has occurred when “bona fide or would-be authority figures from one of the subject’s primary groups” perpetrate violent action so as to coerce the subject to succumb to their authoritative control (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 28). There are two ways for violent subjugation to be perpetrated: one way is

through “coercion,” or when “authority figures employ violence or the threat of violence to force the subject to comply with some command (including to show respect)” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 29); and the other way is through “retaliation,” or when “authority figures use violence to punish the subject for past disobedience to them or for a present display of disrespect towards them” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 31). In coercive subjugation, the perpetrating primary-group-member will comply with the individual’s submissive pleas whereas in “retaliatory subjugation” the perpetrating primary-group-member refuses to heed the individual’s acquiescence for the abuse to end and instead commences with the beating as though inspired to do more harm. Athens explains: “By the time the battery is finally brought to a halt, the subject has sunk into a stupor. As the subject slowly awakens from this stupor, humiliation at being mercilessly beaten down overcomes him” (*Creation of Dangerous* 33).

Coercive subjugation and retaliatory subjugation resemble one another in that the individual’s attitude quickly becomes an insatiable “rage which is partly cooled when it is transformed into an intense desire for revenge against the subjugator” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 33). Clearly, proceeding a violent attack perpetrated by an intimate or primary group member, the individual’s imagination will begin to conjure sweet retribution and in effect create violence long before lifting a solitary finger. As Athens solidifies:

The humiliation from being brutally beaten down incenses the subject.

[Their] burning rage becomes cooled only later when it is transformed into

a desire for revenge. The subject's desire for revenge expresses itself in passing fantasies in which they batter, maim, torture, or murder [their] subjugator. (*Creation of Dangerous* 29)

The two forms of subjugation perpetrated against individuals are done so in order to exercise two separate imperatives. Whereas coercive subjugation's objective is to force a temporary acceptance of the rules being immediately stated by the primary group member, the goal of retaliatory subjugation is to force perpetual subservience upon the individual so as to dictate any and all future situations involving mandatory obedience. Athens distinguishes these forms of control by stipulating that the degree of violence perpetrated in retaliatory subjugation tends to be much more brutal than the degree of violence perpetrated in coercive subjugation. However, this is not a steadfast decree and clearly depends on the specific situation and the specific primary group member under consideration (*Athens, Creation of Dangerous* 36, 38).

Personal horriification constitutes another technique individuals must endure at some point in the brutalization stage. This experience is unlike violent subjugation in that the brutality being perpetrated by a primary group member is not being exacted upon the individual personally. Instead, said individual is forced to watch as a person close to them helplessly endures a vicious assault. The individual who undergoes personal horriification experiences a terrifying internal drama that begins with the commencement of the intimate's beating. In this drama, "every blow of the subjugator and the victim's reaction to it is hammered

into the subject's mind" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 40). The individual subsequently weighs out the odds of how successful he or she will be in halting the abuse versus the potential harm that will be received personally by trying to intervene. The problem is resolved, albeit fleetingly, when the individual decides that, despite the desire to protect the intimate undergoing violent subjugation, a successful physical altercation with the perpetrating primary group member remains a clear-cut impossibility. The ensuing metamorphosis occurring within the individual who does not intervene stems from overwhelming feelings of vulnerability, dismay and dishonour (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 40-41).

While the impartial observer can readily allocate all culpability unto the primary group member who forces the individual's intimate to undergo violent subjugation, the immediate transformation nonetheless involves a change in the individual's interpretation of *who* bears accountability for the violent episode. Riddled with regret and embarrassment, this individual wrongfully assumes significant liability after deducing that the brunt of the blame resides on an internal level. Undeniably, there is a fine line that separates violent subjugation and personal horrification, however, one should not and cannot assume that the latter constitutes the more bearable situation of the two. As Athens purposefully maintains:

The worst part of *both* of these odious experiences is the twisted feelings and thoughts which can linger on in a disordered state long after the immediate experiences which generated them cease. Thus although the

experience of personal horrification may be less traumatizing than violent subjugation from a *physical standpoint*, it is not less traumatizing from a *psychological standpoint*. (*Creation of Dangerous* 44)

Violent coaching comprises the third aspect of the brutalization process and involves a primary group member training an individual in an unceremonious fashion on how to respond aggressively when engaged in potentially violent situations. Since violent coaching is undergone intermittently and matter-of-factly, neither student nor teacher are necessarily cognizant of the fact that they have assumed their designated roles. The underlying principle governing violent coaching remains the dictatorial opinion of a violent primary-group member who espouses that nations are “inhabited by many mean and nasty people, both inside and outside primary groups, and the novice must be properly prepared to deal with these people when he meets them” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 47). Moreover, five identifiable “techniques” are utilized by dissimilar violent coaches in the course of their savage tutorials: “vainglorification,” “ridicule,” “coercion,” “haranguing,” and “besiegement.”

The method of “vainglorification” will be utilized by violent coaches in order to delude the individual into thinking that they will be considered valiant after physically triumphing against a would-be opponent. Through the rehashing of “violent anecdotes,” the violent coach convinces the individual that unprecedented status can be achieved through successful assaults (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 48-49). “Ridicule” is the method practiced by violent

coaches as they attempt to make the individual feel ashamed for not engaging or triumphing in violent situations. The violent coach persistently torments the individual and implies that future violent punishments are imminent unless the coach's violent expectations can be met. Athens clarifies that this perpetual taunting on behalf of the violent coach is meant to beat down the individual's interpretive process so that the perception of no viable option other than violence presents itself as inevitability: "If people are subjected to derision or the threat of it long enough because of their failure to perform some action, then the point will finally be reached where they will prefer to take that action rather than suffer" (*Creation of Dangerous* 49-50). Consequently, the third technique of "coercion" can be digested in the most literal sense. Individuals are told that unless they are willing to engage physically with a would-be opponent, they will receive an act of brutality delivered unto them personally by their violent coach for disobeying orders (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 51).

Unlike the actual or implied physicality involved in the aforementioned methods, "haranguing" involves a brand of psychological warfare in that the violent coach constantly presents scenarios of violence and instructs the individual on how they should respond. (This technique's relationship with the makeshift phantom other is explored in the proceeding chapter). While no distinguishable threats accompany this method of coaching, the unending sermonizing on and implied desire for violence has been conjured so as to suggest, discreetly or otherwise, that when the time comes the individual should

do as the violent coach persuasively suggests (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 52). Notwithstanding, the final technique of “besiegement” is the most brutal of all the methods since it involves all of the devices practiced by violence coaches with the exception of haranguing. Besiegement is the conglomeration of vainglorification, ridicule and coercion, and it is directed at an individual with the intention of ensuring that he or she will heed the violent coach’s savage lessons when the opportunity presents itself. Athens explains that “coaches shrewdly hand out different social penalties and rewards with the sole purpose in mind of achieving the same goal: prompting violent action on the part of the novices” (*Creation of Dangerous* 54).

When the brutalization stage has finally been completed, or when violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching has been entirely undergone, the individual begins to contemplate the consequences of their personal experiences with violence and indubitably gets “left in a confused, turbulent condition” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 56). This undesirable state of mind, as proposed by Athens, has been observed previously by Sartre, who writes in his earlier synopsis of Genet: “Driven from the lost paradise, exiled from childhood, from the immediate, condemned to see himself, suddenly provided with a monstrous and guilty ego, isolated, separated, in short changed into a bug” (*Saint Genet* 18). Once again, we cannot discard seemingly fantastical passages based on mere appearance. Before examining “defiance,” the second overall stage in Athens’s violentization process, let us turn back to the initial stage of

metamorphosis in *Saint Genet* so as to extract the core elements supporting Athens' initial stage of brutalization.

Whereas the present investigation appraises the application of Sartrean profiling to symbolic interactionism, Allan Sapp, a purist in the vein of Richard Quinney, had originally endeavoured to apply existentialism to rational choice. Therefore, Sapp posited the following aim of "existential criminology" prior to the term's twenty-first-century resuscitation:

An existential criminology would focus on the existential view of the nature of man and disregard questions of intent, responsibility, capability, and culpability since such questions are answered by existentialism in the simplest of terms--every man is totally responsible for every action and reaction he takes. The search for the "causes of crime" could focus on the limiting environment, recognizing that crime is merely a human action based upon the choice of the individual to perform that action. ("Existential Criminology" 7-8)¹⁹

This premature objective reveals the dual imperative of including only the relevant tenets of existentialism and discarding anything resembling the unsubstantiated. To begin with, Sartre's psychoanalysis was never created with the intention to reveal or bestow any semblance of culpability;²⁰ rather, it was meant to implicitly affirm the presence and actions of outside forces who impact the individual's interpretive process, particularly in the beginning stages of development. Even Sartre's most extreme vision of human freedom never forgets

an original condition of imprisonment “for there must of necessity be a *presentation* to me of the object which I am” (*Being and Nothingness* 366).

As Athens stipulates, it is the primary group member acting as violent coach that objectifies the individual and presents them with options. An existential brand of criminal profiling would not delegate any external liability? Sartre states no such thing when he deems that the individual’s “original fall is the existence of the Other” (*Being and Nothingness* 352). While the Sartrean Other’s identity will be elucidated in the proceeding chapter, a symbolic interactionist can immediately identify this outside entity as a constituent of at least *some* external liability regarding the creation of dangerous violent offenders. That is, to the exact extent that culpability can be attributed to another when it comes to a human choice that would not have been made under specifically altered circumstances. Rhodes tellingly observes:

One prejudice that has comforted us is that violent criminals are categorically different from the rest of us—mentally ill, or brain damaged, or monstrous, or anomic, or genetically or subculturally determined. Lonnie Athens demonstrates to the contrary that violent people come to their violence by the same universal process of soliloquy and dramatic self-change that carry the rest of us to conformity, pacifism, greatness, eccentricity or sainthood—and bear equal responsibility for their choices. (*Why They Kill* 285)

Sapp was therefore relatively incorrect on the first account, however, absolutely

spot on in that “any search for the ‘causes of crime’ could focus on the limiting environment, recognizing that crime is merely a human action based upon the choice of the individual to perform that action” (Sapp, *Existential Criminology* 7-8). There cannot be a universal formula or milieu applied to individuals with dissimilar interpretations for the very same reason that a deterministic stance on human existence cannot fathom the legitimate propellers behind all individuals who engage in violent behaviour.

Consider the specific aim of Sartre’s unique brand of criminology: Existential psychoanalysis “renounces the supposition that the environment acts mechanically on the subject [...]. The environment can act on the subject only to the exact extent that he comprehends it; that is, transforms it into a situation” (Sartre, *Existential Psychoanalysis* 54). If, as Athens stipulates, it is the primary group member acting as violent coach that objectifies the individual and presents them with a presentation of options, it is also the primary group member acting as violent coach who creates the individual’s immediate state and thus “transforms it into a situation.” Indeed, both Athens and Sartre have recognized the imperative claim by Cooley, that an individual’s limiting environment shall contain the answers we seek herein (23-24).

In *Saint Genet*, Sartre not only applies his analysis to the perfect prototype of the criminal artist but works to elucidate how the criminal artist comes to be. While we shall continue to extract the commonalities between Athens’ initial stage of brutalization and Sartre’s initial stage of metamorphosis, here is a

purposeful synopsis of Genet:

Placed under observation for a time, he gave evidence of evil instincts and committed punishable offences. This is all that was needed. By the gaze that surprised him, by the finger that pointed at him, by the voice that called him a thief, the collectivity doomed him to Evil. They were waiting for him. There was going to be a new vacancy: some old convict lay dying on Devil's Island; there has to be new blood among the wicked too. Thus, all the rungs of the ladder which he has to descend have been prepared in advance. Even before he emerged from his mother's womb, they had already reserved beds for him in all the prisons of Europe and places for him in all shipments of criminals. He had only to go to the trouble of being born; the gentle, inexorable hands of the Law will conduct him from the National Foundling Society to the penal colony. (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 31)

Clearly, Sartre is playing with Genet's limited/limiting options. In *Irrational Man*, William Barrett poignantly assesses Sartrean analysis,²¹ and, as a bi-product, the issue of individual responsibility. "I am not myself," he writes, "and I can never be myself, because my being stretching out beyond itself at any given moment exceeds itself. I am always simultaneously more and less than I am" (246). What I am and what constitutes "me" is how I act and interpret the specific situation I am in. Yet the apparent freedom of any original choice has been shackled prior to conception by the mettle of an other.

The initial act of metamorphosis as presented non-sequentially in *Saint*

Genet corresponds to Athens's first stage of the violentization process in that a horrible metamorphosis is undergone by an individual at the hands of a primary group member before being thrust into what Sartre rightfully deems a "dizzying" state: "In all probability, there were offences and then punishment, solemn oaths and relapses [but] it does not matter. The important thing is that Genet lived and has not stopped reliving this period of his life as if it had lasted only an instant" (*Saint Genet* 17). The consequences of Genet's initial confrontation with his primary group member specifically parallels the subsequent conditions under which an individual unwittingly undergoes Athenian violent subjugation.

"During violent subjugation," writes Athens, "[...] subjugators, such as fathers, stepmothers, older siblings, neighbours, or school-mates, use or threaten to use physical force to make a perceived subject accept their domination" ("Violentization in Larger Social Context" 8). Born and bred in institutions, Jean Genet was a perpetual ward of the state, a theme that would come to dictate the greater part of his life. He was taken in by Morvan peasants who believed in a devout upbringing. To say devout is to say religious, but to say religious is *not* to say non-violent seeing as though physical discipline and Christianity have always gone hand in hand. A timeless truth that existed long before the wraith of any religious tablet or crucifixion, "Athens's work exposes the ugly irony at the center of Christian discipline: that it serves not to prevent violence but to further its production" (Rhodes, *Why They Kill* 316).²² By the age of ten, Genet's mother, serving as Sartrean Other, catches him in the act of stealing and practices

“coercive subjugation” on her adopted son who immediately feels shame at being apprehended and castigated. Genet’s mother herself was also known to “filch” from local shops and neighbours, however, she had nevertheless maintained her sanctioned doctrine of discipline disguised as religious devotion.

“This virtuous anger is relentless,” claims Sartre. “It is not enough for it to murder a child; it must also contrive a hopeless future for the monster it has just fabricated” (*Saint Genet* 11, 19-20). The first stage in brutalization, violent subjugation, was experienced by Genet (the individual) at the hands of his mother (a primary group member) within a particularly specific situation. This individual’s interpretation of the situation would inevitably evoke feelings of guilt and shame as he unwittingly experiences a fantastical transformation as per Athens’s previous stipulation: “The subject’s burning rage becomes cooled only later when it is transformed into a desire for revenge” (*Creation of Dangerous* 39). Remember that a “desire for revenge” can be exacted only by those legitimately capable of distributing violent reprisals whereas those not suited for physical violence must inevitably find alternative outlets. As Sartre reaffirms: “One can understand being torn at first between the passionate desire to dispel these biases and the eagerness to justify them. And as they cannot be overcome, it is the eagerness that prevails” (*Saint Genet* 179). Whereas chapter three will analyze the ways aggressive writers and killers discover their designated inspirations, the rest of this chapter will heed Sartre’s question considering Genet’s small physical stature and unresponsiveness to violent interaction: “What

else could he have done?" (*Saint Genet* 179).

By the time that violent subjugation has occurred, "He is fifteen years old [and] has become what they wanted him to be: a hardened thief" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 76). The second stage of brutalization, "personal horrification," would not be confirmed until Genet's penal immersion. Specifically how Genet could acquire primary group members and/or undergo personal horrification in prison is readily explained by Athens's concept of "dramatic self-change."²³ This particular type of transformation equally applies to those who undergo basic training in the military and those who are initiated into the prison subculture. Primary group members in such situations are assumed without contemplation and quite literally forced upon an individual, for what was once familiar is now gone and new interpretations unwittingly form. Nevertheless, Genet has gone from being under the control of a stern adoptive mother to being under the control of...well...a stern adoptive mother. As Sartre dutifully conveys, Genet's desire for revenge that arises after violent subjugation can now be understood more completely:

He both worships and hates her, smothers her with kisses and seeks to debase her. He is still fairly young when he addresses the Mettray Reformatory as if it were his own mother; he imagines that it appears to him "with all that is peculiar to women": tenderness, slightly nauseating stale smell emanating from the open mouth, deep heaving bosom, in short everything that makes the mother a mother. (*Saint Genet* 8)

There is no universal schemata to be applied, only an individual's interpretation

of the symbolic interaction undergone in immediate and specific circumstances. Once again, while Genet does not necessarily undergo personal horrification at the hands of his first adoptive mother, he undeniably experiences such while immersed in the womb of his next state-sanctioned keeper: "Rejected by the inmates of Mettray, having become, for the second time, a scapegoat and butt, he again resorted to the method which had worked for him once before," an escape into the isolation of imagination (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 119).

Genet would be designated a "queen" upon his penal entry and thereby cast off into the same group as the other effeminate prisoners barely surviving on the lowest levels of the inter-prisoner power hierarchy. Although the penal power system will be investigated in chapter four, the following has to be ascertained now: when designated criminals who cannot physically protect themselves enter prison, the idea of rejection takes on a much more radical, much more horrendous characterization. As in dramatic self-change, the same patriarchal logic equally applies to the soldier and the prisoner: "Rape—actual and symbolic, heterosexual and homosexual—recurs in war time [and in prison]. It expresses domination and conquest, while humiliating enemy [and submissive] males" (Goldstein, *Men and Masculinities* 817). Genet's particular situation can be summed up tragically: "It is not enough to say that one rapes this live, fluid person: one mutilates him" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 260-261). Under the care of Mettray Genet experiences "coercive subjugation, [wherein] the subjugator does not accept the subject's signal of submission and halt the battery, but cruelly and relentlessly continues it"

(Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 32). Surrounded by assumed primary group members being forced to endure the same savage treatment, Genet's intimates, now comprised of cellmates, cellblock neighbours, fellow queens, and pimps, collectively comprise his makeshift family.

Athens states that in personal horrification an individual helplessly watches as "a mother, brother, close friend, neighbour, or schoolmate" gets brutally beaten and, as a result, experiences the same psychological dismay accompanying violent subjugation ("Violentization in Larger" 8). Genet's imprisoned brethren qualify and Sartre confirms the precise situation as it correlates to Athens's postulation of the individual's condition after enduring personal horrification: "It does not require much imagination to guess what he suffered. [...] Genet contemplates with terror the new world in which it has been decided that he is to pass his life and that other society which will be his" (*Saint Genet* 76). Alas, such are the tragic monologues that accompany dramatic self-change.

There is in fact a specific passage from "Violentization in Larger Social Context" that actually clarifies two extremely important issues as they relate to our investigation's immediate goals. One issue concerns the final stage in brutalization, "violent coaching," whereas the other issue serves to elucidate Athens's theory in terms of why society has so many more violent men than women:

Because violent coaches suffer from the same gender bias as many other

members of society, they usually find it more acceptable for females than males to play subordinate rather than superordinate roles and that it is more acceptable for females to rely on reasoning, charm, and guile rather than brute force to settle dominance disputes. Thus, females may just as often as males enter the brutalization stage, but males much more often complete this stage. (Athens 10)

Whereas Genet's violent coaching would be qualified by the pimps he was enamoured to, the violent male/violent female question has to be addressed so as to not become one of the aforementioned models that do not fit the mould. Rhodes purposefully reinforces Athens's views on why so few women end up perpetrating violence: "Besides their smaller average size, [...] women are evidently discriminated against as candidates for violent coaching [...] just as they are discriminated against in other selection processes dominated by men" (*Why They Kill* 136). However, as Robbins indicates, "85 percent of all homicides are committed by men, but that leaves 15 percent for the ladies" (3). According to Athens, gender itself does not play an issue in violentization. As Sartre emphasizes, all that matters is the individual's specific situation and interaction with others.

Anyone familiar with the specific case of dubbed serial killer Aileen Wuornos²⁴—who was convicted of violently killing seven men, who had an abusive grandfather to "coach" her early on, who "spoke of being homeless from the time she was sixteen, of being raped, held hostage, kidnapped, and tied to

beds” (Robbins 34)—will understand that gender is merely a societal allocation dictating nothing other than objectifications and stereotypes. Wuornos would claim that while she was prostituting her “johns” were either in the midst of raping her or about to rape her. In fact, proceeding her first brutal killing, “Aileen’s drummed-up rage came pouring out, and she found it easy to kill the others. In her television interview, she said, ‘I know I’d kill again, because of the dirt I’ve been through’” (Robbins 38). Wuornos’s interpretation of her own specific situation, compounded with the fact that she had previously undergone all requisite stages of violentization, served to both foreshadow and dictate that violent reprisal was *her* only symbolic response.

In regards to Genet specifically, the “johns” would come, however, first there were the “pimps” he submitted himself to unendingly. As Sartre explains: “The Pimp is destiny, pure Evil in its glamorous appearance; Genet is nothing but a dissolute hoodlum, just about good enough to be the slave of a rigorous master” (*Saint Genet* 330). Sartre would designate the evoked consequences of primary group members in the same way that Athens describes the traumatic results triggered by designated violent coaches: “The mere presence of the Pimp is experienced by Genet as a rape; his sacred and powerful voice is a rape for the ear” (*Saint Genet* 288). Moreover, Sartre’s synopsis of Genet’s horrific education proceeding violent coaching corresponds to the consequences proposed by Athens:

Genet will invent exquisite tortures for himself, will refuse himself all

hope, will impose vile contracts on himself, will besot himself with misfortune. He will have no tastes other than the distastes which he has overcome, and if he feels more delicate desires, he will tolerate them only in order to turn them into instruments of torture. (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 67)

Unfortunately, to the same extent that Athens's violent coach represents for the individual an all-powerful captor and subjugator, "the pimp represents the heartbreaking and eternal beauty of a pitiless God" for Jean Genet (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 135). Evocatively, Sartre's own perceived implications of "The Jonah Complex" would fathom the consequences of violent coaching long before the term officially existed.²⁵

After undergoing the stage of brutalization by experiencing violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching, the individual has been positioned to enter Athens's second stage in violentization dubbed "defiance." It is at this stage of the individual's turbulent life that they "want to find a nostrum for the personal disorganization from which they are suffering. More specifically, they seek to resolve the crisis into which their brutalization has thrown them" (Athens, "Violentization in Larger" 10). While the tenets of existential psychoanalysis and symbolic interactionism equally serve to imply that personal aversions from the past have the potential to transform into preferential future actions, an implied question still haunts the logical divide: Can what we fear the most *authentically* have the capacity to meet us halfway? Athens has answered: "In attempting to find an answer to this question, the subject becomes a bundle of

conflicting thoughts and emotions. It is in this stage of emotional turmoil and confusion that the subject enters the defiance stage” (*Creation of Dangerous* 57).

At this point, the disoriented individual sets upon serious contemplation of the world at large. They subsequently reanalyse personal relationships with past and present primary-group members so as to resituate a conception of how people “*actually* conduct themselves towards each other, as opposed to the pictures of how they conduct themselves towards each other contained in fictional accounts of social life” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 57). As an individual enters into the defiance stage, they also temporarily engage in serious contemplation over the state of mankind as a whole before being thrust back into the reality of their particularly distressing situation. As a result of the individual’s brutal treatment over the years, they must now allow their interpretive channels to undergo a process that threads together a range of heightened emotions. By the time they are done piecing together the consequences of a brutalized past, the individual has been left to pose yet another question that has been a long time in the making: ““What can I do to stop undergoing any further violent subjugation and personal horrification at the hands of other people?”” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 59). This pivotal query anticipates how a violent transformation undergoes its own metamorphosis and transmutes from fantasy into reality. As can be deduced by this point, both Athens and Sartre are uniformly equipped to provide a purposeful answer to this question. However, the status quo must be maintained and supersede once again age and authority.

Athens writes:

The subject becomes determined for the first time [...] to attack other people physically who unduly provoke [...] with the serious intention of gravely harming or even killing. This deeply emotion-laden resolution springs from the special way in which the subject was induced from the volcanic blending of the wrenching experiences of violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching to come to terms with the brutalisation experience *as a whole*. Each one of these separate experiences made its own more or less unique contribution to the final combustible mixture, leading the subject to make a mitigated violent resolution. Although this mitigated violent resolution may not be a socially desirable one, neither is it a totally unreasonable one in light of the odious experiences from which it was born. (*Creation of Dangerous* 62)

Sartre similarly announces:

The others had convinced him that he harboured within himself a pernicious nature, an evil will. He sought for years to perceive it, he even tried, though in vain, to put his conscious freedom at the source of this nature. In short, he wanted to make an object of it. He now changes his line of attack: he makes himself an object for it. He resigns himself to never seeing it, provided he is conscious of being seen by it. This demoniacal postulation toward Evil expresses his will, his absolute

freedom which has flung itself into an irremediable commitment. But it is his will as Other. It is still a nature, but a nature-making nature, and it is Genet's clear consciousness which becomes a nature-made nature. (*Saint Genet* 144)

Each prolific rejoinder unmasks the transformation as a commitment to violent resolution; which is to say that the individual is now willing to engage in violent (and even "lethal") recourse if they feel capable of "successfully" perpetrating such (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 60). Upon experiencing brutalization, Genet subsequently enters into Athens's "defiance" stage. However, there was a problem—Genet was an unsuccessful candidate and ill-equipped physically to undergo further stages of the "physical" violentization process.

Indeed, "Genet's misfortune and conversion can be explained only by a *tension* between incompatible groups and ethical systems" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 52). Therefore, as a means of emotional survival and resolution, he is compelled to express his created aggressiveness alternatively:

Genet wants to do Evil, fails, decides to will his failure; whereupon he changes into a traitor, his acts change into gestures and being changes into appearance. Now, the law of appearances and gestures is Beauty. We have got to the heart of this strange endeavour, in that secret place where Evil, engendering its own betrayal, is metamorphosed into Beauty. Evil, betrayal, failure, gestures, appearances, Beauty: this complex assemblage is the 'tangle of snakes' which we have been seeking. (Sartre, *Saint Genet*

192)

The “Beauty” which Sartre speaks of can be understood as Genet’s newly designated commitment to a unique brand of literary creation. Nevertheless, along with Athens’s final two stages in violentization, chapter three examines Genet’s alternative manifestations of violence, his “transgressive artistic desire” as proposed by Lentricchia and McAuliffe. In the meantime, a purposeful confirmation of how individuals become violent should be briefly resituated.

What Athens was essentially attempting to accomplish was a melding, rather than an isolation, of “bio-physiological” and “social environmental” causations of physical aggression. In the end, his findings demonstrated a logical and verifiable truth in that “just as there are no social experiences without social environments, there are no social experiences without bodies” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 15-16). Much like Sartre suggested somewhat circuitously almost a half-century earlier, the creation of criminality relies on specific situations being interpreted and experienced by specific individuals who must learn to cope. The existential summation of Genet is actually every man’s précis: “He is alone beneath the fixed light which has not ceased to traverse him” (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 137). While both Freudian and Sartrean analyses subscribe to interpretations by external forces so as to materialize authentic identity, the most fundamental divide between these schools of profiling resides in the conception of self-knowledge. Unlike Freud, Sartre adamantly states that an individual must accept his or her absolute freedom in order to exist on an authentic level free of bad faith as it is the

individual alone who ultimately carries the most prolific tools for revelation (*Existential Psychoanalysis* 57-59).

As Hazel Barnes solidifies in her introduction to *Being and Nothingness*, “recognition comes not in ecstasy but in anguish. It is not a merging with a higher power but a realization of isolation, not a vision of eternity but the perception that one is wholly process, the making of a Self with which one can not be united” (xxxix). While Athens implies that individuals are responsible for their actions and does not subscribe to theories propagating psychological breaks from reality, he does not outright deny the existence of a Freudian-conceived unconscious. Nevertheless, Athens does clearly reject any kind of universal postulate, symbol, metonym, etc. that furthers the notion of the mind being divided into multiple segments and erasing not only the fullness of the individual but the fullness of the criminal act. People do make choices and then must live with the consequences; however, these options do not spring from an imaginary well. Preference and interpretation alike arrive through the deliberation, the interference, and the mere existence of others. Like Sartre, Athens definitely recognizes that every “individual desire, however trivial, has meaning only in connection with one’s fundamental relation to Being (i.e., one’s basic choice of one’s mode of being, the way in which one chooses to exist)” (Barnes xxxii). Clearly, being condemned to freedom, as a concept, cannot tangibly exist unless there are captors. And who are these keepers and reapers? They are as dissimilar as the individual being formed.

Due to the fact that it remains an impossibility to speak of formed

individuals without considering *them* to be the most reliable profilers of their own devices, let us consider the following passage from Jean Genet's most autobiographical work:

Each of the movements which make up this swift and devastating life is simple and straight, as clean as the stroke of a great draftsman--but when these strokes are encountered in movement, then the storm breaks, the lightning that kills them or me. Yet, what is their violence compared to mine, which was to accept theirs, to make it mine, to wish it for myself, to know it, to premeditate it, to discern and assume its perils? But what was mine, willed and necessary for my defense, my toughness, my rigor, compared to the violence they underwent like a malediction, risen from an inner fire simultaneously with an outer light which sets them ablaze and illuminates us? (*The Thief's Journal* 16)

Distancing the unadulterated truth from the grandiose aestheticism of Sartre or Genet has never been an easy task yet the latter's own specifically unattractive breakdown reveals precisely that which we have contemplated thus far—while simultaneously shedding a distinct light on the issue of culpability as patrimonial legacy.

Indeed, just as violent individuals are created by intimates, those intimates were once created by intimates, who themselves were created by intimates, and so on back in time and direct ancestral line. Genet's interpretation of primary group members and the ensuing choices proceeding their violence—accepting it,

remaking it, wishing for it, knowing it, premeditating on it, discerning it, and assuming it—in short, everything that the first two stages of Athens’s theory of violentization entails—unearths the notion that culpability can be equated to rationality or irrationality, despite claims made by existential extremists. Sapp was too vague when he stated that an “existential criminologist seeks meaning and responsibility for criminal behavior wholly within the individual offender” (“Existential Criminology” 7). To say “wholly within” is to neglect “meaning” or interpretation as something formed subsequent to an individual’s specific situation and symbolic interaction.

This chapter ends with a return to the suspicious claim made by The Son of Sam, wherein he directly implicates “The Devil” as the primary interlocutor responsible for creating a murderer destined to serve a 365-year sentence. At first, Berkowitz’s essay appears to be a fruitless narrative for our intents and purposes, however, based on what we have learned about the early stages of the violentization process, his testimony actually implicates the specifically *human* sources responsible for shaping a potentially violent offender:

The day after I graduated I went into the Army. I had just turned 18 several weeks earlier. I joined the Army, in a sense, to start a new life and get away from my problems. But even in the service I had trouble coping, though I did manage to finish my 3 year enlistment. (Berkowitz n. pag.)

Do not forget the correlation between dramatic self-change, institutions, and violent offenders. In “The Short Course For Murder: How Soldiers and Criminals

Learn to Kill,” Joshua Sanborn draws upon Athens’s violentization model and provides insight into how The Son of *Uncle Sam* could have become a violent perpetrator proceeding his military discharge:

It is highly significant that the processes by which young men are transformed into violent criminals so closely parallels the way that they are trained as soldiers. In each case, “violent coaches” undertake a process to “break down” young men by making their “will” to commit violent acts stronger than what Dragomirov called their “intellectual desire for self-preservation.” This coaching is normally done within the confines of a hyper-masculine moral code that stresses the importance of courage, of dynamic activeness, of “honor,” and of duty. The methods of these coaches are unrepentantly violent. The new moral structure that violentized individuals adopt is constructed and confirmed by acts of brutality. Demonstrating authority, dominance, and effectiveness through violent acts systematically undermines the variety of notions of social relations and of social control that “recruits” had internalized in the “civilian” world. (Sanborn 121)

When David Berkowitz claimed that he “had trouble coping” after being discharged, what was he *specifically* referring to? Is it possible that the U.S. Army trained the Son of Sam to be a murderer on *and* off the battlefield?

According to Athens’s theory, Berkowitz was equipped with the physical training to become a killer. However, since specificity is this thesis’ foremost

goal, it would be irresponsible to confirm that a government created one of their most notorious serial killers without substantiating all of the precise details of Berkowitz's individualized situation. Nevertheless, what remains as the most frightening correlation provoked by Sanborn's application is the fact that exchanging the word "prisoners" for "soldiers" demarcates the exact same outcome. Indeed, "the most basic lesson of the comparison between soldiers and criminals is that individuals become violent mainly as the result of powerful processes of microsocialization" (Sanborn 122). Sartre experienced this truth firsthand as a prisoner of war,²⁶ Genet experienced it firsthand as a prisoner of society, and Athens observed it firsthand as a profiler of prisoners of society.

Through an examination of the first two stages of Athenian violentization and Sartrean metamorphosis, this chapter attempted to define precisely *how* such powerful processes shape an individual's interpretive process in relation to contemplating and attempting violence within highly specific contexts. The Freudian unconscious has *not* been implemented so as to keep truth, evidence, and responsibility entirely intact. Before returning to the final stages of metamorphosis, the next chapter will elucidate precisely *who* or *what* is responsible for the creation of conscious individuals' interpretive process so as to arrive at the most important question criminology endeavours to answer—that ever-elusive *why*.

Chapter Two:
Phantom Others Revisited

“The root is invisible to us. It exists, in a sense, in another realm from our above-ground world. But it is this invisible root that determines what kind of tree and fruit will be produced.”

Eric Holmberg, *Hells Bells* (Part III)

“I have no patience for revelations, for new beginnings, for events that take place beyond the realm of my immediate vision. ”

Brett Easton Ellis, *American Psycho* (241)

Narratives by philosophical criminologists reveal insidious truths about violent criminals, violent soldiers, and, as a result, violent states. By staying true to an imperative investigative desire for holistic specificity, we are at least warranted in speculating over an inversion and thereby contemplating whether or not narratives by philosophical soldiers reveal insidious truths about violent civilians. Bearing in mind the tenets of Sartrean and Athenian profiling, this chapter begins by gauging a modified reversal and briefly considering two infamously dissimilar military experts: Sun Tzu, a direct and representative force of China's most honoured lineage of warriors, and Machiavelli, a circuitous and legendary Italian strategist. While chapter four will resituate in more depth the delineation of strategic and historic observations, the present chapter attests to their purposeful application to existentialism and symbolic interactionism, as well as their intrinsic connection to makeshift phantom consultants.

So far this investigation has been concerned with how violent individuals are created. We have referred to Sartrean “Others” and Athenian “primary group members,” allocating the creation of dangerous violent individuals into a category of knowledge that cannot subsist without the advertent or inadvertent influences

imparted by outside and even armed forces. We have recognized how individuals learn to perpetrate violence, although, we have not yet established why they are actually compelled to do so. In *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu's seemingly simplistic psychological assessment anticipates the complex Sartrean Other with the general/General's profile of an enemy:

And so in the military—
 Knowing the other and knowing oneself,
 In one hundred battles no danger.
 Not knowing the other and knowing oneself,
 One victory for one loss.
 Not knowing the other and not knowing oneself,
 In every battle certain defeat. (12)

Sartre's designation of the individual's relationship with the Other, like that posited by Sun Tzu in his positioning of warriors, remains undisputedly antagonistic. In *The Tragic Finale*, Wilfrid Desan states that "in order to recover my individuality I must overcome the freedom of the Other" (85); whereas in "Comedian and Martyr," Robert Champigny reiterates: "The self of the Sartrean man is intimately haunted by the Other" (80). Of course, Sartre himself solidifies: "For it is not a case of an empty and universal form but of an individual difference that has to do with both form and content. There is Genet and there are all others" (*Saint Genet* 22). Consequently, even a ghost of a designation must have a specific purpose.

The Other's impact and identity have been rooted in the belief that any alternative being exists as a risk to the individual's self-governing freedom, hence the Other as even the free man's judge, jury and executioner. According to Sartre, despite the fact that an individual must exist both in-itself and for-itself, they cannot survive in absolute seclusion since they are forced to exist alongside alternative souls, hence, the Sartrean mode of "Being-for-Others."²⁷ Sun Tzu implies that merely knowing oneself without unmasking the enemy does not yield victory and that being "able to transform with the enemy is what is meant by 'spiritlike'" (24). Sartre enforces this decree by stating that since the Other remains perpetually with us, there remains no choice but to appraise innately disparate confrontational situations lest we too become the eternally subjugated: "The Other's anger, in so far as it appears to his inner sense and is by nature refused to my apperception, [...] is perhaps the cause of the series of phenomena which I apprehend in my experience under the name of expression or gesture" (Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* 307). Consequently, as the relationship with the Other is a perpetual battle in progress and always locatable in a specific situation containing the subjugator and the subjugated, *The Art of War* requires no official battlefield.²⁸

"Thus," writes Sartre, "the evildoer is the Other. Evil—fleeting, artful, marginal Evil—can be seen only out of the corner of one's eye and in others" (*Saint Genet* 30). Like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli also insists that fending off nemeses becomes achievable through an emulation of familiarity and patrimonial legacy.

In 1515, he would purposefully elucidate:

I say, then, that in hereditary states, accustomed to their prince's family, there are far fewer difficulties in maintaining one's rule than in new principalities. Because it is enough merely not to neglect the institutions founded by one's ancestors and then to adapt policy to events. In this way, if the prince is reasonably assiduous he will always maintain his rule[.]
(33-34)

Athens's designation of the violent individual's relationship with primary group members, much like Machiavelli's positioning of the ruler, remains grounded in the immediate. Building off of Cooley, in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals*, Athens had recognized intimate others as fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, close relatives, friends, and gangs or cliques; those outside yet intimate forces that collectively comprise an individual's primary group due to recurrent and significant interactions.

In Athens's third major work, *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*, the criminologist would abandon Cooley's perception of primary group members, revive George Herbert Mead's perception of the generalized other, and then distinguish his own unique identification of the phantom community in order to successfully locate the means in which a "process of interpretation" advances or restrains acts of violence (Blumer 6). Whereas Mead's generalized other takes the mere identities of primary group members and resuscitates their indicative roles, Athens attempts to seize these phantoms of identity and dissect their impact. He

readily admits that both Mead's theory and his own postulation of phantom others consign

the interlocutors with whom we routinely consult when forming our self-conceptions or the interpretations of situations that confront us. Thus our self-conceptions are related to our interpretations of conflictive situations because in constructing both of them, we rely on advice from the same consultants. (*Violent Criminal Acts* 139)

Thus the Machiavellian correlation actually becomes clearer proceeding the Athenian update "because it is enough merely not to neglect the institutions founded by one's ancestors and then to adapt policy to events" (Machiavelli 34).

Yet there exists at least one crucial dissimilarity between Mead's and Athens's designative theories, for while the former can be grasped as the general perception obtained from within the larger and more impersonal community, a "phantom community's perspective is the one we derive from our past significant social experiences, which may be different from those of our present corporal community's members" (Athens, *Violent Criminal Acts* 139). (This clearly discounts Athens's own stipulation of dramatic self-change, which was discussed in the preceding chapter, and which is undergone by an individual in extreme situations such as upon entrance into a military or penal institution). Nonetheless, if the perspective of the phantom community presents itself as violent, the individual will inevitably obey Machiavelli's directive by adapting violent policy to specific events so as to not neglect the institutions founded by the individual's

intimate interlocutors. Virginia Woolf would inadvertently battle that double bind in her prophetic statement: “It is far harder to kill a phantom than a reality” (240).

A succinct reapplication to the first two stages of metamorphosis in *Saint Genet* reconfirms a verifiable specificity: Genet himself was not objectified and influenced by a generalized other, but rather by a conglomeration of precise phantom community members who he inadvertently—not *unconsciously*—conjured and relied upon based on significant social experiences from the past. Can there be both consciousness and co-conspirators who might not be physically present? The answer has to be ‘yes’ since there remains a gigantic difference between being well camouflaged and thoroughly hidden. We will summarize Sartre’s somewhat broader designation of the Other prior to Athens’s much narrower designation of the phantom community since precision remains *the* principal objective. Ultimately, between the overt flexibility of Sartre’s notion and the explicit inflexible essence of Athens’s classification resides the final phantom interlocutor—again, well-camouflaged but certainly not buried—the makeshift phantom consultant. This alternative to a primary group member exists as an isolated individual’s fictitious advisor and, in conjunction with physical violentization, can lead to emulation and hence interpretations that deem violence to be the only course of action.

Nevertheless, for now keep in mind that the Sartrean condition of Being-For-Others is dependant upon what the existentialist perceives as the “Gaze.”²⁹ This gaze initiates and amplifies the for-itself existence of the individual as they

instantaneously recognize that they have been transformed into an object by and for an outside consciousness. This transformation is posited as an object estranged from an impending freedom since the individual's situation becomes altered and thereby outside of self. As in Athenian brutalization, emotions rooted in shame accompany the individual as they become conscious of being under the objectifying gaze, though it is God's omniscient stare that constitutes the most representative example of Being-For-Others in the eyes of Sartrean profilers. The logic behind this inescapable gaze buttresses the fact that we are not only eternally condemned to our freedom but also condemned to know that we are being watched by the ultimate panoptical authority and thus eternally objectified.

In the early stages of *Saint Genet*—wherein Sartre's most lucent observations are locatable prior to being subjected to redundant reappearances—resides the philosopher's most purposeful unearthing of the Other, which moreover exists as exactly that which was to be fatefully and inadvertently apprehended by Athens in his quest to symbolize interaction and culpability alike. Sartre, the original existential criminologist, proclaims:

Evil is the Other. The Other than Being, the Other than Good, the Other than self. Here we have the key to Genet. This is what must be understood first: Genet is a child who has been convinced that he is, in his very depths, *Another than Self*. His life will henceforth be only the history of his attempts to perceive this Other in himself and to look it in the face—that is, to have an immediate and subjective intuition of his wickedness, to

feel he is wicked—or to flee it. But this phantom—precisely because it is nothing—will not let itself be grasped. When the child turns to it, it disappears. When Genet tries to run away from it, suddenly it is there[.]
(*Saint Genet* 350)

From what has been assessed thus far from Athens's postulation of the phantom community, more than coincidental vocabulary warrant an authoritative correlation to the symbolic interactionist's understanding of coercive others. However, under a Sartrean identification of the Other's *modus operandi*, these phantoms cannot be grasped since they are strangers in the way that God and his gaze are strangers, present but invisible, and unfathomable to interpretation of self. By the end of his initial opus, Sartre confirms that all "happens as if the world, man, and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God" (*Being and Nothingness* 792). However, just as we cannot truly verify if God is actually watching us, an individual cannot assume that an alternative other who has not established an intimate connection resides within immediate or relevant knowledge and hence interpretive valves.

Even if an individual cannot be alienated from potential freedom unless another's consciousness specifically stands in the way of that freedom, control of a specific situation can only be lost when the Other's gaze is immediate, present, and, quite literally, in that individual's face. More than anything else, there must be an authentic individualistic recognition of the Other as a constitutive phantom community member for them to exist as such. Although to state that Sartre has

been too general about the identities of outside others does not mean that he is remotely incorrect about their detrimental roles, judgements, or accompanying consequences. Citing an ontological delousing of the body and mind, he defends himself by anticipating an impending judgement:

It is before the Other that I am *guilty*. I am guilty first when beneath the Other's look I experience my alienation and my nakedness as a fall from grace which I must assume. This is the meaning of the famous line from Scripture: 'They knew that they were naked.' (*Being and Nothingness* 531)

Nonetheless, Sartre has included invisible co-conspirators that need not be there because they have never been there and will most likely never be there. They are phantoms of an inconsequential nature since they are actually someone else's phantoms and hence only significant to that other individual.

As Athens explains in *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*:

Thus, even people living within the boundaries of the same corporal community may have different phantom communities, an existential circumstance to which Mead paid insufficient attention. Since the phantom companions that constitute our phantom communities travel with us wherever we go, we can always avail ourselves, for better or worse, of their counsel, no matter what corporal communities we may be inhabiting at the time. (139)

An individual's phantom community remains capable of being altered just as

situations are capable of being transformed as it is the “changes in [the individual’s] phantom communities that are responsible for the type of violent career they undergo” (Athens, *Violent Criminal Acts* 139). Unlike Sartre’s Other, who is omnipresent and everywhere, Athens specifies that within an individual’s interpretive channels, there are *specific* phantom community members—a conglomeration of overlapping voices that emerge as one after being formed/forged through time and significant past experiences—who work to inform the individual about the type of resolution to engage in a *specific* confrontation. Athens believes that crime is a product of “social retardation” to the extent that individuals are governed by “an underdeveloped [...] phantom community, an ‘us’ that hinders them from cooperating in the ongoing activities of their corporal community or the larger society in which it is embedded” (*Violent Criminal Acts* 144). Both Sartre and Athens agree that discord is residential both within and between individuals, and that one’s community can impart persuasive directives regarding altercations within circumstantial confines; however, the latter has also identified three specific types of “communities” that individuals reside in: “civil, malignant, and turbulent” (*Violent Criminal Acts* 148).

While chapter four will ascertain the consequences of these communities on both sociologic and microcosmic levels, it is important to understand them as Athens first proposed them, in relation to the members of an individual’s specific phantom community and as motivating factors behind “escalating” and/or “de-

escalating” violent careers:

As ultraviolent criminals invade civil communities and marginally violent people flee from them, these communities slowly degenerate into malignant ones. Likewise, as ultraviolent criminals are driven from malignant communities and marginally violent people move into them, the community progressively becomes more civil. Turbulent communities are those that are caught in the middle of this larger process of community change. [...] Thus turbulent communities are either in transition from civil into malignant communities or from malignant into civil communities.

(Violent Criminal Acts 151-152)

Apparently individuals can go through similar violentization processes and even be reared by similar phantom community members. However, as Athens stipulates, the changes or lack of changes made to and in an individual's immediate community inevitably dictates whether or not the future entails an interpretive commitment to perpetrate violence, or an alternative resolution to avoid it. As ex-convict Randy Starr underscores in “How I Became a ‘Disorganized’ Dangerous Violent Criminal:” “If my ultra-violent self and the unmitigated violent phantom community around which it revolved had remained intact, no amount of treatment could have ever helped me” (74). Fortunately, Starr was able to find new and non-violent phantom community members who welcomed him with open arms. (Unfortunately, the majority of ultra-violent offenders cannot find alternative communities that are remotely willing to do the

same).

A purist brand of existential criminology and rational choice, as attempted decades ago by Allan Sapp, might accuse the symbolic interactionist of presupposing that all individuals might or might not (à la Dr. Quinney) allow themselves to be governed by anyone or anything else that exists as a potential obstacle to self-governing freedom. In this sense, the word phantom would maintain its original definition of a nonentity, a nothingness. However, the problem with a nihilistic rather than a realistic interpretation of Sartre's tenets remains the undeniable fact that there will always be lingering question marks inserted as rule of thumb. When Sartre's Orestes insisted "I *am* my freedom" (*The Flies* 117), he should have completed the sentence so as to situate identity more clearly: I make my choices to the same extent that I interpret my available options as imparted to me from the gaze or alternative existence of the Other. "Hell is—other people!" cries Sartre's Garcin (*No Exit* 45). Naivety aside, we know the latter declaration to prevail on both internal and external levels.³⁰

As Barnes observes: "[Sartre] follows Husserl in holding that all consciousness is consciousness *of* something; that is, consciousness is intentional and directive, pointing to a transcendent object other than itself" (xii). While there are always a range of choices to be made, why one individual chooses one road and why another chooses a different path remains due to their specific situations, their specific phantom community members, as well as their specific situational interpretations of their symbolic interactions with phantom community members.

Sartre, in the spirit of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Athens, has clearly seized the antagonistic implication for us: “A leader who is only the ghost of a leader commands phantom soldiers who obey him only so as to better destroy him” (*Saint Genet* 177). Moreover, the unencumbered-free-will objection has been anticipated by our own makeshift phantom consultant, for even the most isolated of individuals ultimately invent significant outlets that ignite interpretive channels for preferential actions. Consider what Rhodes ascertained from Athens’s original designation: “We are not necessarily aware of our phantom companions as we go about our lives. We internalize them, come to take them for granted [and] put our attention elsewhere (*Why They Kill* 82-83). The impact of the makeshift phantom consultant can be greater than that of the phantom community member, particularly for the isolated individual who has gone through the first two stages of violentization and then proceeds to rely upon imaginative interlocutors and outlets.

Indeed, the makeshift phantom consultant is also the one and the many, but an entity which is not confined by physical, mortal or even non-fictive status. Furthermore, the reason why we are not necessarily aware of the identities of our makeshift phantom consultants remains simply because they are better camouflaged than the designated non-fictive or human forces residing inside the Athenian phantom community. For instance, when in 1796 the Gothic writer Matthew Lewis decreed, ““There are People in the Vaults! [...] Conceal yourself till they are past”” (229), he was clearly hot on the trail of phantom others before

mistakenly going the way of the supernatural.³¹ Therefore, for a functioning definition of the makeshift phantom consultant herein under consideration, we must acknowledge that both an indeterminate conception of Others (as posited by Sartre) as well a stringent classification of community members (as deemed by Athens) does not anticipate the persuasive phantom interlocutors haunting our interpretive middle ground, or the consultants who literally seep through biased cracks after being written off as make-believe and harmless.

Since this chapter has thus far relied upon Sun Tzu and Machiavelli to amplify conceptions of the existential Other and the symbolic phantom community, let us refer to a contemporary military strategist in order to situate the makeshift consultant. As Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman writes in *Stop Teaching Our Kids To Kill*:

Feeling scared that Freddy's going to get you when you go to bed? Feeling like it might be cool to carry a gun, as your hero does? Feeling fascinated with all the blood and gore, yet slightly ashamed about that at the same time? Feeling sexually aroused at the beating of a near-naked woman and very guilty at the same time? How do our kids understand and disperse all the feelings that watching violence arouses? Unfortunately, most children and teens don't get these vital opportunities. There's no one around to talk with them at these crucial moments. As a society, we have deemed media outlets our number one baby-sitter. It gives us a needed break, to hop in the shower, get dinner on the table, or just read the newspaper and unwind

after a busy day. But if we don't know what the baby-sitter is spitting out at our kids, we are all, children, parents, and society, paying a huge price.

(60)³²

Grossman, a psychology professor and military scientist at West Point, focuses his attack on the entertainment industry in particular (television, movies, internet and video games), however, the makeshift phantom consultant (or Grossman's "baby-sitter") also includes the interlocutors residing within the creative fields of music, literature, drama, visual arts, and any other imaginative medium that legitimately provides an individual an opportunity to identify with and interpret a makeshift phantom voice. Following the logic fuelling the adage "one man's poison can be another's pleasure," one individual's makeshift phantom consultant can be another individual's harmless source of amusement. Consequently, all that is required for the phantom advisor to exist as a potential Athenian "violent coach" remains an isolated interpretation as well as an isolated image.

In the introduction to this thesis, makeshift phantom consultants were described as an oxymoron, or, the *authentic fictive* interlocutors that comprise primary communities for a myriad of individuals locked into post-modern reality. In a letter dated June 1, 1999, President Bill Clinton would dutifully confirm the makeshift phantom consultant's correlation to violent acts and actors:

We now know that by the time the typical American child reaches the age of eighteen, he or she has seen 200,000 dramatized acts of violence, and 40,000 dramatized murders. [...] As their exposure to violence grows, so,

in some deeply troubling cases of particularly vulnerable children, does the taste for it. (1)

What constitutes a “vulnerable” child remains one who feels a lack of support from human phantom community members, who interprets no alternatives other than spending time in isolation, and who spends more time with make-believe or fictitious interlocutors (such as books, alternative art, music, television, movies, video games, internet, etc.) than they do with real friends and family. In updated, existentially-informed criminological terms, what constitutes a vulnerable child is an individual condemned to isolation who spends more time with makeshift phantom consultants than phantom community members. Therefore, the designation does not have to be as severe as Athens states nor as uncontrolled as Sartre first posited. Based on the crucial elements of time and commitment, the makeshift phantom consultant *is* part of the phantom community and its voice haunts the interpretive channels as much if not more than those voices imparted by the most intimate of Others.

Prior to assessing support for the existence of the makeshift phantom consultant and its correlation to the motivations for violence, the individual who remains not only our theoretical supplement’s core source of inspiration but also one of its chief detractors should be considered. When asked on PBS’s *Think Tank* what he thought about subversive artistic products as they relate to criminality and violence in particular, Athens immediately rejected the notion by citing that in the Medieval period, when television was nonexistent, we as a

people were much more vicious. “No television,” he insisted, “no video, no radio. So you can’t attribute it to the mass media” (“Rethinking Violent Crime” n. pag.). Athens’s rationale appears to be logical enough, however, there also appears to be two illogical gaps: primarily, what was interpreted as acceptable in the Middle Ages as opposed to what has been deemed acceptable in today’s age; and secondarily, what kind of alternative outlets were available in the Middle Ages compared to the alternative outlets of today—which, as all twenty-first-century community members are undeniably cognizant of, are only a bag of popcorn, remote control, bound page, mounted frame, rhythmic beat, moist joystick, or high-speed internet-connection away.

The J. Paul Getty Museum released their official statement on a show that Athens could have benefited from attending: “This exhibition explores the presence of violence in the Middle Ages and examines how images of violence were used to teach viewers moral lessons and appeal to their emotions” (3). How could violence *not* have been more prevalent in the Middle Ages than in our present day when said “moral lessons” included both physical and artistic examples of savagery, torture, execution and a myriad of other hellish torments? Entitled “Images of Violence in the Medieval World,” Getty’s philanthropic institution endeavoured to show (through documentation and artistic representation) how medieval war and conflict were responsible for rearing a society committed to violent resolution. Religion has always played its own culpable role as a breeding ground for violence and the Bible or Koran continue to

prevail as two of the world's most culpable makeshift phantom consultants.³³ Accordingly, medieval politicians and respected citizens alike often relentlessly pointed to Christ and scripture in order to condone and propagate warlike behaviour that, from approximately 500A.D. to 1500 A.D., included incessant battles, gruesome tournaments, and bloody encounters over property rights (Vale 144).

Not only was violence permissible during the Middle Ages, it was actually encouraged as a vital ingredient in family resolutions, day-to-day legal matters, as well as edification and amusement.³⁴ Consequently, while television and its created violence was not yet made available, Athens has apparently forgotten about the myriad of alternative sources of graphic entertainment, absolutely brutal in nature, that *had* been made available to impressionable individuals at that time. For instance, countless creative representations of Christ's blood-splattered Crucifixion were readily accessible for medieval viewing pleasure and individualistic interpretation long before Mel Gibson created his own arguably skewed interpretation of not-so-sacred events in *The Passion of The Christ*. In *Violence and Medieval Society*, Sarah Kay's essay "The Sublime Body of The Martyr" imparts precisely why television was unnecessary for Athens's claim to be deemed incorrect:

Medieval audiences appeared to have relished accounts of nubile young girls being subjected by pagan rulers to sexually charged tortures, in which being stripped naked, roasted alive, broken on wheels, boiled in oil, and

having their breasts ripped off, are clear favourites. (4)

This study, however, remains concerned with twenty-first-century violence and the very heated and contemporary debate which surrounds it. Clearly, the makeshift phantom consultant has existed for as long as the family unit or phantom community as there have always been alternative artistic outlets for individuals that desire to isolate themselves and thus interpret their imaginary advisors as though they are legitimate phantom community members. Athens himself concedes that our immediate interpretation of the individual's community is irrelevant as it remains the individual alone who comprehends the phantoms within.

However, in the same *Think Tank* interview, one of Athens's co-panellists, the clinical psychiatrist Dr. Stanton Samenow, would equally dismiss the entertainment/ violence correlation though nonetheless reveal a purposeful point of entry when positing: "What is critical is what is in the mind of the viewer. Sure there are copycat crimes, but for every copycat crime there are millions of people who have watched the same television program and to them it's entertainment" ("Rethinking Violent Crime" n. pag.). Why would Samenow claim to not believe in the correlation when he clearly states that it remains the individuals interpretation of what they are watching or playing or consulting with that deems potential consequences? He apparently plays a safe statistical game and forgets to include the countless number of isolated individuals who have managed to bypass predetermined consultants so as to indulge in phantoms of their own choosing.

This logic implies that some people will interpret makeshift phantom consultants differently, and that these interpretations will inevitably dismiss or embrace their phantoms' amalgamated voice. In other words, Athens has already anticipated this inevitable situation by positing that what rests in the mind or phantom community of the individual is specifically that which will differentiate one person's identity and violence from another's.

In order to arrive at the makeshift phantom consultant's cause and affect, disparate entertainment-violence theorists, researchers, and perpetrators will be relied on. As it remains more convincing to advance a theory by providing detractors a balanced account of the issue at hand, it is worth surmising the core "myths of media violence" as outlined by the media theorist James Potter. Although eleven supportive or unsupportive misconceptions have been posited, most of these pertain to implementations opposed to causations and shall be left out but revisited philosophically in favour of a critical trio of illusions: "Myth 1: Violence in the media does not affect me, but others are at high risk.[...] Myth 6: The media are only responding to market desires.[...] Myth 7: Violence is an essential element in all fiction" (Potter xviii).

The first myth actually appears to border both sides of the makeshift-phantom-consultant debate, for as Potter underscores:

The media continually and profoundly affect everyone, and when the messages are violent, people are at risk for a variety of negative effects.

However, people do not perceive these negative effects happening to them

in their everyday lives—not because those effects don't exist, but because people do not know what to look for as evidence of the effects. (31)

Potter proceeds to explain that while individuals readily express concern for how media violence will affect other people, they themselves feel as though it cannot have an affect on them, a narrow perspective that continues to keep the makeshift phantom consultant from being authentically identified. Lest we forget that in the practice of Sartrean analysis the vulnerable individual has already been deemed guilty by the Other, a rare but crucial determinant permitted by ontological profilers.

In “Existentialism and Criticism,” René Girard poses the question: “How can the privileged position of the observer be justified without a causal link?” The answer, of course, is “bad faith,” which Girard distinguishes on Sartre's behalf as “delusion,” not “the impassable barrier” posited by Freudian and Marxist loyalists (124). Undoubtedly, what Potter's first myth also implies by default is that if individuals did know what to look for they would be able to perceive these negative effects as forces that do exist within interpretive realms. In the end, the mere inability to acknowledge or locate the makeshift phantom consultant does not discount its being but merely reinforces the notion that camouflaged phantoms will not be located if most of us refuse to believe that a search party is even warranted in the first place.

Potter's sixth myth (that “the media are only responding to market desires”) appears to discard the “strength” or poignancy of the makeshift phantom

consultant: "People in the media industry get frustrated by criticism from those who do not recognize that the media companies are businesses and that the purpose of those businesses is to construct audiences [for] advertisers" (127). However, Potter actually sets detractors up for the fall and changes gears after sarcastically claiming that entertainment programmers and distributors truly believe that their audiences cannot get enough of the violent depictions they are being subjected to on a regular basis. He explains how media outlets "also create and shape the demand for violence" and that this is accomplished through "using a storytelling formula that is simple to follow" and pleasurable. "Over time," he notes, "the use of this formula conditions viewers to become attracted to violence" (127). Once more, the correlation to the Athenian phantom community arises instantaneously as Potter refers to a process that actually acclimatizes the individual to embrace violent acts through conditioning and consultation. Indeed, as many other ontologically-minded profilers such as the FBI's Robert K. Ressler, Ann W. Burgess, and John E. Douglas believe: "Understanding the reinforcing quality of actions, be they in fantasy, play, or acting-out behaviours, may lead to different notions regarding not only motivation but also behavior change" (215).³⁵

Potter's seventh myth ("violence is an essential element in all fiction") also appears to discard the makeshift phantom consultant's motivating viability as it implies that the only reason violence has been deemed essential to fiction remains due to the fact that industry writers and storytellers have located a profitable formula—implying by consequence that individualistic creativity and

intent have little or nothing to do with a final universal product. However, Potter does concede that there are verifiable exceptions to this rule and even potential consequences to be imparted by art that transcends the mere methodical cash-cow:

It is possible for more talented writers to use the good-guys/bad-guys formula and in so doing to elevate the formula with a higher level of creativity. that is, to expand the conflict beyond the violence in some way to involve the audience even more. (133)

While Potter is hesitant to specify precisely how the audience will be affected by violent depictions that inadvertently warrant interpretive contemplation, his previous statements have insinuated that different individuals will choose to interpret messages divergently and that the actions proceeding interpretations will be individualized projects.

It is hard, however, to imagine how much more involved one becomes with a fictitious phantom consultant when no meaningful human interlocutors are present to provide alternative clarifications. Now imagine what happens when human interlocutors *are* present but condone the creative violence said individual has been repeatedly subjected to. When the amalgamated voice initiated by the violent makeshift phantom consultant actually corresponds to the amalgamated voice initiated by the violent phantom community, the chance one has of escaping violence remains virtually nonexistent. As Rhodes eerily but honestly deduces in *Why They Kill*: "Violence is the Minotaur; those who survive it spend their lives

threading its maze, looking for the exit” (27). Potter’s alleged “myths” have not so much discounted or solidified the feasible existence of the makeshift phantom consultant so much as they have allowed to further this thesis by announcing the psychological biases that need to be overcome.

A purposeful reinforcement provides yet another point of entry in that camouflaged phantoms will not be located if most people refuse to believe that a search party is even warranted in the first place; and makeshift phantom consultants will continue to remain eternally invisible unless we delineate the specific process that actually acclimatizes individuals to embrace violent arts and acts through imaginative conditioning and consultation. Along with the final two stages of Athenian violentization and Sartrean acts of metamorphosis, the second obstacle exists as precisely that which shall be unearthed in the third chapter. The remainder of this section, however, will be devoted to hardening the allegation that makeshift phantom consultants have always been painless to locate since they have never been gone.

In *It's Not The Media*, Karen Sternheimer also argues against the entertainment/ violence correlation and pithily warns: “Fear can be crippling, especially when we fear something that poses no major threat” (220). Yet in *Killing Monsters: Why Children Need Fantasy, Super Heroes, and Make-Believe Violence*, Gerard Jones demonstrates that fictitious outlets actually manage to establish consequential relationships with vulnerable and isolated audience members. Founder of *Media Power for Children*, Jones actually complements

Athens by acknowledging that “[when] we try to make children banish or ignore their rage, they often respond by identifying themselves completely with it” (214). Jones proceeds to explain that if “violent storytelling isn’t allowed to serve its function, or is connected in young people’s mind with transgression and self-destruction, it can begin to churn obsessively inside without catharsis” (214). What transpires after the self-destructive churning has come to a halt? When *some* kind of action must be taken—and since the same imaginative or phantom interlocutors have not been debunked or erased by primary group members—can we legitimately discount an interpretatively violent course of action? As Steyer confirms in *The Other Parent*, by discounting fantastically provoked violence, we are discarding reality-based evidence:

By now it’s a heart sickening cliché. Alienated, disaffected youths—Dylan Klebold, Eric Harris, Kip Kinkel, Michael Carneal—vent their anger and “get famous” by shooting up a school—in Pearl, Mississippi; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Springfield, Oregon; Littleton, Colorado, or Santee, California—killing not just targeted “enemies” but innocent children and teachers in blasts of bombs or semiautomatic gunfire. [...] There are other similarities too. The young shooters all felt bullied, slighted, or inferior. All were steeped in a hyper violent pop culture of bloody movies and video games. And many saw the massacres as a way not just to get even but to make themselves the center of the media’s attention. (69)

Once again, if primary group members are not present, or simply incapable of imparting affirmative guidance, the isolated individual will inevitably find another interlocutor so as to be the centre of at least one phantom's attention.

In *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals*, Athens readily admits: "Human social experiences can provide a murky and nebulous domain through which one can quickly and easily lose one's way" (21). Just as he once deemed it necessary to bypass the vague generality imparted by Mead's or Sartre's theory of generalized others/Others, we too must filter out the reckless notion that the media as an institution qualifies as a culpable advisor. As recent history serves to identify, there are in fact *specific* makeshift consultants to be designated and considered by dissimilar but verifiably violent criminals: Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris—the Columbine-High shooters from Colorado who murdered twelve students and one teacher before killing themselves on April 20, 1999—had "reprogrammed their copy of *Doom* to simulate the slaughter they were planning and used the game to practice for it" (Jones 168); Kipland Kinkel—the Thurston-High shooter from Oregon who murdered his parents before unleashing forty-eight rounds of ammunition into his unsuspecting classmates on May 21, 1998—"put the lyrics to a Marilyn Manson song on his wall, which asserted that there could be 'no salvation.' His sister reported that it was unlikely that anyone at home ever asked him why those words meant so much to him" (Jones 120); and Michael Carneal—the infamous Heath-High shooter from Kentucky who murdered three classmates and wounded five others on December 1, 1997—

“learned his murderous technique from the movie *The Basketball Diaries*. After he watched the film, he mused to a ninth-grade friend, ‘Wouldn’t it be neat to go in the school and shoot people that you don’t like?’” (Steyer 70).

In his assessment of the allegedly scientific evidence, discarder Jonathan L. Freedman states that while violent creative outlets might cause an isolated individual to become somewhat “excited[,] it is the arousal that affects them, not the content” (208). Freedman’s elementary error resides in the fact that it is not *arousal* that provokes individuals to perform violent acts but *interpretation*. That *Doom*, Marilyn Manson, and *The Basketball Diaries* are harmless if not pleasurable sources of amusement for the masses remains an insignificant detail.³⁶ That specifically isolated individuals have relied on and interpreted such interlocutors much more intimately than others *is* significant. Klebold, Harris, Kinkel, and Carneal had all undergone the physical violentization process at the hands of primary group members—from their homes or schools—and then proceeded to make choices entailing pseudo-escapes into the isolation of imagination wherein individualized interpretations of violent makeshift-phantom-consultants came to be. Since these individuals were made capable of both perpetrating actualized violence and conjuring imaginary violence, and due to the insurmountable amalgamation, their disparate yet overlapping resolutions could have been deemed anticipatory.³⁷

Nevertheless, if in the end an individual’s interpretation of phantoms provides the only concrete evidence, revelations of the perpetrators’ own

observations are in order:

“It’s going to be like fucking *Doom*!” Harris said on one of the tapes, referring to his favorite shoot-em-up video game. “Tick-tock, tick, tick... Ha!...Straight out of *Doom*!” The boys even discussed who would be the best director to immortalize them in a movie, Quentin Tarantino or Steven Spielberg. “Directors will be fighting over this story,” Klebold bragged. (Steyer 70)

Kipland Kinkel covered the bodies of both of his parents with sheets and as he waited through the night, he placed homemade bombs around the home, putting one under his mother’s body. He then turned on the soundtrack to *Romeo and Juliet* to play continuously, and left a note, “I have killed my parents. I am a horrible son.” In his journal, he’d written, “My head just doesn’t work right. Goddamn these voices in my head.” (Ramsland n. pag.)

“I knew I would go to prison, but in my mind I was leaving everything behind.” Carneal told The Courier-Journal. “I perceived my life as miserable. Nobody loved me and nobody cared.” ([Anon.], ““I was leaving everything behind”” n. pag.)

Unfortunately, history also serves to reveal that troubled teenagers are not the only parties susceptible to makeshift phantom consultants. In a statement to the New York Police Department on December 9, 1980, merely hours proceeding his brutal murder of John Lennon, Mark David Chapman told investigators that prior

to arriving at the musician's hotel he had purchased another copy of a novel that he incessantly read, relied on, and consulted with for decades.³⁸ "I'm sure the large part of me is Holden Caulfield, who is the main person in the book. The small part of me must be the Devil" (McGunagle n. pag.). J.D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye*, and more specifically, the novel's protagonist Holden Caulfield, would inadvertently serve as the makeshift phantom consultant to a self-proclaimed loner with limited human resources and outlets.³⁹ Salinger's young hero had raged against "the phonies" of society and Lennon, according to Chapman, was guilty under his character's fictitious charge. As for the killer's own charge that the Devil also played a culpable role, we can now discount this fallacy since imaginary phantom consultants (such as the Devil *or* God) are only conceived of after they are interpreted by the individual who intimately consults either satanic or biblical texts.

In regards to David Berkowitz, Uncle Sam might have equipped The Son of Sam with the physical capability to perpetrate violent acts, however, his actual motivation to manifest evil would inevitably spring from who or what he believed the Devil to be. Upon military discharge, Berkowitz's assumed phantom others, predominantly imaginative in nature, would serve to expose and demystify the construed existence of satanic evil:

All my friends that I knew before had either married or moved away. So I found myself alone and living in New York City. In 1975, however, I met some guys at a party who were, I later found out, heavily involved in the

occult. I had always been fascinated with witchcraft, satanism, and occult things since I was a child. When I was growing up I watched countless horror and satanic movies, one of which was *Rosemary's Baby*. [...] I began to read the Satanic Bible by the late Anton LaVey who founded the Church of Satan in San Francisco in 1966. I began, innocently, to practice various occult rituals and incantations. [...] I did not know that bad things were going to result from all this. Yet over the months the things that were wicked no longer seemed to be such. I was headed down the road to destruction and I did not know it. Maybe I was at a point where I just didn't care anymore. (Berkowitz, n. pag.)

Under an isolated interpretation of metamorphosis, the words imparted by deadly texts locatable in all artistic outlets become, for the isolated and vulnerable recluse, the deadly phantom voices within.

As Psychiatrist Judith Meyers reports in "Cultural Factors in Erotomania and Obsessional Following:"

The link between social isolation and obsessional followers, whether erotomaniac or not, is quite strong. [...] Failures in acculturating may relate to an individual's interpersonal difficulty in engaging people who are different from himself, a lack of flexibility or ethnocentrism, or an inability to establish a support group within the host culture. (214)

In his own statement to the New York Parole Board on Oct. 3, 2000, Chapman endeavoured to explain that he "was very young and stupid, and" that it was easy

to “get caught up in the media and the records and the music” (McGunagle n. pag). Yet Chapman, Berkowitz, Klebold, Harris, Kinkel, or Carneal represent merely a fraction of the modern-day killers who have surmised their enemy others as personified obstacles to freedom after interpreting their specific situations and the choices made available therein. When the only phantoms haunting interpretive valves are improvised, uncontested, and dangerous, excuses attributed to youth or stupidity are themselves nothing short of smokescreens shrouding the existence of legitimate co-conspirators.

Sartre candidly deduces by the end of his own existential/autobiographical profile: “As a militant, I wanted to save myself by works; as a mystic, I attempted to reveal the silence of being by a thwarted rustling of words and, what was more important, I confused things with their names: that amounts to believing” (*The Words* 251).⁴⁰ A sceptical search-party of profilers could have never exposed the identities of makeshift phantom consultants, particularly if these criminologists and alleged media experts were looking anywhere other than inside the individual’s own unique interpretive valves. Once again, a solidification of the existence of the makeshift phantom consultant can only be authentically confirmed by the isolated individual in question who interprets a specific consultant that other individuals might have no interest in or need for. Undoubtedly, if one relies on violent fictive interlocutors in lieu of human interlocutors, be it by choice or by circumstance, the degree of impact will be unfathomable to any and all outsiders. In *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors*

Revisited, Athens might have been defending his own designation of the phantom community, however, this investigation is yet to find the descriptive nomenclature that either discounts or does not directly support the feasibility of the makeshift phantom consultant.

Thankfully, Athens's own makeshift justification provides the necessary validation:

My book is hardly mentioned in criminology textbooks, seldom discussed in research articles or monographs, and never noted in government-sponsored reports on violent crime. There are at least two possible reasons for this neglect. First, perhaps the book is simply devoid of insights. The other possible reason, the one to which I obviously subscribe, is that the interpretive approach in general and its application to violent crime in particular constitute a direct challenge, if not an affront, to the criminologists who control what passes and what does not pass for knowledge in their field. [...] The interpretive approach raises serious questions about assumptions that conventional criminologists take for granted, their accepted procedures, and their real interest in and personal commitment to the problems that they select to study. (*Violent Criminal Acts* 113-114)

This passage confirms that purist existential criminologists in the vein of Sapp and Quinney spotted the indicative trail but neglected to acknowledge the phantom others' accountability in regards to the motivational *why* behind violent

behaviour—instead erasing these invisible spirits from the equation altogether. As this chapter has served to buttress, to delete a phantom one must extinguish an old life and find a new way of existence as one cannot escape their own skin but can *try* to escape the trappings of seclusion.

On their own, Athens's model and Sartre's blueprint are viable for most but not all individuals since, in our contemporary technological world of impersonality, not all of us spend a significant amount of time with other flesh-and-bone beings. When the human others are not around to interfere with or influence an individual's choices, who or what else other than the makeshift phantom consultant—the only intimate interlocutor for the isolated individual intent on fictitious or creative outlets—exists as a feasible co-conspirator?

Jones confirms that as soon as the individual “feels that the most powerful parts of themselves are not seen or acknowledged, then the hidden realm of violent stories can begin to feel like a reality in itself” (214). Whereas our supplement has focussed on designated “violent” makeshift-phantom-consultants, there are obviously positive and even inspirational makeshift consultants that represent, on an individual basis, legitimate interlocutors for throngs of dissimilar actors in the real world. Athens himself should not be surprised to learn that his own anti-violent corpus consistently consults the phantom voice attributed to the American author Thomas Wolfe.⁴¹ In 1989, when an isolated, dismayed, and recently-divorced Athens was struggling in his career—and becoming accustomed to academia's impersonal rejections—he had attempted to vent his frustrations by

taking solace in Wolfe's own artistic outlet of choice.

Rhodes rehashes the specifics:

Remaking his life, Athens was reading Thomas Wolfe and working on a collection of short stories [...] with titles like "The Melting Pot Boils Over," "The Amorous Salesman," "Piggy Crenshaw Drops into the Manchester Café" and "A Mad Greek Comes to Rebeldom" that recycled Athens's childhood as slapstick and dark comedy. (*Why They Kill* 271)

Wolfe was still being consulted with three years later, a fact confirmed by his symbolic appearance in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders*. Athens relies on two of Wolfe's novels, *Look Homeward, Angel* and *The Story of A Novel*—wherein the delineations of conditioned lives and interpreted actions are more than extractable—in order to arrive at "Principle thirteen: Significant social experiences shape our phantom community" (Rhodes, *Why They Kill* 277). As Athens elucidated in his own work: "Although eloquently stated, Wolfe's observation is imprecise. People undergo an almost endless stream of social experiences over their waking lives, but most of them are trivial rather than truly significant" (*Creation of Dangerous* 18). Five years later, upon the publication of *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors*, Athens was not only conjuring Wolfe's phantom voice but attributing direct credit unto the deceased author—whom he had obviously never personally or intimately met—after suggesting that Wolfe's own personal fortitude paved the way for the criminologist's own person perseverance: "Although at first I despised the task because I associated it with

failure, after I finally started it, I experienced a new feeling, one that Thomas Wolfe (1936) sublimely captures in *The Story of A Novel*” (*Violent Criminal Acts* 160). Given that Athens had legitimately relied on a makeshift phantom consultant in order to understand violent crimes, who is to say that another individual cannot rely on a different kind of makeshift phantom consultant in order to perpetrate violent crimes?

Ulmer fittingly suggests that “research should test Athens’s proposition that, if community or even society-wide cultural norms, messages, discourse, media images, etc. cause serious violence, they do so *through* violentization” (178). Indeed, the only fine line remains that which can be established by first-hand experience and interpretation, two irreducible pieces of evidence Sartre would arrive at in his first existential attempt at profiling on Baudelaire: “But the creature he was, by dreaming of impossible escapes, asserted his rights and his supreme value” (*Baudelaire* 98).⁴² Once more, Sartre has inadvertently managed to pre-empt the motivations of makeshift killers and the findings of contemporary criminologists.

Individuals are now fully equipped to enter into the final two stages of Athenian violentization and Sartrean metamorphosis in order to fathom the transformation from aggressively violent action to aggressively creative expression. Becoming familiar with those who have the capacity to become violent and those who do not will be just as important as elucidating Lentricchia and McAullife’s designation of “transgressive artistic desire.” That stated, and

rather than acknowledging the necessity for plausible applications, the next chapter will establish a specific formula—a procedure philosophically inspired by Sartre and symbolically facilitated by Athens—that serves to unmask the acts of metamorphosis fuelling the perpetration of artistically antagonistic manifestations.

Chapter Three:
Creating Violence / Creative Violence

“Wisdom will save you from the ways of wicked men, from men whose words are perverse, who leave the straight paths to walk in dark ways, who delight in doing wrong and rejoice in the perverseness of evil, whose paths are crooked and who are devious in their ways.”

Proverbs 2:12-2:15

“At that instant he saw, in one blaze of light, an image of unutterable conviction, the reason why the artist works and lives and has his being—the reward he seeks—the only reward he really cares about, without which there is nothing. It is to snare the spirits of mankind in nets of magic, to make his life prevail through his creation, to wreak the vision of his life, the rude and painful substance of his own experience, into the congruence of blazing and enchanted images that are themselves the core of life, the essential pattern whence all other things proceed, the kernel of eternity.”

Thomas Wolfe, *Of Time and the River* (550)

The first two stages of Athenian violentization serve to reveal how an individual becomes unwittingly educated in the perpetration of violent choices proceeding interpretations of specifically significant situations. The informal instruction accompanying this education involves one or more of the individual's primary group members assuming the role of a violent coach who always lurks behind any aggressive choices to be made. Athens's subsequent designation of the phantom community serves to expose why an individual becomes unintentionally bound to perpetrating acts of violence proceeding distinct conversations with primary group members. An individual's phantom community symbolizes the primary group's amalgamated voice, an “us” that imparts the significant lessons taught by significant coaches throughout the individual's lifetime: “So although we all make choices we aren't all confronted by the same harsh circumstances [...] and nobody makes the choice to be brutalized. Others make that choice for them” (Athens, “Rethinking Violent Crime” n. pag.). In the end, it remains the individual's own unique interpretation of an immediate environment that

ultimately dictates how or why violence will be avoided or embraced.

In *Saint Genet*, the first two stages of Sartrean metamorphosis serve to reveal how a criminal artist becomes accidentally cultured in the perpetration of hostile acts proceeding isolated interpretations of specifically significant situations as well as microcosmic institutions. The unceremonious edification involves one or more of the deviant being's phantom community members assuming the role of an antagonistic Other lurking behind any aggressive choices to be made. Sartre delineates this Other as an illustration of why the criminal artist arrives at the decision to perpetrate acts of evil proceeding distinct interpretations or altercations. The Other represents the perpetual enemy existing inside and outside of immediate consciousness of self and serves to objectify the individual's quest for freedom or, as Sartre emphatically reiterates, in their quest to be like God. Due to the perpetually intrusive Gaze imparted by the reflective Other, in-itself symbolically representative of that which seizes a criminal's freedom upon conception, confrontational circumstances never cease to exist: "A choice must be made: Genet will destroy the object if he takes hold of it; he will let himself be destroyed if the object takes hold of him" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 265). In the end, it remains the criminal's own unique and immediate environmental assessments that dictate how or why evil acts will be rejected or adopted.

The previous chapter explored how an isolate individual who has undergone the early stages of violentization becomes programmed to make violent choices proceeding unique interpretations of significant artistic outlets. A

camouflaged but conscious consultation involves one or more of the isolated individual's makeshift phantoms assuming the role of an antagonistic other constantly lurking behind any aggressive choices to be made. Our theoretical addendum serves to elucidate why the isolated individual becomes unsuspectingly programmed to perpetrate or recreate acts of violence proceeding distinct interpretations acquired through creatively antagonistic interlocutors. While makeshift consultants are originally delivered through artists' creative wombs, for vulnerable or isolated individuals these phantoms can eventually be adapted and hence transformed into personally-significant community members. Admits the Son of Sam: "I am utterly convinced that something satanic had entered into my mind and that, looking back at all that happened, I realize that I had been slowly deceived" ("Personal Testimony" n. pag.). In the end, Berkowitz's own fantastical detachment, as well as his own personalized delineation of constituent violent-makeshift-phantom-consultants, dictates precisely how and why aggressive acts are simulated opposed to circumvented.

Prior to fathoming the individual's transformation from a potentially violent actor to an aggressively creative artist—that is, before digesting precisely who is responsible for creating and symbolically representing dissimilar makeshift phantom consultants—there must be a presentation of Athens's final two stages of violentization in order to illustrate how individuals who have been prepared for violence through brutalization and defiance proceed to embrace it. Subsequent to our understanding of Athenian violentization, the final two stages

of metamorphosis in *Saint Genet* must also be presented in order to demonstrate how a criminal artist who has been prepared for violence proceeds to fail in the world of physical evil but still manages to express aggression by alternative means. Through a resurrected criminological procedure that elucidates Frank Lentricchia and Jody McAuliffe's own elucidation of "transgressive artistic desire" and proceeds an overall comprehension of the amended Sartrean and Athenian models thus far presented, we shall resituate the formulaic process that clarifies how the perpetration of artistically antagonistic representation *becomes*.

The third stage of Athenian brutalization, dubbed "violent dominance engagements," will be actualized when the defiant individual has simultaneously located and interpreted appropriate conditions in which "to test a newly developed resolve to attack people physically with serious intention of inflicting grave injury upon them" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 63). The line to be crossed has apparently been presented in all of its lucid glory and a choice must be made: To be violent or not to be violent? Or as the criminologist's specific question isolates without the Shakespearean flare: "What is the proper set of circumstances under which the subject will direct his or her belligerence toward others with the explicit intention of gravely injuring them?" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 63). The answer inadvertently embraces poor Hamlet's specifically indecisive situation,⁴³ for "the subject [must be] unduly provoked or suffer greater than minimal provocation. More precisely, the subject must suffer either maximum provocation or at least moderate provocation" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 64). Therefore,

while the individual has reached a breaking point in that they are committed to engage in violent dominance engagements, they are not necessarily prepared to engage in unmitigated violent action if sufficient degrees of *interpreted* provocation fail to present themselves.

After clarifying that in addition to the “specific” circumstance, the “specific” outcome of the violent action remains a critically decisive factor, Athens designates a “specific” type of violent performance called “the violent personal revolt” in which “the protagonist is always a current subjugator of the subject or of a loved one of the subject” (*Creation of Dangerous* 66). Since the subject or individual intends to prevent having to undergo any more physical abuse at the hands of a violent subjugator or coach, the violent personal revolt can be considered a full-blown act of retribution directed at “a perceived evil oppressor” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 66). However, the risk involved in this upheaval accompanies potentially brutal consequences:

If the subject wins, then he or a loved one may escape further oppression at the hands of the subjugator. However, the subject realizes that if he loses, his oppression may become far harsher than before the rebellion was mounted. [...] Thus, for the subject, violent personal revolts usually end as either the ‘sweet victory’ long yearned for or the ‘bitter defeat’ dreaded during past thoughts of defiance. (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 66)

Beyond providing an explanation of how, for instance, domestically battered wives become capable of perpetrating lethally violent reprisals against their

consistently abusive spouses, the aforementioned passage also illuminates precisely how domestically battered wives become incapable of perpetrating such. Athens reiterates the significant details of Case 106, “a middle-aged, married woman who reached the stage of violent dominance engagements but was unable to complete it” (“Violentization in Larger” 15). Insisting that specific factors contributed to this woman’s inability to perpetrate a successful violent act, such as “the repeated major defeats that she suffered at the hands of her husband” or “her aversion to using more lethal tactics to score a major victory over him,” Athens ultimately surmises that this particular case study simply “lacked an aptitude for serious violence” (“Violentization in Larger” 15). Hence, merely possessing the desire for brutality alone will not suffice if an individual is to progress on to the final stage of violentization as a mere indecisive outcome will keep the individual bound to the third stage until or unless they are able to perpetrate an undisputedly triumphant act of viciousness.

Accordingly, violent dominance engagements are crucial in that they inevitably serve to provide a collective backdrop for either the halting of a violent criminal career or, antithetically, the springboard towards one. Cognizant of the fact that “true praxis” consistently requires a consciousness “of the relation between the goal and the means selected for achieving it,” Athens provides a synopsis of violent dominance engagements that this investigation shall purposefully and subsequently utilize as its own springboard towards the Sartrean correlation in *Saint Genet*:

In short, people make their original mitigated violent resolution from their tortuous contemplation about past traumatic violent social experiences – violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent coaching. However, the expansion of this resolution requires much more than mere contemplation. It requires successful praxis or the successful performance of the activity ultimately contemplated – violent action. Nothing expands a person's determination to be violent more than the repeated successful performance of violent action. The more successful the performance or the bigger the violent feat performed, then the more quickly the violent resolution of the person can be expected to deepen and widen. (*Creation of Dangerous* 71)

Whereas the narratives profiled by Athens are imparted by imprisoned case studies who have successfully perpetrated physical violence, Sartre endeavours to analyse the life of an imprisoned case study who attempts to perpetrate physical Evil and fails. As a result, Jean Genet “had decided to be what they had made of him. His original will to assume himself entirely has not changed” (*Saint Genet* 353). At the outset it must be stated that Sartrean purists will undoubtedly remain sceptical of the imminent parallel to Athens's violentization model, particularly if they are still bound to refuting the possibility of culpable conspirators legitimately residing outside of an individual's “self-operating” process (*Saint Genet* 329). But what if those conspirators actually resided consciously *within* said process? If “the monster was fabricated” by those who first bestowed upon him “the primitive

mentality of property owners" (*Saint Genet* 329), Genet can only exist as "self-operating" to the extent that significant directives imparted by phantom community members have metamorphosed into interpretations that now belong to his individualized sense of self. As Genet himself evocatively solidifies:

Not, may I point out, through some swift procedure governed by your principles, but by means of a fatality contained within it, which I have put there, and which, as I have intended, keeps me as witness, field of experimentation and living proof of its virtue and my responsibility. (*The Thief's Journal* 268)⁴⁴

The third stage of metamorphosis in *Saint Genet*, aptly dubbed "The Aesthete," was actualized by Sartre's case study upon his interpretation of the specific situation and circumstances in which to perpetrate a newly developed resolve to perpetrate evil. "As soon as circumstances warrant," vows Sartre, "Genet will invent the gesture that derealizes" (*Saint Genet* 379). This isolated soul, who "dreamt only of doing harm" since the age of fifteen, who upon his release from Mettray and then Fontevrault Prison had maintained his status as a contemptuous outsider, would attempt to undergo the equivalent to Athens's third stage of violentization shortly after his twenty-fifth birthday whereupon Genet "returned to France after a long period of wandering, met a professional burglar and accompanied him on his expeditions" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 355, 402). As stated earlier, there was a legitimate problem as "there is no means of acting on others directly, except physical coercion, which Genet cannot practice" (Sartre,

Saint Genet 420). Once again, regardless of the burning desire to actualize violence, Genet, like Athens's Case 106, would simply lack the necessary aptitude for doling out corporeal punishment. The infamous thief that Genet transformed into was merely a consolation prize, an alternative manifestation of evil that both his specific demeanour and stature allowed for.

"Surrounded by well-built hoodlums," Sartre profiles, "Genet suffered for a long time because of what he called the 'softness' of his muscles. But burglary does not require physical strength" (*Saint Genet* 403). Reinforcing Athens's allegation from the aforementioned synopsis of violent dominance engagements—that people make their original mitigated violent resolution from their tortuous contemplation about their past—Sartre explains that an attempt to perpetrate criminality was for Genet a foreseeable inevitability after tracing the patterns of his significant interactions and interpretations prior to that point in time. However, ensnared in a state of limbo, unable to achieve a successful violent performance and hence unable to progress onto the final stage of Athenian violentization, Genet would have no choice but to halt a violent criminal career and to find a substitute means of antagonism regardless of a lingering desire to exact legitimate physical damage. "According to him," adds Sartre. "this revelation was decisive: 'I went to theft as to a liberation.' That is how he views his life: a long period of absence between two interventions from without" (*Saint Genet* 402). Left to contemplate the violent subjugation he has already undergone and the acts of violent reprisal he will never commit, Genet finds himself

attempting to escape the reality of his situation through an aesthetic amalgamation of his dreams and criminal acts.

When out burglarizing his bourgeoisie victims, Genet was well known for creating fictional scenarios wherein victims' homes and possessions transformed into symbolic backdrops for self-indulgent performances.⁴⁵ Sartre explains that Genet's "acts are both poems and crimes because they are dreamt for a long time before being committed and because he still dreams them while committing them" (*Saint Genet* 160). Therefore, although Genet finds himself trapped within the third pivotal stage of violent development, he nevertheless undergoes his most pivotal act of metamorphosis in that: "By his *gesture-creating act* he re-enters the world and installs himself in it. For the ambiguity of the material traps results in the insertion of the imaginary as such into the web of the real" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 421). Clearly, the isolation of imagination has the capacity to serve as an integral launch pad as much as it does a dangerous escape.

Prior to revealing precisely what the final act of metamorphosis would become for Genet and thereby solidifying Lentricchia and McAuliffe's perception of "transgressive artistic desire," a delineation of Athens's final stage of "virulency" must be digested. Indeed, while Jean Genet had been fortunate in that he was able to successfully locate and channel alternative aesthetic outlets for his aggression despite an inability to perform violent acts, this shapeshifter-of-a-man merely represents a single case study. In other words, what of those individuals who have undergone the requisite stages of "brutalization," "defiance," and

“violent dominance engagements,” and who are equipped to become nothing short of bona-fide violent offenders?

As the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky once maintained in *Thought and Learning*: “To imitate, it is necessary to possess the means of stepping from something one knows to something new. With assistance, every child can do more than he can by himself” (187). Vygotsky was infamous for elucidating the social theory informing and surrounding “Zones of Proximal Development,” which encompass the designated space that separates what an individual has the capacity to learn on their own opposed to that which they can achieve with the aid of an adult assuming the role of a motivational teacher or coach. The psychologist posited that through a demonstrative process known as “scaffolding” the makeshift student successfully accomplishes more difficult feats when aided by adult consultants. Of course, whereas “Zones of Proximal Development” aim at elucidating the stages and attainable results surrounding intelligent or affirmative coaching, Athens’s criminological model obviously functions in reverse to the extent that it elucidates the negative stages and consequences imparted by violent or non-affirmative coaching.

Despite the fact that both socio-cultural blueprints of human development involve the purposeful analyses of significant interactions and contemplative stages of internalization, the individual who enters into Athens’s final stage of virulency has been prepared for making violence—whereas the individual who enters into Vygotsky’s final zone of proximal development has been prepared for

making the honour roll. Indeed, virulency horrifically picks up where the violent dominance engagement leaves off for, as Dumont imparts in *Recipe for Violence*, “the person is now rewarded for violent behavior with a reputation for toughness and deference” (47). Regrettably, the individual has triumphed in his or her violent dominance engagement and has thereby honoured “an earlier resolution to attack people physically who overtly provoke with the serious intention of gravely harming them” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 72). Beyond the individual’s sense of pride or self-fulfilment for having successfully actualized the violence long yearned for, in order for the successful engagement to be significantly imprinted on any perpetrator’s mind there must be a significant external judgement made by a Sartrean Other.

“Thus,” adds Athens, “the job of impressing the subject with the full significance of his successful violent action is gladly performed by other people who [...] always seem to take a perverse interest and pleasure in violence” (*Creation of Dangerous* 72). Consequently, and despite the individual’s own unique interpretation of his or her own specific situation, outside opinions communicated by secondary acquaintances or phantom community members will directly and considerably contribute to this violent individual’s conception of self. Now perceived as legitimately violent, the individual immersed in the final stage becomes aware that judgments made by others “have suddenly and drastically changed in the wake of the violent feat” for “they no longer see the subject as they did before the latest violent performance” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 72-

73). Therefore, cognizant of the fact that others are taking particular pains not to offend or provoke in any way, the individual proceeds to take stock of a created identity moulded by outside forces. Hamlet's "to be or not to be" contemplation inadvertently returns as the conflicted being is back in a position where he or she must either choose to accept and adopt this newfound notoriety or to deny and disallow it altogether. Since this investigation has been dealing with the creation of dangerous violent offenders, let us presuppose the former choice has been made:

As a result of these reverberations, the individual becomes overly impressed with the violent performance and ultimately with themselves in general. Filled with feelings of exultancy, the individual concludes that since they performed this violent feat, there is no reason why they cannot perform even more impressive violent feats in the future. [...] From the lofty heights of this new psychic plateau, the subject makes a new violent resolution which far surpasses the one made before the latest violent feat. They now firmly resolve to attack people physically with the serious intention of gravely harming or even killing them for the slightest or no provocation whatsoever, whereas before the individual had resolved to do this only if more than minimally provoked by someone. (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 75)

Accordingly, in order to catapult the making of a killer, a final "malevolent" choice must be embraced.⁴⁶ The individual's culminating experience with life-

long violence has triggered a complete and radical metamorphosis from within as the designated violent offender paradoxically turns into an amalgamated vitalized and toxic force.

“By the end of this last stage,” enforces Dumont, “the person sensing ‘evil’ in another is culpable of acts of sadistic, unremitting, or lethal violence” (47). “Consequently,” adds Athens, “the added nefarious distinction of being not only a violent, but a *dangerous* violent criminal can now be rightfully bestowed” (*Creation of Dangerous* 79). Inevitably, the final transformation—that has been triggered by a final transformation—will not be undergone by the dangerous violent individual in question but by their primary group members. Intimates begin to steer clear of the individual altogether so as to avoid the likely possibility of violence erupting around them. (“Meanwhile,” writes Athens, “the subject may find that he is now a welcome and desired companion among malevolent groups for whom having violent reputation is a social requirement” (*Creation of Dangerous* 76)).

Pending an allocation or transition into a new primary group, the individual will often have no choice but to endure significant periods of social isolation. As the previous chapter attests, assailants such as Mark Chapman and David Berkowitz had each individually come to exemplify the role of rebuffed recluse only too well by relying on makeshift phantom consultants in lieu of affirmative human consultants. Once again—how and why could these dissimilar killers perpetrate the specific acts of savagery that they did? Athens, despite his

disbelief in the impact of the fantastical or make-believe, has nevertheless responded: “Without new primary groups to fill the void created by the loss of former groups, the subject becomes the proverbial violent outcast and loner so often read about in the popular press” (*Creation of Dangerous* 76).

Jean Genet himself was an undeniable outcast and loner so often read about in the popular press, however, for reasons altogether different than those propelling the aforementioned criminals. Genet’s manifestation of violent perpetration proceeding his third stage of metamorphosis was not to be physically actualized on a *literal* level. Alternatively, his aggression was to be creatively simulated on a *literary* level. As in Athens’s model, the opening moments of the final metamorphosis contain the same “to be or not to be” contemplation: Genet, painstakingly aware of the fact that he has been created to create violence, desiring nothing other than to perpetrate the evil he has thoroughly committed himself to, will undergo his final transformation upon locating an alternatively aggressive expression that—in regards to both steadfast commitment and motivational intent—purposefully leads to the equivalent of Athens’s final stage of virulency.

Aware of the desperation that ultimately fuels this conversion, Sartre explicates:

As one can readily imagine, these reflections do not occur to him all at once. Nor in that order. One can also assume that he did not reach his decision overnight. Writing: what could be stranger, more ridiculous, and

more intimidating too, for this vagabond? Can one conceive the insolence and madness of the project of imposing himself upon the Just who condemn him or are unaware of him? And besides, to write is to communicate: if he wishes to infect right-thinking people with his dreams, he will have to be concerned with what goes on in their heads. [...] We have seen him go from the act to the gesture and from the gesture to the word; but in order to go from the word to the work of art he must travel a long road, a road full of pitfalls. It is along this road that we are going to follow him. (*Saint Genet* 422-423)

Following this course of enquiry, Ringer affirms in *Saint Genet Decanonized*: “Genet’s situation as outsider will determine not only how we read him but also how he perceives writing” (46). Resolved to proverbially pick up the pen and not the sword, by the age of twenty-eight, Genet found himself in the specific situation that would catapult his final transformation and effectually pave the way for one of the most influential European writers of the twentieth century. Sartre recalls: “One day, Genet thought he was being challenged, or rather he challenged himself: but he did so precisely because he judged himself *capable* of winning” (*Saint Genet* 427). Genet—who “composed verses the way a bully beats up the one who has provoked him: to establish superiority” (*Saint Genet* 427) — relays the details of this specific encounter in one of his countless interviews with his existential profiler and thereby reveals the pivotal element that Athens’s final stage entails; namely, the judgment made and handed down by the Other:

I was pushed into a cell where there were already several prisoners in ‘city’ clothes. [...] They despised me. I later had the greatest difficulty in overcoming their attitude. Among them was a prisoner who composed poems to his sister, idiotic, snivelling poems that they all admired. Finally, in irritation, I said that I could do just as well. They challenged me and I wrote *The Condemned Man*. I read it to them and they despised me even more. (*Saint Genet* 427)⁴⁷

While this passage appears to divulge the creative equivalent of a failed Athenian-conceived violent dominance engagement, “whatever Genet does in the attempt to be reintegrated into the black society will be a deliberate courting of failure.” (*Saint Genet* 429). Once again, the perpetrating individual’s interpretation of the outcome alone necessitates a consecration of victory.

Through his composition of “The Condemned Man,” Genet would prove to himself that, in regards to creating evil and despite Sartre’s revisions, the Cartesian assertion “I think; therefore I am” requires no consequential alterations.⁴⁸ Violence can in fact be perpetrated on page and words do in fact have the capacity to become weapons. Genet eventually succeeds in more intense artistic dominance engagements and consequentially blossoms into a prolific writer of antagonistic verse prior to assuming the nefarious or infamous distinction Athens would have bestowed. Once again, this particular criminal does not *become* the artist in order to please others but to abusively annihilate their senses the only way that he can—affirming his isolation, self-sufficiency, and

new-found notoriety in the process. "In short," writes Sartre, "incapable of *carving out* a place for himself in the universe, he *imagines* in order to convince himself that he has created the world which excludes him" (*Saint Genet* 468). Undoubtedly, "his art will always smack of its origins, and the 'communication' at which he aims will be of a very singular kind" (*Saint Genet* 481-482). Consequently, and just as Athens's final stage of virulency serves as an active backdrop for the isolated individual's culmination of life-long violent episodes, Genet's expressive canvas serves as a rebel's backdrop for his own culmination of life-long evil.

In one important way, the Sartrean correlation to the final Athenian stage has been presented as intentionally vague. But why has this technique been implemented? In truth, because to throw out modified clichés like "the pen can be mightier than the sword" or "words can be mightier than weapons" shall remain irresponsible gestures unless the precise formula that legitimize said claims becomes unmasked. Just as Athens's violentization process in conjunction with his elucidation of phantom communities serve to demystify those misleading media taglines mentioned by Rhodes (such as "no apparent motive" "he just snapped" and "we will probably never know why"), we too must distinguish the authentically formulaic course of development undergone by imaginatively antagonistic creators or symbolic embodiments of violent makeshift phantom consultants.

To buttress and fortify the neo-existential-criminological formula fuelling

the creation of *artistically*-dangerous violent offenders, a salient reiteration of Lentricchia and McAuliffe's conception of transgressive artistic desire can do us no harm. As the scholarly duo define in *Crimes of Art + Terror*:

What the transgressive artist relentlessly desires [...] is the insistent recarving out of all outlines of personality and all human variety. The transgressive artist, then, in active rebellion against the culture's need to commodify him, creates "something living, something capable of constant transformation"—Pound's definition of the character of serious literature. The crime of the authentic artist is nothing other than the crime of originality. [...] The transgressive artist believes himself to be the one undegraded opponent of a corpsed world—weaponless except for the originality of his writing: the only human countercultural response, whose failure would necessitate physical force. (21-22)

Lentricchia and McAuliffe's clearly existentially-informed designation loses much of its original impact upon recalling any one of Sartre's countless differentiations between neutral and aggressive creators. Consider the following passage, wherein their wording and intent familiarly resound:

Unlike artists, who usually heighten beauty of form by pleasantness of sensation and who carve even their monsters in marble, Genet denies us all delight: the diamond he offers has to be sought in a gob of spit; the more its gleam attract us, the more the saliva repels us; although the jewel may fascinate us, we cannot forget that our hand is going to touch an

ignoble substance. (*Crimes of Art + Terror* 389)

Thus Lentricchia and McAuliffe's conception of transgressive artistic desire, "which wants to make art whose very originality constitutes a step across and beyond the boundaries of the order in place" (*Crimes of Art* 2)—and which has been mistakenly hailed as "a new form of literary criticism" by the University of Chicago Press (Lentricchia, "Interview" n. pag.)—has merely been repackaged in an attempt to resurrect the motives surrounding violent makeshift phantom consultants. Sartre himself does not receive any points for originality as he too purposefully borrowed from others in an effort to correlate the two forms of violent expression herein under deliberation. For example, in 1827, De Quincey's "Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts" served to prelude a concluding section in *Saint Genet* inversely entitled "On the Fine Arts Considered as Murder." However, perhaps sanctioned imitation remains a deliberate, necessary and illustrative device when one symbolically attempts to elucidate the formulaic and interpretive process of creation supporting theories that propel "crime as art" and "art as crime."

"Do onto others as they have done onto you, but do it to them first" (Athens "Violentization in Larger" 18). While this inverted "motto" exists as a maxim for ultra-violent criminals (and paranoid schizophrenics) accustomed to entropic trappings, Athens realizes that antagonistic expression remains nothing short of a simulation of past violent experiences and coaches metamorphosed into present-day phantoms of inspiration. In *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct*,

Andrews and Bonta reinforce that a “lack of interpersonal controls and the failure to develop internal controls for prosocial behaviours ‘frees’ the person to act according to idiosyncratic and bizarre fantasies” (321). How does the isolated transgressive artist who attempts to assault his or her audience come to be? The answer, as will be demonstrated, is through a creatively makeshift yet admissibly correlated four-stage developmental process that parallels Athenian violentization. As substitution begets substitution, one should not be shocked at the plausible evidence revealed prior to replacing literal terms such as “violence” or “violent offenders” with philosophical counterparts such as “transgressive artistic creation” or “transgressive artists.”

In his concluding remarks about *Violent Acts And Violentization: Assessing, Applying, And Developing Lonnie Athens' Theories*,⁴⁹ Ulmer suggests: “Interactionists would do well to engage, incorporate, use, and evaluate Athens’ distinctive theory of the self and its phantom communities” for a myriad of dissimilar purposes (181). As demonstrated by the ten other dissimilar contributors to the anthology individually inspired by Athens’s distinctive theory, this investigation has certainly been pre-empted by disparate societal profilers who have allowed “brutalization,” “defiance,” “violent dominance engagements,” and “virulency” to be metamorphosed for numerous fields of enquiry. However, despite any modifications made to Athens’s transformational stages, the critical constant remains the offending individual’s or aggressive artist’s own unique motives and interpretations. To bolster this investigation’s own purposeful

designation of the substitutive definitions surrounding artistic violentization, Sartre's observations on killers and artists from the latter sections of *Saint Genet*—once again, the exemplary profile of a criminal artist who perpetually becomes—will be called upon to solidify the following makeshift-model's existence:

Stage 1. *The Metamorphosis: Imaginative Brutalization*

Stage 2. *First Conversion: Creative Defiance*

Stage 3. *Second Conversion: Artistically-Violent Dominance Engagements*

Stage 4. *Final Metamorphosis: Artistic Virulency*⁵⁰

At the outset, it must be re-emphasized that there remains an extraordinary difference between the artist who intends to create beauty (and thus inspire) and the transgressive artist who desires to create evil (and thus repel). The latter brand, Sartre explains, "has no particular desire to produce a 'well-made work,' he is unconcerned with *finish*, with formal perfection: for him, beauty lies elsewhere, in the ceremonious splendor of sacrilege and murder" (*Saint Genet* 484). Lentricchia and McAuliffe purposefully reinforce: "In true transformation, we are possessed and catapulted out of the ordinary—taken over by original vision with no wiggle room for rational escape" (*Crimes of Art* 12). Hence, those creators in the vein of Freud and even Jung—who believed that "an artist is 'man' in a higher sense--he is 'collective man'--who carries and shapes the unconscious, psychic life of mankind" ("Psychology and Literature" 221), are either holding back the truth about invention for their own sinister purposes or simply unaware

of an inherently existential and thereby radically individualistic manifestation of salvation. Regardless, this investigation remains solely concerned with those artists who have been recognized by profilers in the vein of Jean Cocteau, who, in the spirit of symbolic interactionism, deemed artistic inspiration to be “a profound indolence of our incapacity to put to work certain forces in ourselves” (“The Process of Inspiration” 82).⁵¹

The transgressive artist-in-the-making undergoes imaginative brutalization upon encountering, as an audience member, their first significantly-antagonistic piece of virulent art. As in the Athenian stage of brutalization, the composite experience of “[aesthetically] violent subjugation,” “personal [aesthetic] horrification” and “[aesthetically] violent coaching” must be experienced regardless of any timeline for the first stage to be considered complete. Aesthetically violent subjugation is undergone by the transgressive artist-in-the-making upon submitting creative senses and standards to the hostile intentions of the virulent creator responsible for the piece of subversive art under consideration. By the time the transgressive artist-in-the-making has finished interpreting or experiencing the lessons or themes imparted by their artistically-violent makeshift consultant, they are left in a heightened state of both created and creative excitement. The recurring fantasies consisting of imitative “battering, maiming, torturing, or murdering” (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 33) through simulated acts of creation consumes this artist-to-be; however, within this primary stage they are left without the confidence or tactical know-how to perpetrate the

simulated violence they have been imaginatively seduced by.

Personal aesthetic horrification is undergone by the transgressive artist-in-the making when they witness another individual or artist-in-the-making enduring and interpreting aesthetically violent subjugation through a convincingly-antagonistic piece of art imparted by an equally-convincing antagonistic artist. As the transgressive artist-in-the-making will eventually require an audience to creatively assault, it is imperative to witness the sensory effects of aesthetically violent subjugation on an audience member so as to reaffirm the transformational affects of virulent artists who delight in the corruption of imagination. Reassured that aesthetically violent subjugation can have the same affect on others, the transgressive artist-in-the-making proceeds to engage recurring fantasies consisting of imitative battering, maiming, torturing, or murdering upon confirmation that virulent art, when interpreted as significant and legitimate, achieves the horrific means *intended* by virulent artists. Bear in mind the symbolic interactionist's correlation—in conjunction with tactically substitutive rewording—from what would be *The Creation of Artistically-Dangerous Violent Criminals*:⁵²

According to conventional wisdom, there is always an enormous difference between undergoing [a virulently artistic] experience oneself and experiencing someone else undergoing it. However, the conclusion should not be drawn that undergoing [aesthetically] violent subjugation has a greater impact upon [a transgressive artist-in-the-making] than

undergoing personal [aesthetic] horrification. The [inspirational] part of *both* of these odious experiences is the twisted feelings and thoughts which can linger on in a disordered state long after the immediate experiences which generated them cease. Thus, although the experience of personal [aesthetic] horrification may be less [inspirational] than [aesthetically] violent subjugation from a [*creative*] standpoint, it is not less [inspirational] from a *psychological* standpoint. (44)

In addition to aesthetically violent subjugation and personal aesthetic horrification, aesthetically violent coaching must be practiced upon the transgressive artist-in-the-making as this enduring experience constitutes the final obligatory component of imaginative brutalization.

Sociologists Ginger Rhodes, George J. Allen, Joseph Nowinski and Antonius H. N. Cillessen have recently employed “the Violent Socialization Scale (VSS)” in an attempt to measure the progressive elements of Athens’s violentization model.⁵³ In regards to the first stage of imaginative brutalization, the researchers would conclude:

[Transgressive artists-in-the-making] forced to endure [Aesthetically] Violent Subjugation and Personal [Aesthetic] Horrification do not necessarily turn to [aesthetically] violent [artists]. The addition of [Aesthetically] Violent Coaching, however, appears to set the stage for the potential development of later [virulently artistic acts of] aggressiveness. (142)

Unlike the limited number of violent coaches an individual inadvertently learns from in physical violentization, in artistic violentization, violent coaches are not only represented by the human teachers who practice and/or preach violent and/or aesthetically violent manifestations—through “techniques” that include “vainglorification,” “ridicule,” “coercion,” “haranguing,” and “besiegement”—but also by the limitless number of artistically antagonistic interlocutors that an isolated artist-in-the-making incessantly seeks out whenever he or she becomes intrigued or overwhelmed with the desire to create, to inspire or to simply *be* evil.

Thus, artistically antagonistic outlets manage to impart malefic intent through techniques that dissimilar virulent artists themselves impart through transgressive artistic desire. We have already alluded to some of the medieval aesthetically-violent coaches. However, considering specific examples of virulent artists and their artistically virulent manifestations have been suggested by Lentricchia and McAuliffe, let us surmise a chronologically-illustrative sampling of the aesthetically sinister tutelage interpreted as contemporary makeshift phantoms: Fyodor Dostoevsky’s *Notes From Underground* (1864) and *Crime and Punishment* (1866); Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* (1902); Thomas Mann’s *Death in Venice* (1912); W.B. Yeats’ “Easter, 1916” (1916); Jean Genet’s *Our Lady of The Flowers* (1944) and *The Thief’s Journal* (1949); J.D. Salinger’s *The Catcher in the Rye* (1951); Jean Genet’s *Deathwatch* (1954), *The Balcony* (1956), *The Blacks* (1958) and *The Screens* (1961); Anthony Burgess’s *A Clockwork Orange* (1962); Stanley Kubrick’s *A Clockwork Orange* (1972); John

Cassavetes's *The Killing of a Chinese Bookie* (1976); Martin Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* (1977); Jack Henry Abbot's *In the Belly of the Beast* (1981); Thomas Bernhard's *Wittgenstein's Nephew* (1982); Gordon Lish's *Dear Mr. Capote* (1983); Martin Scorsese's *The King of Comedy* (1983); Thomas Bernhard's *Heldenplatz* (1988); Don DeLillo's *Mao II* (1991); Brett Easton Ellis's *American Psycho* (1991) (Lentricchia and McAuliffe, *Crimes of Art* 1-168).⁵⁴

While listings of virulent artists and artworks remain potentially endless, clearly, as demonstrated through title revisions, inscriptions, remakes and adaptations, transgressive artistic desire remains something learned, experienced, and created as opposed to a supernatural gift handed down or up. In the end, "[aesthetically violent] coaching does not necessarily teach the [transgressive artist-in-the-making] how to [create]. Instead, the [aesthetic] coach teaches that, when [inspired], taking [artistically violent] action is a personal obligation" (Rhodes, Allen, Nowinski, and Cillessen 127).

Upon entering the second stage of artistic violentization, creative defiance, the artist-in-the-making has been left to contemplate the next logical stage in their creative development by inwardly pondering rhetorical questions in the vein of: "Do killers, artists, and terrorists need one another?" (Lentricchia and McAuliffe, *Crimes of Art* 2). As in Athenian defiance, the artist-in-the-making consciously proceeds to examine the undeniable difference that exists between the idyllic manner in which individuals should treat one another and the authentically violent manner in which they do treat one another. The intensity that accompanies the

transgressive artist-in-the-making's inward contemplation cannot be underscored since artistic "experiences as odious and [inspirational] as those undergone during [imaginative] brutalization leave a dark and indelible imprint upon the mind" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 57-58). Consequently, the artist-in-the-making, desiring nothing other than to replicate and control the artistic antagonism they have been seduced and assaulted by in the past, begins to undergo a mental transformation that terminates the passive audience member previously assaulted by artistic violence while giving birth to the aspiring virulent creator who perpetrates through artistic antagonism.

The transgressive artist-in-the-making thus makes a commitment to attempt his or her own unique brand of violent creation when or if provided with the feasible opportunity, supplies or means to do so. "It is *as if* the [artist-in-the-making] had been partially deaf and has only now heard what his coach had been telling them: resorting to [artistic] violence is sometimes necessary in this world" (Athens, *Creation of Dangerous* 60). In short, during the creative defiance stage of artistic violentization, the transgressive artist-in-the-making vows that since they are not inclined, equipped or prepared to harm people through corporeal gestures, they will embrace the next best thing and thereby aesthetically invent the aggression prompted from the blending of the inspirationally wrenching experiences of aesthetically violent subjugation, personal aesthetic horriification, and aesthetically violent coaching.

As it remains an impossibility for the transgressive artist-in-the-making to

become a virulent artist until a legitimate attempt to actualize the creative violence thus far only fantasized about transpires, artistically-violent dominance engagements constitute the third stage of the artistic violentization process. Perhaps the quintessential example of an evil artist-in-the-making entering into an artistically-violent dominance engagement remains the previously mentioned incident wherein Genet, upon hearing the poem of a fellow prisoner and insisting that it could be outdone, composes and recites “The Condemned Man” amidst jeers. Though Genet does not conventionally prevail in that particular incident, Athens would have surmised that “the sheer profundity of his realization, together with the renewed need for taking decisive [artistic] violent action against a protagonist, only hardens the subject’s resolve” (*Creation of Dangerous* 69-70). Of course, the quintessential example of an aesthetically aggressive field that actually supplies an outlet for artistically-violent dominance engagements remains an offshoot of advertently combative poetry, modern-day battle-rapping.⁵⁵ As Director Curtis Hanson describes during the making of his film *8 Mile*:

Free-style rap battles, opponents using words as fists. The words are improvised as quickly as they are spit. They rhyme, they are to a beat, and they are aimed directly at the specific weaknesses of the opponent. And when you see these battles, you see their dexterity with words, and their use of words as weapons, you see the way in which they hurl invective at each other literally as fists, as though it were a boxing match. (“Battle Rhyme for Real Time” n. pag.)

For those who doubt the impact of a defeat in a *mere* “artistically-violent” dominance engagement, heed the following words by the virulent artist Marshall Mathers,⁵⁶ whose own life-story fuels the artistry behind Hanson’s motion picture:

If I lost a battle, it would feel like my entire world would be crumbling. And a lot of people would say: “What’s the big deal? Get over it. You lost. Try again. Whatever.” “No, you don’t understand. I just lost a battle. My whole life is over.” That’s how you feel. (“Battle Rhyme for Real Time” n. pag.)

Therefore, be it an early rendition of Jean Genet attempting to creatively assault his fellow prisoners through belligerent lyrics or “The Real Slim Shady” (Mathers) attempting to creatively assault his fellow opponents through precisely the same means, once again, what remains just “as important as the operating circumstances surrounding an [artistically-]violent dominance engagement is its immediate outcome” (Athens, “Violentization in Larger” 13).

Physically violent offenders rely upon other people’s judgements in conjunction with their bloodied opponent’s inability to fight on or back as indicative signs of whether or not dominance engagements have been successfully perpetrated. Artistically violent offenders, on the other hand, must rely on the affirmative judgements of dissimilar audience members in conjunction with legitimate critics who provide dissimilar forums in which to express virulent art. Hence, artistically-violent dominance engagements are often decided for the

aspiring evil creator by publishing houses, record labels, film studios, art galleries, et al. For the virulent artist to legitimize the impact he or she has desired to impart upon the masses since entering into the second stage of artistic violentization, their work must be *interpreted* as possessing the killer or marketable combination of salacious skill and ominous appeal for the fourth and final stage to be entered.

Contrarily, if the artist-in-the-making is unable to complete all requisite stages of artistic violentization, even imaginary violence inevitably fades away as a viable option and the transgressive artist-in-the-making will be demoted back to their mundane and original status of isolated individual. In other words, alternative fields will have to be located in which to express created and creative evil. As in traditional Athenian violentization, merely possessing the desire to create violence does not suffice without a viable audience willing to undergo and vouch for a virulent artist's inventiveness. Aspiring malefic creators who are horribly or incessantly defeated in violently-artistic dominance engagements will thereby be left in a state of limbo as their evil will never be born. Thus the final stage of artistic violentization, artistic virulency, propels the successful virulent artist *alone* into the role of nefarious or malevolent creator. Moreover, upon acceptance of both new-found and new-formed "notoriety," the inward contemplation is now foreseeable: "Overly impressed with a sudden rise from a lowly [artist-in-the-making] to a lofty [virulent artist], he [or she] becomes arrogant" (Athens, "Violentization in Larger" 17).

Of course, it is not so much the *arrogance* than it is the *confidence* of this newly-hailed virulent artist that ultimately drives them to create and embody what we now unequivocally know to be violent makeshift phantom consultants. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, artistic violentization remains nothing other than an application of an existential brand of symbolic interactionism to the making of dangerous artistry. If not for the four significant acts of metamorphosis as profiled in *Saint Genet*, both the rationale and the feasibility serving to inspire a specific formulaic model of antagonistic creation would have never existed. Indeed, this thesis would have never had the scholastic prompt or gall to promote artistic violentization as a viable developmental process unless both Athens and Sartre's own correlative models supported the evidence. Hence, the artistic violentization process serves to demonstrate *how* transgressive artists are created. Transgressive artistic desire serves to demonstrate *why*.

Finally, as Athens himself might have recapitulated by the close of *The Creation of Artistically-Dangerous Violent Offenders*:

In short, the theory developed here explains the creation of [artistically-] dangerous violent criminals as taking place through [an artistic] *violentization* process comprised of four stages, each one of which is based upon distinct [aesthetic] experiences. Thus, this [artistic] violentization process is from top to bottom a [creatively] experiential one. As will be recalled, the notion of [aesthetic] experience as used here integrates, rather than segregates, the human [mind] with its [creative]

environment, so that factors playing upon [virulent artists] from inside their bodies and from outside in their [creative] environments are not falsely separated into two different realms. (89)

The differences between artists who create imaginary crimes and criminals who perpetrate real-life crimes are non-existent. Both are equally culpable as their motivations have been respectively imparted by correlative phantom communities and makeshift phantom consultants. Although the following chapter will examine the specific breed of criminal artist who undergoes both physical violentization *and* artistic violentization, the veracity of the latter should be confirmed through a conclusive summation of Sartre's creative criminology. For instance, in *Saint Genet*'s component "On The Fine Arts Considered As Murder," the existentialist poses a rhetorical question that countless hostile creators throughout the ages have tactically dared to answer (prior to transforming this question into the basis for justifications and inspiration alike): "Since murderers achieve glory by forcing good citizens to dream about crime, why should [the virulent artist] not enjoy similar glory by forcing them to dream about it without becoming a criminal?" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 485).

Sartre readily confirms: "Haunted by the problem of the Other, which is *his* problem, [the virulent artist] has spent his life mediating on the phenomenon of embodiment. He had to *make himself become* the Other that he already was" (*Saint Genet* 489). Genet himself alludes to these phantoms of inspiration in his infamous confession: "I recognize in thieves, traitors and murderers, in the

ruthless and the cunning, a deep beauty—a sunken beauty” (*The Thief’s Journal* 64). Those creators who choose to ignore the significance of symbolic interactionism, and even those who have mistakenly substituted an almighty power for a phantom community member (such as Nietzsche in his *Composition of Thus Spake Zarathustra*)⁵⁷ will never be equipped or informed enough to unmask his or her original crisis. Sartre explains that this crisis is in fact nothing other than the fatal instant—the initial moment of violent creation for Athenians—as incessant repetition perpetually haunts the virulent artist as an inescapable consequence to be accepted as bi-product. Therefore, in regards to Genet:

*All the basic themes of his thought and life are to be found in each of his works; one recognizes the same motifs from book to book: would anyone dream of reproaching him for this? If so, one would have to condemn Dostoevsky for having written the same novel over and over and Kafka for having written the same story a hundred times. (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 484)*

Sartre had in fact challenged the criminologists of his day to read between the artistically sinister lines. Eerily enough, more than a half-century would pass before Lentricchia and McAuliffe seized upon the precise relationship that exists between our watchdogs and those allegedly reduced to impotence when the scholastic duo agreed to open *Crimes of Art + Terror* with a sensationally deplorable correlation between the physical and artistic violence that embodied

the manifestation of evil that transpired on September 11, 2001.⁵⁸

Contemplate the following: “He will make the innocent discover the Other in himself; he will make him recognize the Other’s most improper thoughts as his own; in short, he will make them experience with loathing his own wickedness” (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 495). Is this Sartre speaking of the virulent artist as fuelled by transgressive artistic desire? Or is it Lentricchia and McAuliffe speaking of Osama Bin Laden as fuelled by the desire to exact revenge upon the West? The quote remains equally applicable and particularly so for postmodernist audience members accustomed to having the broader distinctions blurred by disparate makeshift phantom consultants and mortal community members alike. However, despite the fact that malefic intent remains hard at work behind both species of criminal mastermind, the former interpretation is to be credited herein for “to read Genet is to let poetic beauty feed upon prose. And it is also, for the reader, a new way of being a criminal” (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 517).

Fortunately, it does not require an analyst, an artist, or even a criminologist to confirm precisely how, proceeding a developmental process entailing “imaginative brutalization,” “creative defiance,” “artistically-violent dominance engagements,” and “artistic virulency,” evil thinkers transform into aesthetically nefarious perpetrators. “Thus,” Sartre explicates, “the criminal is an archetype of the Ethics of Evil. And [...] the greater murderers whose photos Genet pins on the walls of his prison cell play for him the role of intercessors” (*Saint Genet* 87). As the final chapter of this thesis will confirm, the impact of

criminal artists who have experienced the full spectrum of created and creative violence remain the best equipped and most perfectly positioned of makeshift profilers to support the evidence presented herein. Consequently, there only remains one pivotal question left to be posed: How does a virulent artist wishing to both exact and examine manifestations of evil transform into an authentically *hardened* criminologist?

Chapter Four:
Hardened Criminals / Hardened Criminologists

"I'm struggling like a magician who tries to prevent a charm, who wants to destroy a rival's spell. I'm struggling like a chosen victim who has been sighted and is already caught. I'm struggling without moving, with all my attention taut and vibrant. I'm waiting. I'll explode later on. I'm hardening. I'm struggling."

Jean Genet, *Miracle of the Rose* (289)

"The model we emulate is a fanatically defiant and alienated individual who cannot imagine what forgiveness is, or mercy or tolerance, because he has no *experience* of such values. His emotions do not know what such values are, but he *imagines* them as so many 'weaknesses' precisely because the unprincipled offender appears to escape punishment through such 'weakness' on the part of society."

Jack Henry Abbott, *In the Belly of the Beast* (13)

By the end of "Violentization in Larger Social Context," Athens revamps and extends his original model in order to illustrate the entrenchment of violent acts and actors in communities at large. Admittedly informed by the journalist-turned-sociologist Robert Park,⁵⁹ Athens delineates the fundamental patterns of three prevailing or definitive societal communities: "civil minor," "turbulent minor," and "malignant minor." Beyond appraisals of their residential dominance engagements and respective degrees of socialization, Athens echoes yet another French philosopher—this time the author of *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault⁶⁰—in verifying that man-made institutions in particular serve to supply the groundwork "from which all communities are constructed, demolished and reconstructed" (Athens, "Violentization in Larger" 20). In the end, it remains the overwhelming incongruity that exists between how community members allege their institutions function and how they operate in actuality that serves to legitimize both a philosophical charge and a criminological point of entry.

Athens insists that his revised model remains specifically motivated by Park's environmentally informed conception of what broader societal

communities must consist of: "Every community has a location, and the individuals who compose it have a place of residence within the territory which the community occupies" (Park, *Human Communities* 181). Park had actually anticipated the core of Athens' future designation of the phantom community when, upon living in Chicago in 1914, the transitioning societal profiler urged his readers to recognize that a community is not "merely a physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the people who compose it, it is a product of nature and particularly of human nature" (Park, *The City* I). Prompted by such irrefutable truths, Athens extends that assertion by reinforcing that people's vital processes are always accompanied by conflicts that arise and transform into dominance engagements.

Whereas civil minor communities institute non-violent dominance engagements to resolve potential confrontational situations, turbulent minor communities institute either violent or non-violent dominance engagements to resolve or perpetuate confrontations ("Violentization in Larger" 23, 29). Conversely, malignant minor communities exist as the most dangerous of all societal constructs as they institute the violent dominance engagement to perpetuate all confrontations ("Violentization in Larger" 26). Middle-class realists would therefore do well to consider civil minor communities to be utopian and turbulent minor communities to be those in which they themselves reside. However, while Athens believes that malignant minor communities are embodied by society's impoverished ghettos and crime-infested vicinities, he has neglected

to reveal the authentic malignant community wherein state-sanctioned virulence is created as necessity and patrimonial legacy alike.

Not surprisingly, *the* authentic malignant community is the authentically microcosmic institution that Jack Henry Abbot infamously referred to as the belly of the beast—the modern-day prison. However, in order to understand why even Athens himself would have hesitated to draw a truly authoritative correlation between the authentic malignant community and the contemporary penal community, one has to consider an act of metamorphosis that would take place outside the walls of official criminological enquiry.

In his groundbreaking work from 1978 entitled *The Victim as Criminal and Artist*, H. Bruce Franklin recognized the importance of incarcerated makeshift profilers who have undergone both physical and artistic violentization prior to becoming unequivocal experts in the field of penal analysis.⁶¹

Many important figures in European and American literature have been incarcerated as criminals: Socrates, Boethius, Villon, Thomas More, Cervantes, Campanella, Walter Raleigh, Donne, Richard Lovelace, Bunyan, Defoe, Voltaire, Diderot, Thoreau, Melville, Leigh Hunt, Oscar Wilde, Jack London, Agnes Smedley, Maxim Gorky, Genet, O. Henry, Robert Lowell, Bertrand Russell, Brendan Behan, Chernyeshevsky and Dostoevsky, Stalin and Solzhenitsyn, Christ and the Marquis de Sade. There is certainly nothing unusual about activists and writers being imprisoned as criminals, and, as we have seen, quite a few imprisoned

criminals have become authors. (233)

In 1998, Franklin tactically updated past assertions in *Prison Writing in 20th Century America*,⁶² subsequently revealing the specifically cohesive subsection of convict literature that, according to this investigation, purposefully transforms into corroborating evidence by the exclusive practitioners of an authentically hardened brand of malevolent analysis:

True, there have been many eminent individuals prison writers from other countries, such as Boethius, Cervantes, Campanella, Thomas Moore, Walter Raleigh, John Donne, Richard Lovelace, John Bunyan, Daniel Defoe, Leigh Hunt, Oscar Wilde, Maxim Gorky, Chernyeshevsky, Dostoyevsky, Solzhenitsyn, Francois Villon, Voltaire, Diderot, the Marquis de Sade, and Jean Genet. But unlike the works of these individuals, modern American prison writings constitute a coherent body of literature with a unique historical significance and cultural influence.

(1)

Indeed, unlike sociology, psychology, criminology, or even traditional penology, no field other than hardened criminology—exclusively comprised of the interconnected American prison-writers who have lived with and/or as violent offenders both inside and outside of malignant (penal) communities—can offer lucid, accessible, creative and above all, intrinsically corroborative verifications based on relevant first-hand experiences with microcosmic violence and the coaches who perpetuate such.

Upon its initial release in 1964, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* was hailed as the pioneering effort of hardened criminology and, in conjunction with the ill-received political anxiety awakened by both the Viet Nam War and escalating prison populations (Franklin, *Prison Writing* 11-12), had tactically transformed into a makeshift phantom consultant for caged American artists ready to embrace their interpretive roles as societal profilers. Indeed there exists a profound reason why the list of twenty-three inspirational makeshift phantom consultants from over the last two centuries presented in chapter three includes nine artistically offensive manifestations by international prison writers. However, due to the fact that Abbott's *In the Belly of the Beast* was the only piece of hardened criminology acknowledged or suggested by Lentricchia and McAuliffe, let us herein identify through yet another chronologically-illustrative sampling the most compelling and cohesive of hardened makeshift-phantom-consultants: Malcolm X's *Autobiography* (1964), Malcolm's Braly's *On the Yard* (1967), Eldridge Cleaver's *Soul on Ice* (1967), Etheridge Knight's *Poems from Prison* (1968), Robert Beck's *Pimp: The Story of My Life* (1969), Paul Mariah's "Quarry/Rock: A Reality Poem in the Tradition of Genet" (1969), George Jackson's *Soledad Brother* (1970), Edward Bunker's *No Beast so Fierce* (1973), Miguel Pinero's *Short Eyes* (1974), Angela Y. Davis's *With My Mind on Freedom* (1974), Piri Thomas's *Seven Long Times* (1974), Malcolm Braly's *False Starts: A Memoir of San Quentin and Other Prisons* (1976), Edward Bunker's *The Animal Factory* (1977), Jack Henry Abbott's *In the Belly of the Beast* (1981), Nathan

Heard's *House of Slammers* (1983), Assata Shakur's *Assata* (1987), Jerome Washington's *Iron House: Stories from the Yard* (1992), Sanyika Shakur's *Monster: The Autobiography of an L.A. Gang Member* (1993), Dannie Martin's *Committing Journalism* (1993), Mumia Abu-Jamal's *Live From Death Row* (1995), Patricia McConnel's *Sing Soft, Sing Loud* (1995), Leonard Peltier's *My Life is My Sundance* (1999), Jimmy Santiago Baca's *A Place to Stand* (2001), and Jimmy A. Lerner's *You Got Nothing Coming* (2002).⁶³

As authenticated by the above listing of prolific contributors, constituents of hardened criminology are unique in that they serve to represent communities comprised of incarcerated or previously incarcerated males and females, political and non-political prisoners, as well as African Americans, Muslim Americans, White Americans, Hispanic Americans, Jewish Americans, and Native Americans. That such a convergence of criminal artists manages to crystallize as the birth of corroborative makeshift profilers, despite the perpetual racial tensions that permeate all minor communities and irrespective of any individualized hidden agendas, insinuates that society's malevolent preserves of restricted power do not waste their time discriminating. Instead they target each one of us equally.

Therefore, whereas both Sartre and Athens have wisely relied on the confessionals of prisoners in order to arrive at significantly parallel truths, the former has purposefully delineated the renowned life and works of an introspective criminal artist via Jean Genet whereas the latter has mistakenly extracted interpretive data from arguably premature prison narratives via

interviews with incarcerated case studies solely equipped to reiterate and, at best, question manifestations of authentic violent behaviour.⁶⁴ Once again, hardened criminologists are not only equipped to reiterate and question, like case studies, but to recreate and unmask. as artistically virulent profilers, society's *authentic* violent coaches.

In civil and turbulent minor communities, the ruling group achieves power through veiled acts of legislative coercion. In malignant communities, the ruling group achieves power through an amalgamation of physical and psychological coercion. However, since the strategic objectives and desired outcomes fuelling both of these dominance engagements emulate one another, does makeshift repetition not beget makeshift repetition? "Dominance," Athens reminds us, "is the universal principle on which all social experiences, institutions, and in turn, communities are ultimately based" ("Violentization in Larger" 21). For those exclusive individuals who transgressively desire to maintain their elevated ranks in and on the existent hegemonic power structure, nothing works to their advantage more than making the seemingly free citizens of a nation think that they can bypass violentization—particularly since we have been created to stridently impart or silently condone systemic coaching upon conception.

In 1971, Robert Beck, the notorious American pimp-turned-profiler, had managed with precision to call out society's authentic violent coaches in his collection of essays entitled *The Naked Soul of Iceberg Slim*.⁶⁵ Removing the duplicitous patriarchal veneer of the subjugators and culprits in question, the

hardened criminologist cogently asserts:

The irony is that the cynical clique of ruthless men who masquerade as champions of justice and humanity are really the architects of repression and murder at home and abroad. Cops and prison guards are the ruthless slaves and shields and the victims themselves of these viciously cold-blooded men who perhaps become emotional only when their power is threatened. (136)

Thus contemporary American prison writers have tactically followed the phantoms of corruption and hypocrisy until hitting a seemingly impenetrable wall. However, through overlapping accounts, manifestations, and transformational utilizations of the power hierarchy, these prolific criminality experts communally indict the very forces that Athens merely gestures towards.

This gesture becomes amplified in “Gender and The Politics of Punishment” wherein the editors of *Prison Masculinities*, Don Sabo, Terry A. Kupers, and Willie London, present a tangible model of the contemporary American inter-prisoner power hierarchy—in and of itself an authoritatively magnified version of the hegemonic superstructure at work in all inhabited communities (Gramsci 190-221):

DOMINANT PRISONERS[:] Tough Guys with the Capacity and Willingness to Use Violence to Get What They Want[.] PRISONERS WITH RESOURCES[:] Stand-up Guys, Gangs, and Inmates Who Can Move within the Prison, Operate in the Prison Economy Because of Their

Access to Drugs and Contraband, and Carry Out Contracts, Assaults, and Extortion Schemes[.] WEAKER. STIGMATIZED PRISONERS[:] Snitches, Homosexuals, Sex Offenders, Child Abusers, Bitches, and Punks (Sabo, Kupers, London 9)

Based on the eternal utility of this structure, it becomes easy to fathom how Europe's Jean Genet had little choice but to allow his own sexual predilection, smaller physical stature, and sheer inability to perpetrate successful physical violence to collectively contribute to his incontestable position at the bottom. As Sartre readily affirms: "It is sufficient for this community to reject him and for Genet to want to be adopted by it all costs. In the past, the child tries to love his judges. This theme is immediately inverted to become that of resentment" (*Saint Genet* 429). Thus the premier existential profiler confirms the grander significance of a devastating societal allocation, as well as its enduring influence on a violent offender's and a virulent artist's developmental process.

Genet's "dominant prisoner" from his 1949 play *Deathwatch* had symbolically embodied the institutionalized product of a malignant conversion—"You might even call him a Green Eyes with a coat of shoe-polish, Green Eyes with a smoke-screen, Green Eyes covered with mud, Green Eyes in the dark" (106-107).⁶⁶ Despite international corroboration, though very much so in the vein of Genet's evidentiary findings, two of America's most notorious hardened criminologists, San-Quentin-Prison-Writers Malcolm Braly and Edward Bunker,⁶⁷ were branded government property long before the age of consent. Abandoned by

his parents as a teenager, Braly spent his adolescent years in juvenile facilities and by the age of forty had spent seventeen years behind bars (Lethem xii). Deserted by his mother when he was four, Bunker still holds the distinction of being San Quentin's youngest convict upon entering at age seventeen (Styron x). Beyond accepting the penal complex's intestinal composition as a genuine reflection of their own learned natures, both men have endeavoured to convey that experienced convict chameleons or "dominant prisoners" earn positions of power within the confines of the authentic malignant community by systemic mimicry—through achieving favourable standing with immediate officials and through manipulating, controlling, and/or dominating fellow prisoners.

Athens stipulates that "it is the ultra-violent and violent persons who rise to the top and marginally violent persons who sinks to the bottom of a malignant minor community's dominance order" ("Violentization in Larger" 27). After probing the timeless inter-prisoner power hierarchy and its purposeful utilization in Braly's calculating novel *On the Yard* as well as Bunker's equally tactical work *The Animal Factory*, an undisputed legacy of violence reveals itself to be nothing more than an incorporation of self and societal deceptions. Braly describes his "ultra-violent criminal" Chilly Willy as a young veteran of the prison system at twenty-six and a seemingly permanent criminal intent on replicating the violent routines his state-sanctioned coaches have perfected. As both virulent artist and virulent perpetrator, Braly knows his anti-hero only too well. In *The Victim as Criminal and Artist*, Franklin presents the similarities between character and

creator by interjecting overlapping details from their criminal careers:

Chilly, like Braly, had been involved with crime from his youth, beginning with the burglary of a store. A few months after his release from reform school, he “staged a string of armed robberies with two other boys,” covering three states and ending in a running gun battle, not totally unlike Braly’s own youthful spree. Like Braly and his two companions, Chilly and the other two boys “were sent to prison in the state of their arrest, and upon completion of that sentence they were extradited home in chains to be tried for the robberies they had committed before they left” (193). Chilly is paroled at age twenty-four, “a two-time loser with almost seven straight years of reform school, county jail and prison behind him.” [...] When he is sent back to prison, he is classified as a habitual criminal. (199)

As per the unofficial rules that govern any hardened criminologist’s purposeful correlation of the authentic malignant community and the inter-prisoner power hierarchy, those who are reliant upon Chilly Willy for his goods and services, as well as those who cannot protect themselves from his control, can be classified as “weaker, stigmatized prisoners.” Accordingly, those who take orders from Chilly and follow out the array of tasks associated with his prison-yard enterprises can be classified as “prisoners with resources.” Chilly himself exists as an unequivocally “dominant prisoner,” a self-sufficient gangster and prison-house magnate who deftly “controls a small empire of cigarettes, pharmaceutical

narcotics, and petty bureaucratic favors, orchestrated by a routine of minimal violence and, as his name suggests, maximum cool” (Lethem viii).

Ironically, Chilly is in charge of the very illegalities that government officials and corporations have been accused of controlling, albeit from plush executive offices opposed to enclosed gravel yards. Nevertheless, the dominant prisoner’s overall profits pale in comparison to the funding authentic malignant institutions procure on an annual basis.⁶⁸ Upon her own release from the prison vortex, Angela Y. Davis would call out the lucrative double standard by stating that today’s prisons are “becoming an integral part of the U.S. economy, which means that there are stakes other than anti-crime stakes that keep the prison industry expanding” (*Prison Industrial Complex* 13). Consistent with Foucault’s hypothesis that the human body can be transformed into both an “object” and a “target” of power, one must always be weary of “the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces” (*Discipline and Punish* 136). Dead-set on not becoming one of the commodities, Chilly decides that rather than turn his body into a “property” he will transform it into a “strategy” involving “manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, [and] functionings” (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* 26). In short, true chameleons will learn to emulate the controlling techniques implemented by their captors in order to control the makeshift captives of their own design.

By creating a dominant prisoner in his own image, Braly grants other makeshift profilers a rare gaze into authentic keepers and reapers and hence the

techniques imparted by authentically-malignant violent coaches and their victims. For example, Chilly remains an individual who, like any dominant government power, protects himself and his criminal clique—yet he also remains an individual who, like any dominant government power, will inevitably terrorize the weaker individuals outside of his protection. Fittingly, in *On the Yard*, Braly's symbolic characterization of the authentic violent coach who supersedes the highest level of the power hierarchy is San Quentin's Head-Guard, who remains more than happy to be a silent partner receiving a large percentage of Chilly's illegitimate profits. The Lieutenant is also eager to remind Chilly that, despite any possible delusions, those who have created the power hierarchy always work to ensure that dominant prisoners never become remotely stable. Therefore, when the corrupt official asserts his dominance by instructing Chilly to slow down "production," his calculated response reveals what Braly as prolific hardened criminologist has learned about the futility of possessing provisional control under the reign of permanent rulers:

"Well, then." Chilly said, automatically assuming his educational voice, "strictly to facilitate the continuation of your meteoric rise through the department, and because we're such tight buddies, you can't expect a man to straighten up his hand if you don't give him any room to hope in. Now, that's me. You show me where I can make an A on that great report card in the sky, and I'll listen. I won't like it because it's not my game, but I'll listen, and if you can make sense maybe I'll play. But you can't do that. I

don't see any light and there aren't any windows you can open for me. But

I'm not crying, so why should you care how I amuse myself?" (96)

Of course, Olsen's sardonic answer cuts to the heart of the matter: "I'm told it hurts our image" (96). Maintaining the institution's image not only supplants justice but perpetuates those illusions and façades that lead us to believe that malevolence is only perpetuated by those who exact detectable violent force.

The magnitude of a hierarchical microcosm within a microcosm becomes subtly exposed when one of Chilly's "prisoners with resources" agonizes over his fluctuating hierarchal status after sitting down to break bread with the gang's ranking members:

They squatted down on their heels like Yaquis, the open package of rolls in the center. There were eight rolls, two apiece and two left over. The arithmetic was of vital interest to Red. He wasn't able to enjoy the roll he was eating because he was afraid he was going to have to settle for two rolls while the others ate three apiece. It wasn't just his hunger, and he was hungry, but each time he sloughed off with the short end of the goodies his place in the group was clearly defined for the moment — a mascot, or a pet. Under this pressure he remembered an entertainment he had planned, and he took a coverless magazine from his pocket. [...] Opening it to a photograph he passed the magazine to Chilly. (89)

The quiet control achieved over one of his top men reinforces the extent of Chilly's true power. Surely a man such as Red resembles the brand of pseudo-

Sartrean actor for whom Nietzsche makes allowances, those individuals “who are denied horns or the sharp fangs of a beast of prey with which to wage the struggle for existence” (*On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense* 875). Moreover, regarding relationships that are both formed and forged in confinement, the hardened criminologist Derrick Corley reports that most prisoners establish ties “with other prisoners for two main reasons: for protection, being part of a group or ‘crew’ is stronger and safer than being alone; and for convenience, to pool resources and connections so that they can do a better ‘bid’” (106). Red’s paranoid fear of being watched and policed by Chilly only illuminates the dominant prisoner’s strategic gaze and reign over the rolls/roles of his prisoners with resources.

Athens warns: “If marginally violent people remain in malignant communities for too long, they may be sooner or later brutalized, which could split their *selves apart* at the seams” (“Violentization in Larger” 27). Through omnipotent supervision, Chilly maintains his own elevated ranks by anticipating that inevitability and thereby existing as a frightening parallel to that which has been the most effective governmental device to eternalize humankind’s tyrannous nature, namely, surveillance (Parenti 131). Foucault has noted that the utilization of surveillance itself can be traced back to the nineteenth-century use of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison system where cells were situated around one central watchtower from which a supervisor or guard could observe the inmates yet the inmates could never be exactly sure when or where they were being

watched—inevitably leaving them to “probe” themselves (*Discipline and Punish* 202). That surveillance exists as an unmitigated instigator of veiled dominance engagement remains a fact confirmed by Red’s assessment of his makeshift competition as well as the steadfast principles fuelling supply and demand.

“The military is based on guile,” says Sun Tzu. “Acts due to advantage, / Transforms by dividing and joining” (27). The same techniques and strategies accompanying the dominant soldier or the dominant convict suggest that any shape-shifting commander, penal, subcultural, societal, governmental, or presidential, actualizes successful dominance engagements through amalgamated manifestations of physical and psychological warfare. By the end of *On the Yard*, Chilly makes one crucial mistake in that he accumulates so much illusionary power that systemic phantoms decide to take it all back. Chilly’s relationship with a “weaker, stigmatized prisoner” normally ends after a transaction or service. However, the prison administrators decide to overthrow the dominant prisoner by situating an extremely amenable homosexual prisoner in his immediate space. As the prison administrators know only too well, the installation of a receptively gay convict in the previously one-man pod carries the same consequences of dangling raw meat in the face of an emotionally-starved Rottweiler: the mad dog will bite and when he does there will be blood. Once again, this correlation can only be confirmed by those who have experienced or witnessed this dynamic first-hand. As the former political activist-turned-hardened criminologist Mumia Abu Jamal authoritatively elucidates in “Caged and Celibate:”⁶⁹

At one level, homosexual relations reflect and reproduce pecking orders of dominance and submission among the prisoners themselves. At another level, savvy administrators look the other way on such couplings, because they can utilize these relationships to extend their control. (140)

How do the interchangeable keepers and reapers conquer the interchangeable keeper and reaper? They clearly tantalize Chilly with the one commodity that he cannot procure, an emotionally charged relationship fuelled by acts of physical coercion and mental submission.

That Braly's hardened manifestation permits a weaker prisoner at the bottom of the power hierarchy to contribute to a dominant prisoner's downfall demonstrates the futility of residing within a model crafted by sinister coaches with vested interests. In his own aptly-titled work *The Animal Factory*, Edward Bunker tactically presents a more seasoned rendition of Chilly Willy in Earl Copen, a prison-house chameleon created in the virulent artist's own malignant image:

Copen was serving his third term in San Quentin, having come the first time when he was nineteen, and he sometimes felt as if he'd been born there. If he'd ever conceived eighteen years ago that he'd be in the same place at thirty-seven, he would have killed himself—or so he thought sometimes. He was as comfortable as it was possible to be, and still he hated it. (19) [...] Earl had several vocabularies and selected the one he wanted according to whom he was talking to and what it was about. He

could use this soft, twangy voice and exaggerate it to buffoonery—or, he could give off the obscenely vicious radiations of a rabid doberman. (74)

Indeed, as with Malcolm Braly and Chilly Willy, Edward Bunker and Earl Copen maintain their own undeniable semblances. Moreover, like the background he would create for his symbolic anti-hero, Bunker's own corrupted youth was spent behind the hardened and padded walls of state-run orphanages and juvenile facilities. In the introduction to Bunker's autobiography, William Styron provides an ample springboard for the biographical parallelisms:

Bunker[/Copen] was in and out of foster homes and military schools, from which he began to run away with determination augmented by an obstinate antiauthoritarian streak well developed even at that early age. At eleven he was committed briefly to Camarillo State Hospital for observation, and a year later he was sent to juvenile reform school at Whittier. [...] Twenty-nine days into freedom he was caught trying to rob a liquor store and was shot (though not seriously wounded) by the owner. This crime gained Bunker[/Copen] a sentence to the youth prison at Lancaster, even though he was considerably younger than the legally mandated age of eighteen to twenty-five. (x)

Based on Bunker's own verifiable interactions with countless prison guards and administrators, readers are granted an all-access pass into the behind-the-scenes show illegitimately controlling the authentic malignant community. As with Braly's Chilly, investigating the relationships between Earl (dominant prisoner)

and a ranking prison official (violent coach), the young men in his crew (prisoners with resources), as well as a newcomer to the prison environment (weaker, ostracized prisoner) reveals the ancient spokes of patriarchal duplicity in motion. “For Edward Bunker,” writes Franklin, “the criminal achieves victory over society by fulfilling his own character to the utmost, something which Bunker has achieved more successfully in art than in life” (*Victim as Criminal* 266). This existential assessment of the author’s mission only highlights the contemporary *raison d’être* fuelling artistic violentization and, for a select few, hardened criminology.

The specific relationship between Earl and the high-ranking Lieutenant Seeman, the convict’s direct jailhouse supervisor, once again serves to reveal how both lawmaker and lawbreaker emulate one another without necessarily intending to do so. “It was an odd friendship,” writes Bunker, “the former submarine boss who epitomized Middle America and the hard-core convict so ravaged by moral confusion that he believed in nothing except personal loyalty” (*Animal Factory* 43). Unlike Braly’s Lieutenant Olsen, Bunker’s Lieutenant Seeman has interests beyond extracting profits from Earl’s prison-yard ventures. That both men are white in a prison full of predominantly African-American convicts allows for common biases to establish the prejudiced tie. When a violent sex offender named Buck Rowan attempts to dominate a fresh fish who is under Earl’s panoptical protection, the maladjusted osmosis of interchangeable keeper and reaper exposes itself. Subsequent to the attempted rape, Earl successfully perpetrates a

dominance engagement against Rowan and is subsequently sent to isolation for both his stabbing and hospitalisation. Lieutenant Seeman proceeds to look the other way when Rowan's IV tube becomes mysteriously spiked. Due to the fact that Rowan is a sex offender and, more importantly, that Earl will owe the lawman a significant favour, Seeman feels entirely comfortable playing the part of a criminal. Accordingly, if his own peers question him about the incident, he can simply maintain a patriarchal status quo by denying involvement regardless of culpability. (In fact, he might even turn to Bunker's stock answer from *Education of a Felon*: "I didn't see nuthin'; I didn't hear nuthin'; I don't know nuthin'" (263)).⁷⁰ Once again, Bunker's Earl has mastered the penal power dynamic by monitoring privileged officials such as Seeman—however, privileged officials such as Seeman have created the penal power dynamic and thereby control dominant prisoners such as Earl.

Regarding the community's "prisoners with resources," the influence Earl holds over his crew resembles the influence attained by any quintessential jailhouse chameleon in that by utilizing surveillance on objects and targets, true knowledge—and hence true power—*seemingly* belong to the dominant prisoner alone. When two of Earl's men, T.J. and Bad Eye, threaten not to follow orders until curiosities about an impending race war are entirely satisfied, Earl tactically sidesteps repercussions by pretending to identify with their concerns while actually sizing up the potential for a dominance engagement. Bunker consequently allows his semi-fictitious lead to interpret his own malignant

community members: “Earl was capable of violence as the answer to any problem. T.J. was less quick but relentless; Bad Eye was more explosive but could be reasoned with after the first blaze of temper” (*Animal Factory* 34). Since all individuals bound to power models must either know their place or risk falling off altogether, Earl as a provisional General anticipates his created soldiers and they predictably relent.

Upon assuming what Sun Tzu refers to as a deliberately “unfathomable” course of action, the dominant prisoner eventually attempts to invert the inter-prisoner power hierarchy by superseding his own authority and helping a “weaker, stigmatized prisoner” named Ronald Decker successfully escape from San Quentin without any reverberations. However, that Earl decides not to leave with Decker only reinforces that dominant prisoners atop the power hierarchy can be manipulated into believing that makeshift power actually counts for something tangible. (“Earl turned away, then snorted an ironical laugh. ‘Aw, fuck it [...] I run something around here’” (Bunker, *Animal Factory* 202)). Regarding the perpetual nature of this logic, Athens verifies that “although the faces of the people occupy the top and bottom rungs of any pecking order change, a dominance order of some type or another always remains” (“Violentization in Larger” 22). The incentive to stay in prison for a dominant prisoner such as Earl has been authoritatively amplified in great detail by hardened criminologists who still realize that microscopic interpretations remain vital to our understanding of the West’s violent mirroring of hierarchal powers.

Why Athens remains quick to discredit any practitioner who cannot speak on or to violence authoritatively is somewhat baffling.⁷¹ Until he himself resides in the authentic malignant community without a visitor's pass, any gauging of pure expertise should be left to authentically hardened criminologists alone. It remains these profilers who not only work but live to reveal precisely the same brand of hypocrisy and violence that American prison writers had been documenting since the earliest of slave narratives (Franklin, *Victim as Criminal* 3).⁷² In *On the Yard* and *The Animal Factory* specifically, Malcolm Braly and Edward Bunker veil insightful verification on violence and power in order to protect themselves and their peers from those allegedly civil community members who continue to have the most to lose. As Sanyika Shakur confirms in his 1993 memoirs: "My consciousness about the larger enemy was being raised bit by bit. Why wouldn't someone want us to learn about who we really are?" (232). An abhorrently "civil" implementation of the (aptly dubbed) 1977 "Son of Sam" law and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 540.20(b)—the latter stipulating that an "inmate may not receive compensation or anything of value for correspondence with the news media" (Franklin *Victim as Criminal* 15)—are demonstrations of some of the coercive techniques implemented by authentic violent coaches who need to keep true identities at bay.⁷³

However, legislative powers do not replace acts of physical and psychological coercion altogether. In his 2002 prison-memoirs entitled *You Got Nothing Coming*, the Jewish-American prison-writer Jimmy A. Lerner

purposefully describes a convict referred to as Big Hungry, a three-hundred-and-fifty-pound African-American sexual predator who has been set loose by officials in order to terrorize a Nevada prison's general population. A ranking administrator who believes that Lerner has disrespected him in the past purposefully misleads Big Hungry into believing that Lerner has been hitting on the violent predator's love interest. If not for a last minute intervention by two other prisoners, Lerner would have been tactically destroyed by the powers that be on account of their utilization of a corporeal commodity (Big Hungry) transformed into a microcosmic weapon of mass destruction. Imparting the consequences of provoking authentic violent coaches who control hierarchical positioning and hence physical safety, Lerner as hardened criminologist lucidly recalls: "The Hunger is lifting me right off my feet—by my neck. A massive right paw pulls back to center a killing shot to my dome lights" (174).

If hardened criminology can, in fact, be legitimately discredited, why do sanctioned officials do everything within their power to silence incarcerated profilers before evidentiary manifestations are made available to anyone other than malignant community members? Answers should be evident at this stage of the present investigation. Athens thus incorporates a rather naïve recommendation that not only bypasses legitimate conspirators but actually requests assistance from the veiled violent coaches who perpetuate violentization in malignant communities:

[It] serves the long-term interest of members from all our minor

communities, including those from the most refined, civil ones, to support the search for and development of programs to help transform malignant minor communities into civil ones. (“Violentization in Larger” 37)

Legitimate powers do not dominate unless they maintain panoptical control. If Athens had interviewed genuinely reflective hardened criminologists as opposed to interviewing undemanding hardened criminals, the symbolic interactionist would have been reminded that there will never be enough power to go around.

This chilling admonition remains horrifically evident as it conjures those ageless phantoms of *the* authentic sinister design, the inter-prisoner power hierarchy that existed in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany.⁷⁴ Consider the following amalgamation of the inter-prisoner structure that existed at the Dachau concentration camp and the inter-prisoner power hierarchy that exists in America today:

GREEN TRIANGLES / DOMINANT PRISONERS

(Criminals. Kapos. and Dignitaries) / (Tough Guys. Violent Guys)

YELLOW STARS AND RED TRIANGLES / PRISONERS WITH RESOURCES

(Jewish Prisoners and Political Prisoners) / (Stand-up Guys, Gang Members, Connected Inmates)

PINK TRIANGLES / WEAKER. STIGMATIZED PRISONERS

(Homosexual Prisoners) / (Snitches. Homosexuals. Sex Offenders. Child Abusers, Bitches, and Punks)⁷⁵

As Athens claims, violent models might very well be created. Still, the most consequential and malignant of structures are clearly perpetuated.

Corroborating evidence from Martin Sherman’s 1979 play *Bent* serves to

reinforce the homosexual prisoner's (or pink triangle's) flailing position at the very bottom of the inter-prisoner power hierarchy.⁷⁶ Reminiscent of Braly's depiction of Red's anxiety over his rolls/"roles," Sherman's depiction of a concentration camp's mess-hall illuminates an ageless pecking order through a clear-cut serving process:

The KAPO wears a green triangle on his prison uniform. Prisoners come up, one by one, with bowls in their hand, to be fed. They all wear prison uniforms. [A PRISONER with a yellow star enters. The KAPO stirs the soup. He fills the PRISONER's bowl. The PRISONER leaves. A PRISONER with a red triangle enters. The KAPO stirs the soup. He fills the PRISONER's bowl. The PRISONER leaves. [A PRISONER with a pink triangle] enters. The KAPO does not stir the soup.]

HORST: Only soup. You skimmed it from the top. There's nothing in it but water. No meat, no vegetables...nothing.

KAPO: Take what you get.

HORST: [Reaches for the ladle.] Give me some meat.

KAPO: [Pushes him back.] Fucking queer! Take what you get! (36)

This scene (and immediate situation) has been confirmed by the makeshift German profiler Heinz Heger,⁷⁷ who in *The Men With The Pink Triangles* provides first-hand insight into the ageless power hierarchy and thereby specifically reveals what society's authentic violent coaches continue to be governed by:

Our block senior and his aides were “greens” — that is, criminals. They looked it, and behaved like it too. Brutal and merciless towards us “queers,” and concerned only with their own privilege and advantage, they were as much feared by us as the SS. (34)

Priceless commodities such as “privilege” and “advantage” are the authentic goods that keep civil and turbulent communities from desiring to aid malignant communities in an authentic manner. Abu-Jamal, originally incarcerated for attempting to convert his own malignant community in the ghettos of Philadelphia, has insisted: “Repression is not change, it’s the same old stuff” (“B-Block Days and Nightmares” 354). No hardened criminologist has refuted that emulating violent coaches, even those who the Allies *allegedly* despise, only preserves those techniques that continue to keep power eternally reserved.

Athens concedes that “although civil major and minor communities are always preferable to malignant or even turbulent ones, they are now far from perfect in their operation” (“Violentization in Larger” 38). The hardened criminologists have not only reported that they are far from perfect but, in reality, authentically malignant. That the power structure existent in contemporary America perpetuates the backdrop for precisely the same type of dominance engagements once permeating the makeshift and man-made institutions of Germany should not be shocking but rather disturbing. Nevertheless, for those who choose to remain weary of hardened criminology’s practitioners based on deceptively official judgements imparted by dominant others—and thereby permit

society's authentic violent coaches to maintain their collectively iniquitous gaze—then perhaps a final verification should be made by the only makeshift profiler accepted by creators, perpetrators *and* residents of malignant communities. During the final stages of Hitler's reign of terror, once America's most renowned and respected lawman, Sing Sing Prison's Warden Lewis E. Lawes—the premier makeshift profiler to identify a prison as its own interpretive community⁷⁸—painstakingly acknowledged that the misleading governmental men who sanctioned his own rise to power were in fact “proud” to emulate the most sinister model known to mankind. As Lawes-Biographer Ralph Blumenthal had reported in *Miracle at Sing Sing: How One Man Transformed The Lives of America's Most Dangerous Prisoners*:

And who were those, he asked, who hid behind the magic word “peace”? Who could not be for peace? And on whose terms? [...] There could be peace—a monstrous peace—in the vast prison house Hitler had made of Europe. And so, he warned, a domestic fascism was afoot in America, fermented by traitors backing Hitler who called him invincible, worth doing business with, sentiments that meant only one thing, Lawes said:

They wanted him to win. (270-271)

Adolph Hitler, *the* malignant makeshift-phantom-consultant after *Mein Kampf*,⁷⁹ only appears to be dead and gone since both his societal and microcosmic models of evil, the violent structures and the violent coaches, remain perfectly intact.

Authentic dominant coaches will continue to bank on our mass caging of

personal liability. Sartre was not merely being optimistic when he espoused: “The right-thinking man shuts himself up in a voluntary prison and locks the door, but his stubborn freedom makes him leave by the window” (*Saint Genet* 25). Athens should know that in an effort to combat the authentic phantoms of systemic power, their help cannot be enlisted. We must embrace and engage the first-hand experiences of hardened criminologists for it remains our condemned profilers alone who authoritatively and authentically represent society’s revelatory models of created violence.

Conclusion

“Violence violates the self. Yet that’s exactly what the system believes in, what the system preaches, what the system practices: violence. Certainly I believe in the necessity of fighting the system, and in the necessity of self-defense, but I’m *not* going to employ the same tactics and methods the system uses every day. Why replace the system with the same thing?”

Mumia Abu-Jamal, *Death Blossoms* (100)

“At last, without his knowing how, departure became possible. He was able to go out, and began to walk in a state of oppressive well-being which covered over eddies of limitless hatred. When he had gone thirty meters he stopped. ‘I left the door open on them.’ He retraced his steps. As he drew near, he felt sobs rising, becoming knotted in his chest below his throat, and remaining there. He shut his eyes, drew the door shut. The lock clicked: locked. He started off again. ‘It’s not finished. It’s beginning...’”

André Malraux, *Man's Fate* (271-72)

The scope of this thesis has been interdisciplinary in nature as it proceeded to unmask the legitimate interlocutors responsible for both aggressive human performance and imaginatively aggressive expression. Situating Sartre’s existential acts of metamorphosis within Athens’s developmental stages of violentization has legitimately equipped dissimilar ontological profilers with the tools necessary to explicate the phantoms that could be argued to haunt all dangerously violent manifestations. In order to accurately assess those isolated individuals merely incapable of creating physical violence, as well as those virulent artists eager to create violence through alternative outlets, a simultaneous amplification to both Sartre’s Other and Athens’s phantom community revealed the crucial situational motivators imparted by makeshift phantom consultants. Their communal existence has been suggested by disparate media-violence researchers over the past century and their identity remains fuelled by what Lentricchia and McAuliffe designate as transgressive artistic desire.

This project has also confirmed that hardened criminologists immersed in

the malignant microcosms of society provide the substantiated evidence required to forge ahead in seizing the duplicitous designs of our man-made institutions. That the same governing conventions apply to both societal and phantom communities reinforces that duplicating sinister models remains entirely customary. Note the universal testament by makeshift profilers in the vein of Sanyika Shakur: "I did not start this cycle, nor did I conspire to create conditions so that this type of self-murder would take place. My participation came as second nature" (138). Once again, authentic violent coaches remain the allegedly civil community members who clearly shroud models of violence at home and abroad in order to ensure that tangible power never becomes allocated equally.

An integrative melding has thus permitted profilers to demonstrate how a resurrected brand of existential criminology serves to demystify corresponding propellers behind physical, systemic, internalized and, of course, artistic designs of manifested evil. Genet's criminal philosophy has been corroborated by Sartre, whose existential theory has been verified by Athens, whose criminological model has been amplified by hardened criminology, whose authentic corpus of evidence brings us back to Genet. Prior to elucidating feasible connections and implementations based on the symbolic interpretations of evidentiary findings, it is worth reassessing the subject and subjects of culpability.

Regarding individual freedom, Richard Restak's moderator queries of Athens: "So I take it that you would not agree that there is a 'Mark of Cain,' a tell-tale neurologic sign by which potentially violent people can be identified? Or

that a person's brain organization predetermines their propensity for violence?" (Restak 81). By now, combatants of bad faith should be prepared to anticipate the symbolic interactionist's commonsensical response: "Since human beings are normally aware of at least some of the contingencies that confront them in any situation, they can always exercise some degree of control over their conduct" (Restak 82). Athens proceeds to stipulate that a choice to engage in violent action is arrived at after a consultation with internally significant accomplices who serve as phantom community members. Consequently, upon detecting interior culprits, it does remain possible to escape intimate interlocutors and thereby claim responsibility for entirely conscious acts.

In order to arrive at 'I *am* my choices,' Sartre originally argued that, regardless of the perpetual presence of the antagonistic Other, one's primary and secondary group members can be anticipated as makeshift captors and thereby eluded. Thus the existential profiler's fittingly foretelling terminology underpins a preventative indictment: "If the phantom persists, it becomes flat, ineffectual: I know that it comes from me" (Sartre, *Saint Genet* 364). Genet, upon tactically recognizing and then breaking away from his malignant phantom community, confirms the Sartrean directive through Green Eyes's dramatic confession: "If I say 'my crimes,' it's because I know what I'm saying. I say 'my crimes.' And no comments or I might get nasty" (*Deathwatch* 108). For the individual who escapes into the isolation of imagination, who circumvents human phantom community members and assumes makeshift phantom consultants in their place,

undeniably, the same extent of culpability remains. As always, the creation of violent intent does not require the participation of human coaches alone.

However, regarding the culpability of those who perpetuate artistic violentization through the creation or promotion of makeshift phantom consultants, the issue of responsibility is by no means self evident. While an imaginary act of violence would seem to be entirely less harmful than a physical act, it certainly remains possible for one virulent artist's creative ferocity to beget actual destruction by more than one isolated audience member. At the same time, to curb or set legitimate restrictions on artistically violent artwork remains an unmistakable nod towards authoritarian censorship. As dissimilar criminologists over the decades such as Athens and Samenow have argued, clearly, there remains an overwhelming number of people who do not transform fictional characters into significant phantom consultants. Therefore, this pivotal issue ultimately comes down to whether or not the entertainment-oriented desires of the many should be sacrificed for the potentially transgressive desires of a few. According to Grossman, even an imbalanced trade-off remains well-worth the inconvenience: "As we now reap the tragic harvest of our past impotence, we know in our minds and hearts that we cannot afford to go down the same road as before" (118). Indeed, both the creators and the distributors who continue to profit off of imaginary violence cannot allow the freedom of individual expression to overtake a conscious obligation to prevent physical harm inspired by their products.

Subsequently, regarding the relationship that exists between individual culpability and those who disseminate systemic violentization, a patrimonial legacy of quiet consent continues to dominate resoundingly. In *The Satanic Bible*, followers are asked to consider: “If humans ceased wholly from preying upon each other, could they continue to exist?” (LaVey 3:4).⁸⁰ The answer is of course ‘yes, however, not as comfortably.’ Turbulent community members do not have the courage or desire to address makeshift demons to a sufficiently revelatory degree; and symbolic prisoners-with-resources, caught in the middle of hierarchical power, cannot afford the inconvenience. Athens contends that it is entirely unfathomable to believe that individual community members who support the authentic violent coaches of society do not implicitly “brutalize each other” by default (“Violentization in Larger” 39). Once again, the relationship between individual culpability and those who perpetuate systemic violentization has always been rooted in resurrected models of emulation. As a result, any implementation that serves to feasibly combat violent situations must also work to legitimately dismantle violent institutions.

Sartre’s own admittedly fluctuating stance on solutions to man-made violence confirms that feasible philosophical implementations and feasible policy-based implementations are not synonymous offerings. In *Sartre and Violence: Curiously Ambivalent*, Ronald Santoni substantiates the existential profiler’s oscillation:

In some of Sartre’s early writings, he clearly took a stand in opposition to

violence and tried to show how it was anti-community. Then he moves on to speak of violence as though it's a unifying thing. Then he moves clearly in the direction of justifying violence. (183)

Perhaps this cyclical account reaffirms the existential psychoanalyst's fundamentally ontological goal of profiling concretely through individualized stages of metamorphosis—not curing or rehabilitating ineffectually through institutionalized models of power. In spite of this question mark, Sartre could have been defending himself upon rationalizing in *Saint Genet* when he declares:

One must will an act to the very end. But the act is alive, it changes. The goal one sets at the beginning is abstract and consequently false. Little by little it is enriched by the means employed to attain it, and ultimately the concrete goal, the true goal, is what one wants at the *finish*. (582)

Thankfully, Sartre's words *and* actions had spoken volumes when the existential criminologist declined the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1964. Honouring both the experiences and the evidentiary findings of makeshift convict profilers, he rationalized to critics: "A writer must refuse to allow himself to be transformed into an institution" (Haught n. pag.). Of course, this directive does not reveal an implementation so much as it does a purposeful direction in which to look for viable solutions; hence, to combat malignancy authentically, we must rely on those who authentically combat malignancy as second nature and who symbolize the inverse of Sartre's directive—virulent institutions that transform into writers.

While the cohesive body of work created by contemporary American

prison-writers remains a logical source for the undeviating implementations required herein, it is in fact a subsection of hardened criminology, hardened political activism, that serves to supply bona fide solutions for diffusing violent situations and dismantling violent institutions. A hardened political activist can be defined in one of two ways: either as a hardened criminologist who transforms into a campaigner for mass societal reform while immersed in the authentic malignant community or as a hardened criminologist involved in political activism before entering prison who comes to view the authentic malignant community as a microcosmic model of what (and who) should be dismantled. Malcolm X, Angela Y. Davis, Mumia Abu Jamal, Jarvis Masters, Marilyn Buck, and Stanley 'Tookie' Williams are merely a handful of the representative makeshift campaigners recognized for their contributions to hardened political activism.⁸¹ As Franklin elaborates in *Prison Literature in America*:

Now we have two overlapping groups of prison authors; the political activists thrust into prison, and the common criminal thrust into political activism. The distinction between these two groups tends to dissolve as the definition of crime, from both sides of the law, becomes increasingly political. (242)

Fuelled by transformation and amalgamation, incarcerated or previously-incarcerated political activists and their policy based discourses extend observations beyond the realm of recognition into the territory of implementation. In lieu of correlations from the previous chapter between hardened criminology

and symbolic interactionism, it is not surprising that hardened political activists inadvertently serve to confirm, illuminate and/or discredit Athens's own proposed implementations.

For instance, in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals*, Athens endeavours to present a "violent crime control policy" intended to prohibit individuals from entering into the developmental stages of violentization. Insistent that all community members directly involve themselves in the termination of violent individual creation, Athens nonetheless promotes a limiting or "selective rehabilitation" process aimed at transforming "*only* nascent criminals into non-criminals before they become hardened criminals" (*Creation of Dangerous* 98). Consequently, he argues for violent coaching to be dismantled and replaced with affirmative role models whose non-violent acts of tutelage would likely parallel the strategies observable within Vygotsky's aforementioned Zones of Proximal Development. However, in *Violent Criminal Acts and Actors Revisited*, Athens amplifies his initial findings and thereby inadvertently evokes vital directives that makeshift political activists have authentically corroborated since Alexander Berkman's *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist*.⁸²

Rhodes offers a concise summary of Athens restorative call to action:

Efforts to reduce family violence, to reduce school violence, to offer non-violent coaching such as training in negotiation, anger management and conflict resolution, to discourage bullying, to offer (non-violent) mentoring of children at risk, to discourage violent coaching of school

athletes, to improve child welfare, to counsel belligerent young people, to support gun control, to dissolve or pacify street gangs and many more such antiviolent initiatives should be effective. (*Why They Kill* 317)

By discounting the interpretive power of the makeshift phantom consultant, Athens has obviously neglected to address the curbing of artistically violent manifestations created by media and/or entertainment outlets. Once again, for the sake of communal tranquility, this remains a deadly occlusion lest we forget the creation of the Son of Sam, John Lennon's killer, the Columbine tragedy, etc. However, that Athens clearly demands for the mass rehabilitation of cycles is to be commended. In order for there to be an end to violent primary group members, undeniably, there must first be an end to a patrimonial lineage of violence and values. Seizing upon the created violence that exists in and through the intertwined institutions mentioned above, the symbolic interactionist justly promotes alternatives that symbolically attempt to nip aggressive manifestations in the bud.

Gesturing towards the primary individuals and institutions responsible for propagating violence confirms that only implementations accounting for synonymous reflections can be considered authentic; and only *hardened* authentications incessantly arrive through political activists born and bred in volatile conditions. Upon being immersed in the authentic malignant community, makeshift implementers attain microcosmic vantage points that serve to enable philosophical assessments as well as theoretical alternatives. The incarcerated

political reformist Eldridge Cleaver had addressed the amalgamated violent individual/institution in great detail.⁸³ In 1968, after arguing that any community's hierarchy can veil "a trigger-happy social order," the former Minister of Information for the Black Panther Party observed that society's extended version of the inter-prisoner power hierarchy needed to undergo a radical reconfiguration. In *Soul On Ice*, he manages to emphasize the undeniable futility of relying on systemic leaders who have always profited off of our incessant acts of bad faith: "The Omnipotent Administrator starts with a basic 'anti' reflex. Any liberality he might show is an indication of the extent to which he has suppressed his 'anti' reflex, and is itself a part of his lust for omnipotence" (Cleaver 180). Once again, Athens paradoxically looks towards the individuals who violently supervise said administrators for the rehabilitative means required for legitimate transformation.

In contrast, hardened political activists verify that in order for non-violent models to become viable, those who sit atop the power hierarchy must first be thoroughly dethroned by any means necessary. In *Blood in My Eye*, the hardened political activist George Jackson reminded his audience of the perils attached to waging war on ageless generals: "They know how to hold on to their privilege, could they have held it this long otherwise? We are being repressed now. Courts that dispense no justice and concentration camps are already in existence" (46).⁸⁴ Why would disparate makeshift profilers in the vein of Sartre potentially argue for violence to end violentization? Due to the fact that authentic violent coaches perpetually refuse to relinquish any of their hierarchical power or positioning.

Recent hardened practitioners, picking up exactly where makeshift profilers like Cleaver and Jackson left off in the 1960s and 70s, still verify the same acts of “deliberate indifference” by allegedly civil community members who feign efforts to end violent cycles.⁸⁵

Dannie ‘Red Hog’ Martin’s revelatory essays from the 1980s and 1990s on veiled governmental tortures earned the hardened political activist state-sanctioned penalties and reprisals that included “being thrown in the hole, deprived of writing materials, and then transferred to a remote prison in the Arizona desert” (Franklin, *Prison Writing* 337). As an incarcerated journalist-turned-profiler, Martin paid dearly for recognizing a caveat that transforms conventional solutions into naive pipedreams: until we all take an active role in assuring the installation of legislators authentically willing to make equitable concessions, our communities shall remain as warped and futile as the vested interests fuelling all models of violentization. Unfortunately these words have stood the test of time and their continuous challenge remains costly. In turn, the hardened political activist Leonard Peltier, arrested in 1975 after the Pine Ridge Lakota massacre in South Dakota (Matthiessen 169), would only evoke the wraith of omnipotent administrators and false politicians upon choosing to fight for the rights of native community members in both the United States and Canada.

Surveying both the individual and the institutional degrees of failure regarding the transformation of violent phantoms worldwide, Peltier concludes his 1999 memoirs *Prison Writings: My Life Is My Sundance* with two hauntingly

compassionate imperatives:

Let us forgive the worst among us because the worst is in ourselves, the worst lives in each of us, along with the best. Let us forgive the worst in each of us and all of us so that the best in each of us and all of us may be free. (214)

All learnt hypocrisies aside, we know ourselves to be not only institutionally but individually complicit in perpetuating those who dominate ineffectual models and programs that have never been designed to succeed. Consequently, transforming authentic violent coaches into authentically-civil community members remains as an exercise in futility until we consciously choose to annihilate the very collusion that systemic bullies anticipate and require.

Lest we forget the dangers of leaving a quest for non-violence to those who have never had a legitimate interest in universal harmony, the hardened political activist should symbolically rest atop our new inter-communal hierarchy; the hardened criminologist should symbolically occupy the second tier of responsibility; and everyone else as makeshift existential profilers and communal anchors should be accountable for ensuring our model's integrity. The logic that fuels a radical metamorphosis or departure from the existent structure has fittingly been aforementioned by Sartre: "This game of hide-and-seek will end only when we have the courage to go to the limits of ourselves in both directions at once" (*Saint Genet* 599). By simultaneously embracing the hardened criminal artists and rejecting the artistry of systemic criminals, what could we possibly have to lose

that has not already been taken from or by us? In order for quiet consent to find itself replaced by strident rebellion or perceptible results, the tiers of power *must* be occupied by society members qualified to play their parts—by those who can legitimately speak to the conditions of individuals plagued by violent phantoms, violent communities, and violent selves.

Finally, this project would be remiss not to include or address that which has consistently served as the most violent of institutions or makeshift systems—the family unit. If hardened political activists, hardened criminologists, and makeshift existential profilers could occupy a new communal structure of developmental interaction, unquestionably, each level's efforts would need to be directed toward ensuring that all violent coaches become removed or reassembled so that positive coaching via Vygotsky's Zones of Proximal Development can assume a fixed position. In addition, makeshift phantom consultants cannot be allowed to develop into intimate interlocutors by isolated individuals who do not have the support or attention of family members. All eliminatory strategies must be implementations that everyone—existent as primary group members for *somebody*—authentically strive toward in order to install themselves as affirmatively non-violent phantom-community members in the future.

In *American Superrealism*, Jonathan Veitch dutifully warns of the dire ontological consequences attached to shirking ethical responsibilities: "In the absence of any catharsis, the mind takes revenge on itself with a relentlessness that ends in nihilism" (131). In other words, the longer others are allowed to

assume our own roles and responsibilities is the closer one gets to being completely powerless and invisible. Considering that Sartre and Athens rely on makeshift prison narratives in order to arrive at significant interpretations of violent phantoms and actors remains an auspicious indication of the fact that textual sources and first-hand references by experts are not only existent but riddled with implementations that should have been learned by now. Undeniably, just as violent phantoms will only be combatable once they are recognized as such, non-violent implementations will only be powerful when information has been made accessible to all.

Notes

¹ The American experimental-psychologist B.F. Skinner discarded Freudian tenets and felt that an individual's choices, violent or otherwise, came to be proceeding the learned consequences of experiencing those choices first-hand. The British psychologist Hans Eysenck believed that "a combination of hereditary and environmental factors" could be attributed to criminal behaviour (quoted in Innes 202). However, he, like Skinner, also realized that many individuals were capable of engaging in criminality proceeding rational interpretations of potential gains and losses.

² In 1876, Cesare Lombroso, who had conducted the majority of his experiments in Italian prisons, authored *L'Uomo Delinquente*, a work wherein dissimilar criminal actors are alleged to be detectable upon examination of physical attributes such as the skull, nose, cheekbone, and ears. Lombroso actually attempted to correlate specific physical features to specific criminal professions.

³ Blumer's understanding of symbolic interactionism, an ideology deep-rooted in William James' pragmatism, involves the meaningful dealings between individuals as they strive toward gaining knowledge of their immediate selves within specific social contexts. Blumer posits three core principles in order to illuminate his theory, namely, "meaning," "language," and "thought." Individuals interact with one another based on the meaning they allocate unto one another; language provides individuals opportunities to communicate with others through a negotiation of signs and signals; and thought serves to transform individuals' interpretations of signs and symbols after assuming different vantage points (Griffin 18).

⁴ The Austrian born Gross was a professor of criminology and penal law who is regarded as the first makeshift profiler to buttress the significance of criminal profiling as an all-encompassing holistic technology.

⁵ While this thesis subscribes to the works and philosophies of the French theorist Michel Foucault and in particular *Discipline and Punish*, dissimilar ontologically-minded academics have consistently *over*-relied on Foucaultian ideologies in order to fortify individualized postulates surrounding power and privilege or lacks thereof. Although status quo for philosophical and literary specialists, criminologists and concrete practitioners have every right to question or challenge—as they have with Sartre's verbosity—what appears, at select times, to be intentional obscurities. Nevertheless, the fourth chapter of this investigation will include an application of Foucault's hypothesis that human bodies can be altered into weapons and targets of systemic powers-that-be.

⁶ Like Blumer before him, Athens would come to rely on Mead, a social

psychologist at the University of Chicago, whose presupposition was that human actors undergo stages of evolutionary development. In *Mind, Self, and Society*, Mead writes: "Human society as we know it could not exist without minds and selves since all of its most characteristic features presuppose the possession of minds and selves by its individual members" (227).

⁷ In his last will and testament, the Marquis de Sade readily confesses and thereby provides an elucidation: "Imperious, choleric, irascible, extreme in everything, with a dissolute imagination the like of which has never been seen, atheistic to the point of fanaticism, [...] kill me again or take me as I am" (222). Indeed, the principle of delicacy only applies to the individual who desires to live in the fantastical or imaginative as opposed to the mundane or real.

⁸ De Quincey was a critic and essayist who remains best known for his 1822 autobiography *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*. In "Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts," he tactically endeavours to bestow true aestheticism unto any introspectively virulent manifestation—be it painting or murder—that serves to provoke a significant sensory reaction.

⁹ Prior to his assassination, El Hajj Malik El-Shabazz evocatively foreshadowed his fate: "I know that societies often have killed the people who have helped to change those societies" (389). Transcribed by Alex Haley and integral to any inclusive or authentic study of race or power relations in Western society and beyond, Malcolm's life story remains a symbolic warning to contemporary Americans and the symbolic muse for American prison writers. Irrefutably, the demagogue's confessional serves to underpin the importance of anticipating veiled enemies at all costs.

¹⁰ In 2001, The Joseph Bell Centre for Forensic Statistics and Legal Reasoning was formed in the hopes of amalgamating research, development, and implementations that will benefit the future of criminal justice science and practice. Bell, who met Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in 1877, was extremely well known for being able to deduce his patients' routines, livelihoods, cultural influences, and sometimes even their names (*The Sherlock Holmes Society of London*, 2004). One of Bell's contemporaries, the French scientist Edmond Locard, remains highly regarded by evidence technicians and profilers. Locard's "principle of exchange" serves to demonstrate how organisms that come into contact with one another inevitably transmit and/or leave identifiable particles. In Stephen White's fictional novel *Cold Case*, in a chapter entitled "The Dead French Detectives," the clinical psychologist pays tribute to the scientific profiler's overarching approach by introducing a fictitious organization named "Locard," a crime prevention unit dutifully comprised of law enforcement officials, forensic specialists, special prosecutors, and disparate philosophical

“others” (12).

¹¹ Originally tagged “The .44 Caliber Killer” by members of the press, Berkowitz actually dubbed himself “Son of Sam” in a letter received on April 17, 1977 by Captain Joseph Borelli of the New York City Police Department’s “Operation Omega” Task Force. Berkowitz’s murderous rampage took the lives of six people between July of 1976 and July of 1977, a statistic he subsequently blamed on Satanic possession after his arrest. However, in a 1979 interview with the FBI’s Richard Ressler, Berkowitz reportedly admitted to fabricating his “devil-made-me-do-it” defence after admitting that killing women simply turned him on sexually. In the book *Whoever Fights Monsters*, Ressler—who is clearly familiar with Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good & Evil*—devotes a section to Berkowitz and how the overwhelming media attention he received only served to propel further violent acts.

¹² Existentially speaking, the concept of bad faith involves more than inauthentic acts or self-deceptive behaviours. Acts of bad faith parallel deliberate refusals to acknowledge human freedom.

¹³ Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis should not be confused with the existential psychoanalysis attributed to the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, who, in his 1963 work *Being in the World*, relies on Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (‘being there’ or ‘existing’) and discards traditional science. Binswanger took a special interest in the interpretations of mentally ill patients and his goal was to release them from the burdens accompanying their disorganized modes of being-in-the-world.

¹⁴ Ovid’s ageless creatures live on in the aesthetic realms of Kafka and Sartre both. Kafka’s “The Metamorphosis,” first published in 1915, would inadvertently serve to inspire the philosophical musings of Sartre considering the non-fictitious Jean Genet becomes a symbolic bug long before the fictitious Gregor Samsa undergoes the same creative transmutation. Kafka’s “The Judgement” and “In the Penal Colony,” written two years prior to and four years proceeding “The Metamorphosis,” were also transformed by Sartre so as to provide correlative backdrops (and borrowed titles) for Genet’s existential biography and development.

¹⁵ The two basic modes of existence, being “in-itself” (en-soi) applies to the existence of non-conscious objects whereas being “for-itself” (pour-soi) relates to conscious beings and freedom. When the for-itself negates the in-itself, a move towards authenticity has been made. Therefore, if an individual’s mode of being is in-itself, acts of bad faith are imminent (May 12-14).

¹⁶ Bio-physiological theories from Mednick's "Biology and Violence" have been tampered with by Athens, who transforms the scientist's major findings on children's autonomic nervous systems and potential connections to violent criminality. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, in contrast, concern themselves with an individual's socio-environmental factors and Athens's framework thereby could have derived from the sociologists' decisive observation: "We are lead back to the external social environment as the area where the causative key to aggression must at present be found" (143).

¹⁷ Lombroso's physiognomy would not have been possible if it were not for the Italian prisoners he autopsied in the 1870s. Indeed, prisoners' minds and bodies have been utilized by completely dissimilar criminological profilers in their quests to arrive at the root causations of deviant behaviour. Even Patricia Jacob's contested research in the 1960s on X and Y chromosomes chiefly relied on the genes of Scottish prisoners. (The magnitude of extracting revelatory evidence from prisoners' minds and bodies has been elucidated further in this investigation's fourth chapter).

¹⁸ Cooley, the son of a prominent judge, was a University of Michigan sociologist who allowed his own personal experiences with primary group members to dictate the course of his life and work. In a letter to his mother, he writes: "I should like as an experiment to get off somewhere where Father was never heard of and see whether anybody would care about me for my own sake" (315).

¹⁹ As the novice existential criminologist succinctly clarifies in the abstract preceding his academic paper: "Man is viewed as essentially free of any deterministic forces or elements and he is free to choose his existence, to change his existence, or to remake his nature" (Sapp I). This statement is not wrong, however, it is incomplete. Sapp, who deserves credit for making an intrinsic connection between existentialism and a functioning line of criminological questioning, does not identity any other external forces or interlocutors and thereby makes a theoretical connection that, prior to an inclusive integration of Athens, remains inconclusive.

²⁰ There have been many unauthorized conclusions and solutions offered up by academics and analysts in the name of Sartre's specific philosophy. However, Sartre himself emphatically reiterates that *his* existential psychoanalysis does not offer individuals finite solutions or cures. The goal of Sartrean profiling is to help patients disseminate the changing signs and symbols in their lives so as to reveal but not restore authentic consciousness and freedom. Moreover, it is the individual alone who possess the best vantage point from which to makes authentic observations.

²¹ Barrett's *Irrational Man* was first published in 1958 and remains one of the most lucid and accurate examinations into the root of existential thought. My own project primarily relies on scholars who were also contemporaries of Sartre (like Barrett, Cranston, Barnes, May and Girard) since viable applications should be indicative of clear and accurate disseminations arrived at with Sartre's overarching situation and condition in mind—as opposed to the postmodernist trend to simulate or regurgitate without regard for intelligibility. For instance, while Ronald Santoni's 2003 book *Sartre on Violence* has been recognized in order to fortify a point, other recent instalments including George Cotkin's *Existential America* (2003), Ian Birchall's *Sartre Against Stalinism* (2004) and Thomas Flynn's *Sartre: A Biography* (2004), as well as Yiwei Zheng's *Ontology and Ethics in Sartre's Early Philosophy* (2005) are not credited herein since they contain mundane, incorrect, repetitive and/or manipulated applications that Sartre would not automatically subscribe to if he were alive today.

²² J. Harold Ellins's four-volume tome *The Destructive Power of Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* serves to reinforce, in a truly historic and holistic fashion, the intrinsic relationship between religious and violent practices.

²³ Athens posits “that whenever people undergo dramatic personal change [...], or else live or work in a community in which they are ‘social misfits’ for too long, then they will inevitably suffer from at least some personal disorganization” (“Violentization in Larger” 7). More than anything else, dramatic self- or personal change will be undergone in verifiably drastic or intense circumstances.

²⁴ The 1992 and 2003 documentaries *Aileen: The Selling of a Serial Killer* and *Aileen: Life and Death of a Serial Killer*, as well as the 2003 film *Monster*, depict Wuornos's true crimes, trials and tribulations prior to her execution by the State of Florida in 2002. A first-hand account was finally provided by Wuornos herself in the posthumously-released 2004 autobiography *Monster: My True Story*.

²⁵ According to Hazel Barnes, the Jonah Complex remains for existentialists an “irrational desire to assimilate and to identify with oneself either the object of knowledge or a beloved person” (“Key to Special Terminology,” 803). Clearly, violent coaching has the potential to be readily embraced by novices since lessons are being imparted by assumed “role models” in the truest sense of the term.

²⁶ Upon his division's capture in June of 1940, Sartre began composing *Being and Nothingness* under legitimately dismal conditions in a German prison camp.

²⁷ When in the existential mode of “Being-for-Others” (être-pour-autrui), an individual resides outside of self as an assumed object for others. For Sartre, to exist for others will equate to incessant discord of self since the for-itself attempts to reclaim itself by advertently or inadvertently making an objects out of others.

²⁸ The applicability of *The Art of War* to fields other than military warfare has been confirmed by its appearance on disparate course syllabi from departments of philosophy, history, literature, business, and athletics.

²⁹ The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan posits the “Gaze” as belonging to the object rather than the subject. For the existential analyst, writes Barnes, being the object of an other’s gaze inevitably evokes feelings of indignity (“Introduction” xxxix).

³⁰ Sartre’s creative pieces, be they novels or plays, are always symbolic soundboards for his philosophical contentions. Whether it is the dramatic character of Orestes challenging mighty Zeus or the paradoxical Garcin playing a part and knowing the price, Sartre’s facts cannot be hidden by his fiction.

³¹ Gothic literary creations in the vein of Matthew Lewis’s *The Monk* serve to provide an enduring theme: More haunting than an unspeakable crime remains an unknowable perpetrator. Indeed, whereas tales of horror readily award culpability to an array of supernatural elements, our authentic demons insist on tormenting the contours of tangible freedom.

³² Grossman begins his barrage of rhetorical questions by alluding to none other than the slasher-film icon “Freddy Krueger” (played by Robert England), who made his first appearance in Wes Craven’s 1984 film *A Nightmare on Elm Street*. Freddy quickly developed into a staple of popular culture and bad dreams alike due to his ghastly reappearances in seven back-to-back *Nightmare* instalments culminating in the 2003 collaboration *Freddy Vs. Jason*.

³³ There is no originality to be found in the statement: “All religious texts were written by human forces with vested interests.” However, since too many individuals still refuse to believe that fact, realists have little choice but to repeat themselves.

³⁴ All eleven of the essays that appear in Richard W. Kaeuper’s 2000 anthology *Violence in Medieval Society* serve to unanimously confirm an overwhelming dependence on brutal practices in relation to human interaction, survival, and routine.

³⁵ Criminal profilers within the FBI’s Behavioral Science Services

(established at Quantico's FBI Academy in 1972) follow five specific analytical "stages" prior to the apprehension of violent actors: "profiling input" and collection; "decision process models" and organization; "crime assessment" and reconstruction; "criminal profile" and correlation; as well as "investigation" and revision (Innes 96).

³⁶ Explicitly graphic games (like *Doom*), musicians (like Marilyn Manson), and films (like *The Basketball Diaries*) have made their makers and distributors hundreds of millions of dollars. However, in the incessant game of 'risk vs. reward,' we are just as culpable as the corporations bringing these phantoms to life.

³⁷ "Eventually I crossed that invisible line of no return," confesses the Son of Sam. "I did not know that bad things were going to result from all this" (Berkowitz, 1999, n. pag.). To ridicule organizations such as *Media Power for Children*, the *Center for Media Literacy*, the *National Coalition on TV Violence*, or the *National Institute on Media and the Family* only perpetuates dangerous models and profitable designs. Clearly, primary group members *should* have enough sense to realize that extreme isolation and violent displays can only equal future acts of devastation.

³⁸ Mark David Chapman stood outside and waited for John Lennon at The Dakota, the musician's residence located on the corner of 72nd Street and Central Park West in Manhattan. When Lennon emerged, Chapman opened fire.

³⁹ The anti-social Holden Caulfield remains a prominent and archetypal loner of Western literature and culture. A prognostic passage from *The Catcher in the Rye* eerily serves to provide the interpreted part that Chapman ultimately chose to accept and pull-off: "What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they start to go over the cliff—I mean if they're running and they don't look where they're going I have to come out from somewhere and *catch* them" (Salinger 173).

⁴⁰ Sartre's *The Words*, initially published in 1964, remains a unique and pivotal work in that it serves as the French philosopher's existential analysis of self. Accordingly, posited tools for a phenomenological self-examination are not only contained in this autobiography but symbolically put to work through first-hand evaluations of immediate and repetitive confrontational situations.

⁴¹ Thomas Wolfe—who is not to be confused with Tom Wolfe, the author of 1968's *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test* and 1998's *A Man in Full*—became prominent in 1929 upon the publication of *Look Homeward, Angel*, his first of four major autobiographical novels. The Southern author's printed words have not

only served to motivate but direct makeshift human profilers. The French-Canadian Wolfe-specialist Steve Bordeau has insisted that Wolfe “made” him interpret others’ confessionals by supplying a point of view that only ontological detectives can provide: “In that exits are entrances and vice versa” (n. pag.).

⁴² Sartre clarifies in his 1950 study into the French poet, drug addict, and self-confessed “demon” Baudelaire: “When he found himself abandoned and rejected, Baudelaire chose solitude deliberately as an act of self-assertion, so that his solitude should not be something inflicted on him by other people” (*Baudelaire* 18). Accordingly, when Baudelaire consciously chooses isolation, he simultaneously abandons the probability of significant consultations with anything other than makeshift phantoms.

⁴³ In Shakespeare’s 1603 play, Hamlet’s father, the King of Denmark, has been murdered by Hamlet’s uncle, the new King of Denmark, who marries Hamlet’s mother, the immobile Queen. Of course, Hamlet’s hesitation to avenge his father’s untimely death by means of violence surely incensed the blood-thirsty audience members of Elizabethan England, just as it would the trigger-happy audience members of today.

⁴⁴ The “fatality” that Genet speaks of can be associated to Sartre’s postulate of the “fatal instant” in *Saint Genet* wherein a “living dead man” symbolically serves to die over and over again by consciously choosing how to overcome the incessant arrival of confrontational situations despite the existence of others and the anticipation of outcome: “One is still what one is going to cease to be and already what one is going to become” (*Saint Genet* 2).

⁴⁵ Sartre emphasizes both the creativity and assumed identities affiliated to Genet’s illegal break-ins by confirming that he also “indulged in play by spinning round among illustrious memories in order to change into a high-heeled lord” (*Saint Genet* 404).

⁴⁶ Athens hypothesizes in *The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminals* that “violent notoriety” and “social trepidation” are simultaneously experienced by the individual in question before the “culminating” plateau of “malevolency” can be reached (81).

⁴⁷ “I later had the greatest difficulty in overcoming their attitude,” admits Genet in regards to his adversarial audience and poem (*Saint Genet* 429). However, Sartre purposefully underpins that Genet’s audience had the greatest difficulty in overcoming *his* attitude: “With his prisoner’s outfit Genet creates a scandal: once again he is the Other, the black sheep, the Undesirable. Among the men in jackets [...] he is the Condemned Man whom they do not want to be.”

(*Saint Genet* 428).

⁴⁸ As Barrett confirms in *Irrational Man*: “For Sartre there is no unalterable structure of essences or values given prior to man’s own existence. That existence has meaning, finally, only as the liberty to say ‘No’” (244).

⁴⁹ Athens readily admits that his theory of violentization was virtually unknown before Richard Rhodes’s resurrection of the symbolic interactionist’s criminological opus in *Why They Kill*. The fourth volume in the *Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance* series (*Violent Acts And Violentization: Assessing, Applying, And Developing Lonnie Athens’ Theories*), published in 2003, was entirely devoted to the assessment of Athens’s evidentiary findings by means of dissimilar models and formulas relied on by the likes of criminologists, sociologists, neurologists, and even dangerous violent offenders.

⁵⁰ This investigation’s own “artistically-violent” developmental process clearly amalgamates the four stages of development as posited first by Sartre (on his own terms) and then by Athens (in his own terms) so as to arrive at both the causation of creative aggression and the making of makeshift phantom consultants.

⁵¹ As a poet, painter, playwright, author, actor, director, and designer, Cocteau was unlike men such as Freud due to the fact that first-hand experiences from disparate fields and outlets could be relied on and transformed effectively. Cocteau obviously believed that our conscious understanding of toxic, harmless and even neutral internal forces serve to permit an authentic backdrop for aesthetic confessional and thereby tangible revelation.

⁵² Based on the aforementioned design and purpose of Sartre and Athens’s correlative four-stage developmental processes, additions to titles of works or statements in works are based solely off of plausible and commonsensical substitutions that our investigation has thus far proven necessary. Unsound modifications have not been attempted or supported since specificity cannot be comprised.

⁵³ The Violent Socialization Scale tests the validity of Athens’ components when weighed against the experiences of institutionalized prisoners *and* college students.

⁵⁴ Any listing of transgressive artists and their works will always be indicative rather than representative. Once again, since the individual alone interprets the impact of the makeshift phantom consultant, the same artist or work can be deemed monumental or inconsequential.

⁵⁵ As Aino Konkka elaborates in “Power, Pride and Politics in Rap Music:”

Battle rapping is one of the oldest styles of rap. Two rappers would meet and start competing — remotely reminding one of the singing competition between Väinämöinen and Joukahainen in the Kalevala, the Finnish national epic. Battle rapping is based on spontaneity, verbal wit, imagination and quick reactions. Another, perhaps more sensible comparison could be the West Indian calypso competitions. Battle rapping may sound offensive, but it is significant as being a [physically] non-violent way of competing and getting rid of extra energy and frustration. (n. pag.)

⁵⁶ Marshall Bruce Mathers III, who performs under the stage name “Eminem,” became an instantaneous fixture in contemporary popular culture following the 1999 release of his first major album *The Slim Shady LP*. The semi-fictional film *8 Mile* parallels his real life to the extent that both he and the film’s protagonist, an emerging rapper dubbed “B. Rabbit” (who is perhaps the altered spirit of John Updike’s literary protagonist), have to “battle” their ways out of Detroit in order to escape turbulent conditions. Mathers, who was actually born in St. Joseph, Missouri, in 1972, has taken his painful and violent first-hand experiences, particularly those involving his absentee father, abusive mother, and unstable ex-wife, and transformed them into fuel for unabashedly graphic—and unbelievably profitable—lyrics.

⁵⁷ Nietzsche solidifies his abstract reliance on unconfirmed forces through the statement: “Providing one has the slightest remnant of superstition left, one can hardly reject completely the idea that one is the mere incarnation, or mouthpiece, or medium of some almighty power” (“Composition of Thus Spake Zarathustra” 201).

⁵⁸ In order to extract the aesthetic beauty from the horrific repulsiveness, Lentricchia and McAuliffe take a disconcerting approach to 9/11 by seemingly paralleling the way in which De Quincey’s fictitious critics approached the sensory evocations of murder and art. To justify their disconnected attitude, Lentricchia and McAuliffe callously reiterate that “for most of us [...] the thousands slaughtered are abstract. [...] We never really did, or ever really will, grieve for them, thought we may think we do so in the world made by Oprah” (*Crimes of Art + Terror* 5).

⁵⁹ Like Sartre, Park did not believe in passing moral judgements on the existence of environmental entities’ discernable patterns. Like Genet, Park was also a race-relations activist and concerned with systemic manipulations of social communities.

⁶⁰ Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* has been integral to countless contemporary works on power relations and, in particular, the prison system. However, first-hand accounts by those who have incessantly suffered the consequences of power/penal relations should be relied on much more significantly, as this investigation ultimately serves to demonstrate.

⁶¹ H. Bruce Franklin has been recognized by the majority of scholars in his field as America's foremost prison writing specialist and historian. In *The Victim as Criminal and Artist*, which was expanded in 1989 and re-titled *Prison Literature in America*, Franklin includes one of the most extensive bibliographies ever compiled on American prison narratives and authors.

⁶² Franklin's anthology *Prison Writing in 20th-Century America* has been configured as a chronological sampling of prominent prison writers who not only capture the encompassing prison conditions at various points in American history but also the timeless hypocrisies of American culture.

⁶³ The chronological listing of American prison authors has been compiled in lieu of extensive independent research. H. Bruce Franklin's contributions, Bell Gale Chevigny's *Doing Time* anthology, as well as private consultations with international prison-writing-experts including England's Howard Cunnell, Germany's Jan Alber, and Canada's Jason Haslam.

⁶⁴ The reliability of Athens's case studies are not being questioned herein, however, we must acknowledge that there exists an enormous difference between answers prompted by questions and confessionals prompted by revelations. Although Athens claims to have filtered out the unreliable or uninformative case studies through his own filtering out process (which presumably became more accurate with more experience), prison writers have taken it upon *themselves* to provide us with the evidence and data that makeshift profilers have been attempting to correlate since the days of Lombroso.

⁶⁵ Beck, who assumed the pseudonym Iceberg Slim in his days as a high-flying pimp on the streets of Chicago, has been regarded as one of the most influential prison writers of the late twentieth century due to his unique individual flare and enlightening lyrical aestheticism. These attributes are demonstrated evocatively throughout his corpus of work which includes the 1969 autobiography *Pimp: The Story of My Life*, the 1971 collection of essays *The Naked Soul of Iceberg Slim*, the 1977 novel *Long White Con*, and the posthumously-published 1998 novel *Doom Fox* (originally written in 1978). As a cultural icon and rhythmic mastermind, Slim inadvertently paved the way for the existence of rap as a musical genre in the early 1980s, a detail confirmed by rap moguls such as Ice-T (Tracy Marrow) and Ice Cube (Oshea Jackson), who have proudly

attributed their own stage names to the artist in question.

⁶⁶ Genet's play *Deathwatch* made its Paris debut in February of 1949. Green Eyes, an archetype of the amalgamated sinner and saint, figuratively spoke for Genet on the subject of crime and authenticity. He asks and then warns us: "Are you ready? Be careful. The axe is going to fall" (129). The Puerto-Rican-American prison-writer Miguel Pinero, a hardened criminologist out of New York State's Sing-Sing Prison, paid his tribute to Genet and Green Eyes in the award-winning 1974 play *Short Eyes*.

⁶⁷ Located in Marin County and opened in 1852, San Quentin exists as California's oldest functioning penal complex. In 1953, the prison's resident librarian, Herman K. Spector, compiled *San Quentiniana: Books Published by Officials and Inmates of San Quentin*. For a truly interesting perspective on San Quentin, refer to the hardened criminology posited by Jimmy Santiago Baca in his prison essay "Past Present," a piece that serves to relay the painful experiences of revisiting San Quentin to shoot the 1993 film (written by Baca) *Blood In, Blood Out*.

⁶⁸ According to the latest figures released by the United States Department of Justice: "State correctional expenditures increased 145% in 2001 constant dollars from \$15.6 billion in FY 1986 to 38.2 billion in FY 2001; prison expenditures increased 150% from \$11.7 billion to \$29.5 billion" (n. pag.). Going by the numbers, the American prison system continues to be the epitome of big business.

⁶⁹ Mumia Abu-Jamal (formerly Wesley Cook) remains notorious for speaking out on countless penal and systemic injustices as a makeshift prison journalist and hardened political activist. Prior to and upon his arrest in 1981 for allegedly murdering a Philadelphia police officer, Abu-Jamal, who has been petitioning to save his own life ever since a "death warrant" was signed in the 1990s, has written, recorded and released major works for public consumption including *Live From Death Row* (1995), *Death Blossoms* (1997), and *We Want Freedom* (2004).

⁷⁰ Bunker's autobiography has actually been published and marketed under at least two separate titles, *Education of a Felon* and *Mr. Blue: Memoirs of a Renegade* (the latter title an allusion to his role as "Mr. Blue" in Quentin Tarantino's 1992 film *Reservoir Dogs*). Bunker, who also wrote the existential screenplay for the 1985 film *Runaway Train*, concludes his memoirs with an optimistic vow: "A lotus definitely grows from the mud" (294).

⁷¹ Athens remains well known in the criminological community for

unabashedly attacking the credibility of fellow academics upon ascertaining that no genuine first-hand experiences with violence and/or violent actors has been undergone by the 'authority' in question. As he imparts to Rhodes in *Why They Kill*: "Academia is a world where lying is accepted" (268).

⁷² Two of the most influential American slave narratives remain 1845's *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave: Written by Himself* and 1862's unconventionally-titled *An Autobiography of Gerald Toole, the State's Prison Convict, who murdered Daniel Webster, Warden of the Connecticut State Prison, on the 27th of March, 1862 (Written by Himself) Being a Full Confession of Crimes for which he was sent to the State Prison....*

⁷³ In "The Resurrection of the Dangerous Classes," Jon Marc Taylor alludes to how many states force "civil commitment" programs on prisoners—civil commitment meaning "indefinite incarceration" (104).

⁷⁴ By May of 1944, six million Jewish people had been murdered by the underlings and instruments of authentic violent coaches in and outside of countless extermination cites throughout Eastern Europe. Virtually all of the concentration camps in Germany and Poland also housed non-Jewish communists, socialists, monarchists, homosexuals, gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, and commonplace criminals.

⁷⁵ The amalgamated representative structure of the correlative German and American power hierarchies has been derived from an amalgamation of Heinz Heger's first-hand experiences in *The Men With the Pink Triangles* as well as Sabo, Kupers and London's aforementioned configuration from "Gender and the Politics of Punishment."

⁷⁶ *Bent* is a dramatic portrayal of homosexual prisoners struggling to overcome the repercussions of their identities and inclinations upon being transported to the concentration camp at Dachau. Forced to endure the consequences of being located at the very bottom of the camp's power hierarchy, two of Sherman's main characters, Max and Rudy, meet with dissimilar fates due to conflicting ethical stances and unmatched survival skills. Sherman's theatrical production was debuted in London's Royal Court Theatre in 1979 and then moved over to Broadway one year later. (The moderately-successful 1997 screen adaptation of *Bent* was written by Sherman himself and stays true to the original script).

⁷⁷ Heger's depiction of the atrocities and hardships endured by homosexual prisoners in wartime Germany, like Gad Beck's heart-wrenching first-hand accounts in *An Underground Life: Memoirs of a Gay Jew in Nazi*

Berlin, serves to reveal a warped masculine code that has been systemically programmed into captors and captives alike.

⁷⁸ Lewis E. Lawes vehemently opposed the death penalty but still executed over three hundred men while acting as Sing Sing's warden. A man clearly torn between professional duty and personal honour, Lawes's cautious indecisiveness has been summed up in his 2004 biography: "*Treat a man like a dog and you will make a dog of him*. But what if you treat him like a man, he wondered, and he made a dog of you?" (Blumenthal 262).

⁷⁹ Over one and a half million copies of *Mein Kampf* were purchased in 1933. Today, Hitler's opus has served as a seminal guide and text for a countless number of neo-Nazis worldwide. Over eight hundred websites affiliated to prominent "White Power" organizations (including the National Socialist White People's Party, the Libertarian National Socialist Green Party, the American Nazi Party, the National Socialist Movement, the British Nazi Party, the Northern Alliance, the White Aryan Resistance, the Aryan Vanguard, Jew Watch, and Stormfront) continue to consult and/or plagiarize virulent passages from the dictator's memoirs. (The specific recruiting measures and techniques practiced by the violent coaches of wartime Germany *and* contemporary Western society are elucidated further in Rhodes's 2003 study "Violent Socialization and the SS-Einsatzgruppen").

⁸⁰ LaVey, who passed away in 1997, founded the Church of Satan in 1966 and wrote the definitive guide to his cult's daemonic practices and ideologies in 1969. Burton Wolfe's 1974 biography *The Devil's Avenger: A Biography of Anton Szandor LaVey* as well as Blanche Barton's 1990 biography *Secret Life of a Satanist: The Authorized Biography of Anton LaVey* are definitive looks at the iconic author, musician, philosopher, high priest, and ultimate con artist.

⁸¹ Prominent phantom consultants delivered by the likes of Malcolm X, Angela Y. Davis, and Mumia Abu-Jamal appear to be cited in anthologies and encyclopaedias as apparent rules of thumb (Franklin; Steck). Jarvis Masters's 1997 *Finding Freedom: Writing From Death Row*, Marilyn Buck's 1999 article "Prisons, Social Control, and Political Prisoners," as well as Stanley 'Tookie' Williams's 2005 memoir *Blue Rage, Black Redemption* are but a few of the pivotal hardened texts that authentic violent coaches should feel threatened by.

⁸² Berkman's final vow in *Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist* inspires the existential beginning that both Sartre and Genet would endeavour to embrace: "My resurrection, dear friend. I have found work to do" (515).

⁸³ In 1957, Cleaver was convicted of assault and banished for nine years to

two of California's most dangerous prisons, San Quentin and Folsom. During his incarceration, the former Black Panther subsequently developed original theories on revolution, race, and violence and created a philosophical doctrine that can still serve to fuel community members working together as one phantom force.

⁸⁴ Jackson's reference to the German concentration camps should not be taken lightly. On August 21, 1971, he was killed by prison guards in San Quentin after an *alleged* escape attempt.

⁸⁵ "Deliberate Indifference" is actually the title of an accusatory piece that received an honourable mention in the PEN American Center's 1993-1994 contest and was subsequently featured in Sabo, Kupers and London's *Prison Masculinities* anthology. The first-hand account was written by the now-deceased hardened political activist O'Neil Stough, who had documented the consequences of first-hand experiences (particularly with HIV-positive and AIDS-infected inmates) through highly-acclaimed journalistic confessionals. In the vignette "A Moment," Stough acknowledges our painstaking reflection: "I feel for both the savage beast and its frightened prey" (138).

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